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THE RECOGNITION AND EVOLUTION OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW:
LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND NORMATIVE
REFLECTIONS ON A FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Andrea M. Seielstad*
"It Is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent This is the general sense and the
general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the
union."
i
"[indian tribes are] distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights .... 2
"As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have
historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state
authority.... Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the
common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers."
3




The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a curious feature of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. It is a doctrine that has long and widely been
hailed in the United States as essential to the sovereignty of a nation or
state, transcending definitional categories and extending to the legal
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Dayton College of Law.
1. The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U. Press
1961).
2. Worcesterv. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
3. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 58 (1978).
4. R.I. v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1994).
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definitions of sovereignty developed with respect to many kinds of
sovereign entities.5 Firmly rooted in federal common law,6 the doctrine
of immunity protects the federal government as well as the states from
nonconsensual suit, except in certain narrowly prescribed
circumstances.7 Sovereign immunity also has been recognized under
5. By "definitional categories," I refer to those recognized with respect to different types
of sovereign entities. As set forth more fully below, sovereign immunity has been
recognized in the United States as inherent to the sovereignty of states, the federal
government, American Indian tribes, and foreign nations, each of which derives its
sovereign authority from different sources.
6. Compare Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 349 (3d ed., Aspen 1999)
("[Fledera common law" is "the development of legally binding federal law by the federal
courts in the absence of directly controlling constitutional or statutory provisions."), with
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881,
890 (1986) (Although she acknowledges that "[no definition of [the term] is inherently
incorrect, [Field chooses to] use 'Federal common law' to refer to any rule of federal law
created by a court.., when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal
enactments-constitutional or congressional."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1985) ("'Federal common law,'.., means
any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative text-
whether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a
conventional or an unconventional sense."). While the development of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity with respect to the states enjoys a dimension of constitutional
interpretation insofar as it may be linked to the Eleventh Amendment, as demonstrated
below, the doctrine of sovereign immunity predominantly has been recognized and
developed as a matter of federal common law.
7. For instance, federal and state immunity may be circumscribed by Congressional
abrogation or by voluntary waiver. With respect to Congressional abrogation, the Supreme
Court has limited Congress's power to abrogate state immunity to clear and unequivocal
waivers of state immunity enacted pursuant to Congress's enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (The
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to limit state sovereignty, and Congress can,
pursuant to that Amendment, "provide for private suits against the states or state officials
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."). Congress, however, may not
abrogate state immunity pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause. See
Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) [hereinafter College Savings n1 (holding that
Congress lacks power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
immunity to hold states accountable in federal court for patent infringements prohibited by
federal law).
In addition, the Court, while upholding the general principle that Congress may
abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, has struck down a series of
other Congressional efforts at abrogating state immunity pursuant to Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power by imposing stringent fact-finding
requirements on Congress. See e.g. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) [hereinafter College Savings III (false-advertising portions
of federal Trademark Remedy Clarification Act allowing suits against states improper
abrogation under the Eleventh Amendment because Congress failed to establish an
underlying substantive right with respect to trademark protection deserving of enforcement
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act constituted unconstitutional abrogation of
sovereign immunity on the grounds that age has not been recognized as deserving of the
most stringent constitutional protections and Congress failed to establish sufficient record
and pattern of age discrimination by states); Bd. of Trustees of the U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001) (Congress lacks Fourteenth Amendment power to waive state sovereign
immunity under the Americans with Disabilities Act because it failed to establish a
sufficient record and pattem of discrimination by states). State action that derogates
federal law may also be circumscribed through the filing of suits for prospective injunctive
relief against state officers. See infra n. 54.
[Vol. 37:661
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federal law with respect to foreign nation-states and American Indian
nation-tribes, entities that are external to the constitutional system of
government.
The principle of sovereign immunity is deeply imbedded in our
constitutional system of government and in the ordering of power and
relationships between the different sovereign entities such as American
Indian tribes and foreign nations, which intersect it. Jurisprudentially,
the doctrine has been established virtually as a sacrosanct corollary of
sovereign authority: namely, if an entity is recognized under federal law
as possessing an independent and inherent basis for exercising
sovereign authority, it will naturally be immune from suit unless certain
circumstances, also recognized under federal law, occur to abrogate that
immunity. As an interpretive matter, therefore, the recognition of
sovereign immunity and the force of law it is afforded depends
significantly on the extent to which an entity's sovereignty is recognized
as a matter of federal law. Principles of federalism and notions regarding
the proper allocation of power and decision-making authority between
the states, federal government, tribes, and foreign nations therefore
penneate and influence the law of sovereign immunity.
8
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has been active in
defining a kind of "new federalism"9 in which states have gained
8. By "federalism," I refer, throughout this paper, generally, to the allocation of power
between the federal and state governments. It has emerged as a distinct doctrinal area, a
blend of constitutional law and federal common law. Considerations of separation of
powers, or the allocation of power between the different branches of the federal
government, also influence the debate. For a discussion of the underlying prominence of
these two themes with respect to federal jurisdiction, see Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 33-
35.
With respect to the allocation of power between these constitutionally-rooted forms of
government and those of American Indian tribes, a separate body of law-referred to as
"federal Indian law" or "Indian law"-has evolved. As one scholar describes: "The term
'Indian Law'... refers primarily to that body of law dealing with the status of the Indian
tribes and their special relationship to the federal government, with all the attendant
consequences for the tribes and their members, the states and their citizens, and the
federal goverment" William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshel I (West
1998). Federal Indian law is distinct from "the internal law that each tribe applies to its
affairs and members," a separate doctrinal area of the law that is typically referred to as
"tribal law." Id. at 3.
While federalism and federal Indian law traditionally have occupied separate
doctrinal categories, a number of scholars-including the author of this paper-have
recognized the need to integrate the two, advocating that considerations of tribal
sovereignty be included in the study of federalism. For a more in-depth discussion of this
point, see Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts: An Open
Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 123,
124 (2000) (criticizing the failure of federal court teachers and scholars to adequately
include discussion of tribal sovereignty in the study of federalism: the "failure of federal
courts' scholars to identify and discuss the tribal sovereign, particularly tribal courts,
seriously restricts, even distorts, the purview of contemporary federalism."). See generally
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges
for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 313 (1997).
9. A number of scholars have used the term "new federalism" to refer to the Rehnquist
Court's expansion of state sovereignty and its concomitant restriction of Congressional
20021 663
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increasing authority vis-d-vis the federal government, and Congress has
been constrained in enacting legislation that could conceivably impose
unwanted limits or requirements on states.10 Consistent with this trend,
the Rehnquist Court has decided a number of cases regarding state
immunity from suit, all of which have been protective of state
immunity.11
During this same period of time, the Court also has been active in
altering the contours of tribal sovereignty. In contrast to its
jurisprudence with respect to the states, however, the Rehnquist Court
has been considerably less protective of tribal sovereignty. For instance,
it has limited tribes' exercise of regulatory and judicial jurisdiction and
other aspects of sovereign authority. In the process, it has reversed
some of the presumptive rules of interpretation that previously applied
to tribal sovereignty. 12
power to regulate or delimit state sovereignty. See e.g. Michael Crusto, The Supreme
Court's "New" Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 517 (2000); Robert
Knowles, Student Author, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to
Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735 (2001); Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman,
Federal Environmental Law in the "New" Federalism Era, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 11122 (2000);
Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce
Clause, and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 869 (2000); Mary-
Christine Sungaila, United States v. Morrison: The United States Supreme Court, The
Violence Against Women Act and The "New Federalism," 9 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud.
301 (2000); Mark Tushnet, What is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 Okla. City U.
L. Rev. 927 (2000).
The term "New Federalism" also has been used to characterize the Reagan
Administration's attempts to dismantle welfare programs. See Erwin Chemerinsky. The
Values of Federalism, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 499, 500 (1995). Originally, it may have been used to
refer to a balance of power between states and the federal government in which federal
rights may have been more expansive. See e.g. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
10. Specifically, the Court has restricted Congress's power to enact legislation pursuant
to the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other structural
interpretations of the Constitution. See e.g. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(declaring invalid a provision of the Violence Against Women Act and restricting Congress's
power to enact civil rights legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring invalid a federal
statute commandeering state executive officials based in large part upon a structural
interpretation of the Constitution that protect states from federal regulation); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and limiting Congressional power to enact civil rights legislation under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down
the Gun Free Schools Act as exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
See cases cited supra n. 7.
11. See e.g. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; College Savings H, 527 U.S. 666;
College Savings 1, 527 U.S. 627; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 501 U.S. 2618 (1997); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
12. For instance, the Court circumscribed tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over cases
arising from the activities of nonmembers on state-held right-of-ways or, by extension,
other non-Indian-held fee land within the exterior boundaries of tribal reservations. See
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (A tribal court may not exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over a personal injury action between two non-Indians that arose from
an accident on a state highway, even though the highway was on tribal trust land within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation.). For a comparison of the Court's holding in
Strate with its sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see infra Part III.D.3.
664 [Vol. 37:661
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Significantly, however, the Court has declined to reverse precedent
recognizing and establishing the doctrine of tribal immunity. In May
1998, the Court expressly reaffirmed the principle of tribal sovereign
immunity, rejecting a challenge to the application of tribal immunity
brought in the context of a business dispute between the Kiowa tribe
and a non-Indian enterprise. In doing so, it continued a longstanding
tradition of federal common law in which tribal immunity has been
recognized as a fundamental and inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty.
The evolution and development of this tradition is at the heart of this
paper and is described more fully below.1
4
While the federal judiciary has developed one line of reasoning and
precedent with respect to tribal immunity, Congress also has considered
and enacted legislation addressing the sovereign immunity of tribes,
circumscribing tribal immunity in certain narrowly prescribed
circumstances.15  Similarly, the federal government through its
Executive Branch has demonstrated a longstanding commitment to
tribal sovereignty 6 While each of the branches have developed their
own jurisprudence and policies with respect to tribal immunity,
Congress and the Court-often in concert with the Executive Branch-
have engaged in substantive dialogue about the appropriate scope of
tribal immunity. This dialogue in itself has been influential in defining
the parameters of tribal immunity.
In its 1998 decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., for instance, the Court presented a number of
"reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine" while
"defer[ring] to the role Congress may wish to exercise in this important
judgment." 17  Congress, at the time the Court deliberated over and
rendered its decision in Kiowa Tribe, was actively reconsidering the
13. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. TecIL, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). A more recent opinion
by the Supreme Court also addresses the issue of tribal immunity; however, and as set
forth more fully below, the case did not significantly alter the Court's jurisprudence with
respect to tribal immunity. See C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
532 U.S. 411 (2001). Rather, it addressed whether an arbitration clause contained within
a construction contract to which the Citizen Band was a party constituted a clear waiver of
the tribe's sovereign immunity against a suit to enforce an arbitration award. Id. at 414.
14. See infra Part III. Consistent with longstanding principles of federal Indian law, the
Court also has consistently deferred to the plenary power of Congress to resolve the debate
over the ongoing viability of tribal immunity. For a discussion of the plenary power
doctrine, see infra Part IVA.
15. A more detailed discussion of the circumstances in which Congress has abrogated
tribal immunity is set forth below. See infra Part IV. Congress has also enacted
legislation-the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-limiting the natural immunity of
foreign nations. For a discussion and comparison of this legislation, see infra Parts 11.3.
and IV.3.h.
16. The Executive Branch has endorsed tribal sovereignty through its Executive Orders
as well as its intervention in litigation, including appeals before the Supreme Court, and in
testimony before Congress. See infra nn. 427-40 and accompanying text.
17. Kiowa Tirbe, 523 U.S. at 758.
2002] 665
5
Seielstad: Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity under Fede
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
doctrine, and the Court was aware of this fact.' 8 After months of
deliberation and Congressional hearings, however, Congress declined to
implement the sweeping changes recommended by the Court.' 9 In 2000
Congress enacted legislation that, in the end, had little substantive
impact on the scope of tribal immunity.20 The Supreme Court has not
altered the Court's fundamental position regarding tribal immunity even
as it addressed the issue in the context of a specific contractual
21provision.
Significantly, Congress and the Supreme Court, each faced with
argument and testimony advocating a change in tribal immunity,
declined to change significantly the status quo with respect to tribal
immunity. While Congress has carved out some exceptions to tribal
immunity in certain contexts, the legal principle that tribes retain an
inherent immunity from suit persists as a matter of federal law. Tribes,
like states, the federal government, and foreign nations, continue to
enjoy a natural immunity from suit, an immunity that has been derived
from the recognition under federal law of each entity's sovereign status.
Unless a tribe expressly and unequivocally waives such immunity or
Congress clearly and unmistakably abrogates it, tribes may not be hailed
into court.
B. Scope of Article
This Article traces the recognition and evolution of tribal sovereign
immunity as the doctrine has emerged under federal law, including
federal statutory law, judicial precedent, and selected orders and actions
of the Executive Branch. It examines the theoretical underpinnings of
the doctrine, as reflected in federal common law and in the public
policies debated and enacted by Congress. It synthesizes various
strands of contemporary debate about the topic, and documents the way
in which the doctrine has been shaped by interplay and dialogue
between the different branches of the federal government. Written in
light of a number of recent judicial decisions and legislative enactments,
it is intended as a reflective piece about the development of tribal
sovereign immunity. The hope is that it may serve also as an
interpretive backdrop for future legislative debate and litigation
18. See id.
19. Id. Congress considered the Supreme Court's opinion in Kiowa Tribe in its
deliberations. It also considered the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA7), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1605 et seq. (West 2001), and the Court's suggestion that it apply the
restrictions set forth in FSIA to tribes.
20. Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts
Encouragement Act of 2000 and the Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 2000.
For a discussion of these enactments, see tnfra Part IV.C.3.
21. SeeC&LEnter., 532 U.S. 411.
22. See infra Parts IV.2-3.
666 [Vol. 37:661
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regarding tribal immunity and, more generally, for comparative
consideration of the law of sovereign immunity that has developed with
respect to states and the federal government. 2
The Article makes the following observations. First, despite recent
legislative proposals to eviscerate tribal immunity and opportunities to
delimit its scope through federal litigation, the doctrine of tribal
immunity remains surprisingly intact, relatively free from unwanted
incursions by state and private entities and subject only to abrogation by
the federal government. As set forth more fully below, it is firmly rooted
in contemporary and historical decisions of the Supreme Court. It has
remained intact even while the Supreme Court has limited other aspects
of tribal sovereignty such as the civil adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal
courts.24 With few exceptions, the doctrine of tribal immunity has been
protected by Congress. It has been protected even in the face of
legislative proposals that would have resulted in wholesale evisceration
of the doctrine and even in view of Congressional testimony revealing
instances in which immunity barred a remedy to persons injured by
tribal governments or officials. Its survival in the face of significant
adversity is testimony to the enduring and inherent nature of the
sovereignty of American Indian tribes.
Analyzing the development of the doctrine of tribal immunity,
including the basis for its authority and the way in which it has evolved,
also provides unique insight into the meaning of the doctrine of
immunity as a more general principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
So long as a governmental entity is recognized by the United States as
possessing some form of sovereign status, then basic suit immunity is
23. By way of self-disclosure, which is often essential to one's legitimacy in commenting
upon issues of central importance to indigenous people and the laws that purport to define
their relationships with others, I am not a Native American. This fact has caused me great
pause in writing about Native Americans or even the body of law known as "federal Indian
law." I have spent a significant portion of my life living and working with, reading about,
and otherwise immersing myself in a number of indigenous cultures, customs, laws and
traditions, as well as in studying the Anglo-American doctrinal field of federal Indian law.
As an attorney I have represented individual Native Americans before the courts of the
Navajo Nation and the Nez Perce Tribe. These experiences combined with my personal
connection to other ethnic minorities such as the Basques, although in no way a
substitute for being a Native American, have cultivated in me a respect for and
understanding of the importance of the autonomy, self-determination, and cultural
integrity of indigenous peoples. I write this piece about federal Indian law fully aware that
I am relying upon and perpetuating a doctrine that has been identified by at least one
Native American scholar as "white Man's law." See Williams, infra n. 108. The Article is,
in fact, about the federal law of one aspect of tribal sovereignty. I am hopeful, however,
that to the extent any written piece in the form of a law review article may have an impact,
the research and views set forth in this piece will be instructive to others engaged in
strengthening and advocating for tribal self-determination and sovereignty. At the very
least, I hope it will not undermine their efforts.
24. The current Supreme Court has markedly limited tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction in a
number of recent decisions. See e.g. Nev. v. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304 (2001); Strate, 520 U.S.
438. The evolution of the court's doctrine regarding tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction is set
forth more fully below. See infra Part III.D.3.
66720021
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deemed to attach, subject only to abrogation by Congress or by
voluntary waiver by persons authorized to speak on behalf of the
relevant sovereign entity. The fact that suit immunity is universally
recognized-no matter how perceptively weak, foreign, inferior or
marginalized the sovereign entity is within the federal system may be
construed as proof of the fundamental nature of the link between
sovereignty and immunity. The fact that immunity has emerged as an
inherent and essential corollary that attaches to a number of types of
sovereignty, each with different historical and legal bases for their
sovereignty, is further indication of this fact.
An analysis of the emergence and development of the doctrine of
tribal immunity reveals that tribal immunity from suit is something that
is consistently recognized as arising inherently from tribes' long-
recognized and firmly rooted sovereignty. Developed without reference to
or basis in the Constitution, the doctrine emerges and is perpetuated in
the precedent of the Supreme Court as a veritable truth or natural law of
sovereignty. The doctrine has proven to be resilient even in the face of
contemporary criticism of the doctrine, and it remains intact even as
other areas of tribal sovereignty have been eroded by contemporary
decisions of the Court. Its resilience may be attributed to the general
Anglo-American reverence for immunity as much as it may be construed
as testimony of the ongoing strength of tribal sovereignty. As such, in-
depth exploration of the development of the doctrine of immunity in the
context of tribal sovereignty provides an opportunity to examine the
underlying historical, political, and jurisprudential rationales behind the
doctrine.
Finally, studying the development and evolution of tribal immunity
presents an opportunity to explore many of the practical and normative
consequences of immunity as a general corollary of sovereignty. It also
provides a context for exploring the dynamics and force of interbranch
dialogue and constitutional interpretation.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the contours of the federal
law of sovereign immunity with respect to the federal government, states,
and foreign nations. Part III traces the development of the federal
common law of tribal immunity through decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and, to some extent, other courts within the federal
judiciary. Part IV examines Congressional activity in the area of tribal
immunity. A brief discussion of the Executive Branch's protection of
tribal sovereignty, self-determination, and economic development is set
forth in Part V. Part VI synthesizes the various strands of federal law
regarding tribal sovereign immunity, describing the doctrine's impact on
tribal self-governance and economic development and setting forth
interpretive possibilities for future litigation and dispute-resolution in
the area. Finally, the Article concludes in Part VII with a challenge to
668 [Vol. 37:661
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tribal governments to take advantage of the current state of the law
regarding tribal immunity and continue to enhance their legitimacy and
powers of self-governing by developing and strengthening appropriate
remedies for tribal members and others to obtain redress for disputes
with tribal governments.
II. THE NON-TRIBAL CONTOURS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES: COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES
A. The Constitutional Design: Federal and State Sovereign Immunity
As a matter of federal law the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been recognized with respect to the federal government as well as the
states. While the federal government and many states have provided
for voluntary waivers of their immunity, the federal law governing
immunity recognizes and preserves the power of each of these entities to
define when and under what circumstances each sovereign will permit
suit or other legal action against itself. With respect to both the states
and the federal government, the doctrine of immunity has been
recognized pursuant to federal common law as arising inherently from
each entity's sovereign status. Congress has abrogated federal immunity
in certain circumstances and has attempted to do so with respect to the
states as well in order to allow for enforcement by ordinary citizens of
rights guaranteed under federal law.
1. A Brief History of Federal Immunity
As early as 1821, the Supreme Court declared that "[tihe
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States[.]" 26 Other decisions have affirmed
this principle.27 "Only Congress can consent to suits against the United
25. With respect to local governments, it has been established that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity does not apply. See e.g. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279-81 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
However, local governments and officials in some circumstances have been successful in
claiming that the performance of certain tasks renders them part of the state government
for the purposes of the doctrine of immunity. See e.g. McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S.
781 (1997) (Despite the fact that sheriffs are elected and paid locally in the relevant
jurisdiction, county sheriff in Alabama is a state, not local, official because the sheriff's
office Is created by the state constitution and enforces the state law.); Freeman v. Oakland
Unified Sch. Dst., 179 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1999) (Local school board in California is part of
the state government and, hence, is immune from suit.). Other cases wherein local
officials have attempted to render themselves arms of the state for the purposes of
immunity, however, have not been successful. See e.g. Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174
F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1999) (Parish district attorney's office in Louisiana is not an arm of the
state and, hence, is not entitled to sovereign immunity.); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d
552 (6th Cir. 1999) (County coroner not entitled to immunity from suit because he, not the
state, was responsible for the policy which was the basis of the lawsuit.).
26. Cohens v. Va., 19 U.S. 264, 411-12 (1821).
27. See e.g. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commn. 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946)
20021 669
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States; the Executive is powerless to waive the federal government's
sovereign immunity. "2  The principle that the United States may not be
sued absent express authorization by Congress has been firmly
established as a matter of federal common law. The fundamental legal
basis for its existence in the common law, however, is less clear. Devoid
of any express basis in the text of the Constitution, it seems to have
emerged rather from an assumption that permeates Anglo-American
jurisprudence: namely, that immunity is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. 29 Despite the doctrine's lack of authoritative roots 3° and
criticisms 31 that have been mounted against it, however, there is little to
indicate the Supreme Court may take steps to alter it. Waivers have
been created by Congress, authorizing suit against the government in a
32number of narrowly prescribed circumstances.
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882) ("[The United States
cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case[."); Hill v. U.S., 50 U.S. 386, 389
(1850).
28. Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 589-90 (citing U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940));
Munro v. U.S., 303 U.S. 36 (1938); Finn v. U.S., 123 U.S. 227 (1887). Congressional waiver,
moreover, must be clear and unequivocal. See Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 590 (citing
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996)).
29. Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 590 (citing Kenneth Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
vol. 5, 6-7 (2d ed., Carswell 1984); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice
vol. 2, 210 (1985)). Although there is no express reference to federal immunity, Justice
Frankfurter once suggested that sovereign immunity was "embodied in the Constitution."
Kennecott Copper, 327 U.S. at 580 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
30. See e.g. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 ("iTihe principle has never been discussed or the
reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.").
31. Commentators have criticized the doctrine on the grounds that it is anachronistic,
derived from ancient principles of English common law and imported into America's legal
system at a time when the United States and its states were fledgling entities susceptible to
ruin by the costs of money judgments. See e.g. Noel Fox, The King Must Do No Wrong: A
Critique of the Current Status of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 Wayne St. L. Rev. 177(1979); James S. Sable, Student Author, Sovereign Immunity: A Battleground of Competing
Considerations, 12 Sw. U. L. Rev. 457 (1981). Others have criticized the doctrine because
it renders the government above the law, thereby ensuring that some individuals will be
unable to recover redress for injuries they have sustained at the hands of the government.
See Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 591-92; John E. H. Sherry, The Myth That the King Can
Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States
and the New York Courts of Claims, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 39, 56 (1969). The effect of our
current policy of distributing absolute versus qualified immunity among government
officers has also been called into question. See e.g. Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government 82,
89-92 (Yale U. Press 1983). Finally, the doctrine has been criticized in light of the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution on the grounds that the Clause supercedes
interpretations borrowed from the English common law. See Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at
592. For a more complete discussion of the normative and policy considerations of the
doctrine, see infra Part VI.B.
32. See e.g. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 2001) (The Administrative Procedures Act)
(authorizing suits for injunctive relie); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-880 (West 2001) (The
Federal Tort Claims Act, which authorizes suits for the negligent torts of United States
employees); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (West 2001) (the Tucker Act, which authorizes
suits for breach of contract and other monetary claims). In addition to these statutes, the
Supreme Court has created one exception to the general rule that the federal government
is immune from suit, authorizing suits for injunctive relief against federal officers who are
acting outside the boundaries of their legal authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional
statute. See e.g. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Larson v. Dora. & For. Corn. Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949). See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
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2. State Sovereign Immunity
[Tihe States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of
their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other
States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments.
3 3
The development of the law of state sovereign immunity has
followed a complicated and tortuous path. The source and justification
for the doctrine is the subject of much debate. The Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution informs many decisions
interpreting the doctrine of state immunity? 4 However, much Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has been based largely upon other
considerations such as debates about the common law that may have
existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution as well as
fundamental notions about sovereignty in which immunity arises as a
natural corollary to sovereign power.3 5  Abandoning textual
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has relied upon
historical interpretations of the structure and balance of power between
the states and the federal government .3
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (inferring cause of action for money damages against federal agents
from a constitutional provision).
33. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
34. The Eleventh Amendment reads: UThe Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Ga.. 2 U.S. 419 (1793), upholding a citizen of
South Carolina's suit against Georgia to recover a debt incurred during the Revolutionary
War for the provision of materials. Chemerinsky,. supra n. 6, at 394. An intense reaction
by states to the Chisholm decision resulted in approval of the Eleventh Amendment within
three weeks of the decision by both houses of Congress, and ratification by the requisite
number of states within a year. Id. at 395. The presidential proclamation of the Eleventh
Amendment declaring its proper ratification, however, did not take place until three years
later. Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment, see John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh
Amendment in American History 12-29 (Oxford U. Press 1987). See generally Clyde E.
Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity (Greenwood Publishing Group
1972); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. A Narrow
Construction of an Affurmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); James Pfander, History and State Suability: An
Explanatory Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1269 (1998).
35. In a late nineteenth century interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, for instance,
the Supreme Court deviated markedly from a textual interpretation of the amendment,
creating a defense of immunity even with respect to a suit brought against a state by one of
its own citizens. See Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Subsequent decisions both
expanding and delimiting the sovereign immunity of states have cited Hans and other
precedent, policies, and historical sources in crafting the federal common law of state
sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court has been particularly active in expanding states'
immunity protection in recent years. See supra n. 7.
36. See e.g. Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (holding that probation officers employed by the state of
Maine could not sue state in Maine courts for alleged violations of the Fair Labor
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In one of its earliest interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Supreme Court departed from the plain language of the Amendment,
holding that immunity applied to suits brought against states by their
own citizens even though such suits were not covered by its terms.
Acknowledging that the plain meaning of the Eleventh Amendment did
not apply to the circumstances of the case, the Court noted the
"anomalous result" that would occur if a state could be sued in federal
court by its own citizens but not by citizens of other states or foreign
nations. 38 It concluded that neither the drafters and signatories of the
Constitution nor those that ratified the Eleventh Amendment could have
intended such a result since "[tihe suability of a State, without its
consent, was a thing unknown to the law."
39
The Court's decision in Hans initiated a debate over the history of
the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment that has included the
development of a number of theories regarding the meaning of state
sovereign immunity in light of circumstances surrounding the
ratification of the Constitution as well as the Eleventh Amendment.4 °
Standards Act). The Court in Alden employed textual interpretations of the Eleventh
Amendment and premised its decision upon an interpretation of the immunity that was
enjoyed by the states prior to the ratification of the Constitution and, hence, was embodied
in the structure and historical context of that document. Id.
A number of commentators have analyzed and critiqued the Court's decision in
Alden v. Maine. See e.g. John Allotta, Student Author, Alden v. Maine: Infusing Tenth
Amendment and General Federalism Principles into Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 51
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 505 (2001); Mark Strasser, Chisholm, The Eleventh Amendment, and
Sovereign Immunity: On Alden's Return to Confederation Principles, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
605 (2001); Louise Weinberg, Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1113 (2001).
37. Hans, 134 U.S. 1.
38. Id. at 10. The Court determined "in the light of history and experience and the
established order of things" that those who ratified the Constitution could not have
intended the state to be subjected to suit by any individual; nor could those who ratified
the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 13-14. The Court stated:
It is an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction never
imagined or dreamed of. Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment
was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their
own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other States,
or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?
Id. at 15.
39. Id.
40. One "theory of the Eleventh Amendment is that it recognized and reinstated common
law immunity... enjoyed by the states prior to the adoption of Article III [of the
Constitution]." Chemerinsky, supra n. 6, at 396 n. 1. Under this theory, the states
enjoyed common law immunity as to all suits brought against them, whether by citizens of
their own state or by persons and entities external to it. Consequently, the Eleventh
Amendment and the Court's interpretation in Hans are viewed to have reinstated, not
constitutionally imposed, an immunity that the Supreme Court in Chisholm failed to
recognize. For a discussion of this theory, see e.g. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court,
the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L. J. 1 (1988). Another
theory is that the Eleventh Amendment acts as a constitutional restriction on the subject
matter jurisdiction of federal courts and bars suits against states. See Chemerinsky, supra
n. 6, at 398-400. Yet another, is that the Amendment was intended only to restrict the
jurisdiction of federal courts over cases brought against states that are founded exclusively
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Subsequent decisions by the Court have reflected an ongoing debate
about the legal basis for state sovereign immunity, as wel as its
historical roots. While four of the current Supreme Court justices and a
number of prominent scholars favor a more restrictive interpretation of
the scope of sovereign immunity, the majority of the members of the
Court favor the expansive interpretation set forth originally in Hans.4'
In a series of decisions supporting state sovereign immunity, the
majority of the members of the Court have increasingly moved away from
textual analyses of the Amendment to ones linked more to public policy,
history, common law, and even natural law principles. As the Supreme
Court recently acknowledged in upholding Hans: "Although the text of
the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts, 'we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition... which it confirms.'"41 More recently, the Supreme
Court even renounced the suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment is
the proper authority for state sovereign immunity.43 Stated the Court:
[The sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretation by this Court
make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of
their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other
States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain
constitutional Amendments."
Over time, then, the text of the Constitution has become largely
peripheral to the law regarding state sovereign immunity, giving way to a
larger debate about inherent sovereignty that is rooted in political theory
and divergent theories regarding the doctrine's historical roots.45
Considerations of federalism have driven many recent developments in
on diversity jurisdiction and, consequently, that the Supreme Court's decision in Hans was
erroneous. Id. at 400-01. The Rehnquist Court is split over its support for the last two
theories. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas
support the more expansive jurisdictional interpretation of sovereign immunity; Justices
Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsberg support the more restrictive diversity view of
sovereign immunity. Id. at 401-02.
41. Chemerinsky, supran. 6, at 401-02.
42. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and
Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
43. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
44. Id. at 712-13.
45. Analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to state sovereign
immunity is a vast topic, with much contemporary significance and change in the
development of federal common law. Discussion of state sovereign immunity and
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the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the matter.46 Value judgments
about the proper scope of state sovereignty within the United States and
the remedies that should be available to individuals to seek remedies for
and protection against violations of federal and Constitutional rights also
underlie these decisions.
Whatever its purported jurisprudential basis, the federal judiciary,
most notably the Supreme Court, has delineated the contours of state
sovereign immunity. The Court has held that the Constitution prohibits
suits against states in federal court by a state's own citizens,4 7 by
citizens of another state,4 8 and by citizens of other countries.4 9  It has
also precluded suits by foreign nations5 ° and by tribes.5 '
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has authorized suits by one
state against another so long as the state is suing to protect its own
interests rather than those owed to individual citizens.5 2 Sovereign
immunity does not bar suits against states brought by the federal
government.5 3  Exceptions to immunity have been created in some
circumstances for suits brought against individual state officers.-4 While
46. The Rehnquist Court's activism in recent years in strengthening state sovereign
immunity has been part of a broader trend in the jurisprudence of federalism that has
resulted in the empowerment of states vis-a-vis the federal government. For a short
discussion of federalism and the Rehnquist Court, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Forecasting the
Future of Federalism, 37 Tr. 18 (July 2001). Not only has the Court strengthened the
protection afforded to state sovereign immunity, but it has also delimited federal power in a
number of other jurisprudential areas. For instance, it has determined in several cases
that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in compelling state
regulatory activity. See e.g. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. It has restricted Congress's power to
regulate state action under the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5 enforcement powers.
See e.g. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") unconstitutional on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment only authorizes
Congress to provide remedies for rights recognized by the courts and Congress in RFRA
had intruded impermissibly on the Court's power to interpret and accord meaning to
substantive constitutional rights); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down portions of the
Violence Against Women Act on the grounds that neither the Commerce Clause or the
Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress with the authority to enact those provisions).
See cases cited supra n. 7.
Other cases protecting states from federal regulatory authority have been rooted in
the Tenth Amendment as well as structural interpretations of the Constitution. See e.g.
N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz, 521 U.S. 898.
47. Hans, 134 U.S. 1.
48. See e.g. In re N.Y., 256 U.S. 490 (1921); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). The
bar applies against suits by individuals against territories of the United States. See e.g.
Fred v. Rogue, 916 F.2d 37, 38 (1st Cir. 1990).
49. Id.
50. Principle of Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
51. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44; Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.
52. See e.g. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. 176, 182 n. 9 (1982); Md. v. LX., 451 U.S. 725, 738
(1981).
53. See e.g. U.S. v. Miss., 380 U.S. 128 (1965); U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
54. In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not
preclude suits against state officers for injunctive relief, even where the result could be to
enjoin the implementation of official state policy. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56
(1908). While it has been criticized by some as creating a false or fictional distinction
between the state and its officers, this decision has formed the basis for an important
means of limiting the effect of state sovereign immunity and of ensuring state compliance
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a full exposition of the contours of and exceptions to state sovereign
immunity lies beyond the scope of this paper, the development of the
federal law of state sovereign immunity has followed a long and complex
path, guided largely by debates and public policy concerns over
federalism.
3. Basic Principles of Sovereign Immunity with Respect to Extra-
Constitutional Entities: The Development of the Doctrine with
Respect to Foreign Nations
For more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted
foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit in the courts of this
country.
55
As with states and the federal government, the federal judiciary and
Congress also have recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity with
respect to foreign nations and American Indian tribes. Tribes and
foreign nations, however, are not part of the constitutional design,
possessing instead an inherent, natural sovereignty that preceded or
otherwise remained separate from the sovereign authority of the United
States of America. Thus, there is no purported constitutional text to
which the origin of the doctrine of immunity may be attributed. As with
the jurisprudence of states and the federal government, the federal
judiciary has contributed to the development of the doctrine of immunity
with respect to foreign nations. In contrast to its role with respect to the
states, however, Congress has played a greater role in defining the
contours of the federal law regarding foreign nation immunity. So, too,
has the Executive Branch.
with federal law. As one group of scholars has explained: "To be sure, the doctrine of Ex
Parte Young has a fictive quality to it; nonetheless, it serves as an effective mechanism for
providing relief against unconstitutional conduct by state officers and for testing, in the
federal courts, the constitutionality of the state statutes under which they act." Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 13 § 3524 (West 1994). In
subsequent cases, the Court expanded its holding in Ex Parte Young to grant injunctive
relief even if it imposes a prospective financial burden on the state, so long as such costs
are ancillary to the prospective injunctive relief. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971); Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-49 (1979).
A number of exceptions, however, have been developed with respect to suits against
state officers. See e.g. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (suit against state by tribe to
quiet title to submerged lands under Lake Coeur d'Alene is precluded by Eleventh
Amendment); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state
officers to enforce federal statutes-in this case the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which
contains comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.); Pennhurst St Sch. & Hosp. v.
Haiderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1994) ("[Nl]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of
jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment."); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits' against state officers for retroactive relief,
including payment of damages for past violations of federal law, but not prospective
injunctive relief.). For more information about sovereign immunity and suits against
officers, see generally Wright et al., supra; David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits
Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 149; Kenneth Culp Davis, Suing the
Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435 (1962).
55. Verlinden B.V. v. C. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
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The development of the federal law regarding foreign immunities is
rooted in executive policy and Supreme Court acknowledgement and
implementation of such policy. It has been defined significantly by
Congressional enactment as well. In 1976, Congress enacted the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA').ss The legislation codified a
view of sovereign immunity that evolved with respect to foreign nations
as a matter of international customary law and was adopted by the
United States State Department and a number of federal courts.
57
While it provides a general presumption of immunity for foreign
nations, the FSIA expressly waives such immunity in a number of
circumstances. For instance, the Act waives the immunity of foreign
nations for actions arising out of "commercial activity" engaged in by
such nations.5 8 It further requires that the commercial activity have
some connection with the United States, allowing federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the following categories of activity: (1)
commercial activities carried out within the United States,59 (2) actions
performed within the United States that are connected to commercial
activities carried out outside the United States,6 0 and (3) actions that
have a direct effect within the United States even though performed
outside of its territorial boundaries.6 1 The Act also waives immunity for
the tortious acts of the nation or its officials 62 or where immunity has
been waived by contract.63 In addition, FSIA restricts the ability of
foreign nations to claim immunity with respect to counterclaims. 
64
Responding to growing national sentiment that absolute immunity gave
foreign states an unfair competitive advantage in business transactions
and denied legal recourse to citizens who suffered injury at the hands of
the state, the FSIA essentially restricts the sovereign immunity of foreign
56. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West 2001).
57. The view that emerged was commonly referred to as a "restrictive theory" of foreign
sovereign immunity insofar as it began to embrace restrictions on the scope of sovereign
immunity accorded to foreign nation-states under federal law. For a more detailed
discussion of the development of this theory, see infra nn. 69-73 and accompanying text.




62. Id § 1605(a)(5).
63. See id. § 1605(a)(1), (6).
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (West 2001). Foreign states are precluded from asserting their
immunity from counterclaims that arise when the state is a plaintiff where (1) the
counterclaim is based upon a situation in which the foreign state would not be immune
were it sued separately, (2) the relief sought is substantially the same as that sought by the
foreign state, and (3) the counterclaim arises from the same transaction or occurrence as
that of the underlying suit by plaintiff. Id. The Act also provides for exceptions to
immunity "for certain actions 'in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are in issue,' Section 1605(a)(3); actions involving rights in real estate and in inherited
and gift property located in the United States, Section 1605(a)(4): and certain actions
involving maritime liens, Section 1605(b)[.]" VerlindenB.V., 461 U.S. at 488 n. 11.
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nations to public or governmental activities.
Prior to the enactment of FSIA, foreign nations, like American
Indian nations and other sovereign entities recognized by the United
States, enjoyed virtually absolute immunity from suit in domestic courts
under common law. The United States Supreme Court articulated this
principle as early as 1812 in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddor66 In
that case, which involved a dispute over ownership of a French warship
harbored in a United States port, Chief Justice Marshall held that a
foreign state was immune from suit in the courts of the United States by
virtue of the "perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns[.] "67 To hold otherwise, the United States Attorney had
argued, would "amount to a judicial declaration of war."6s
As time passed and trade with foreign nations increased, however, a
more restrictive view of foreign immunity began to permeate
international customary law.69  As one commentator has noted, the
restrictive theory "generally posits that a foreign sovereign should be
subject to suit for its actions if a private person would be subject to suit
for the same conduct in the jurisdiction where the action is brought."70
Under this theory, immunity is limited to suits involving a foreign
sovereign's public acts but does not extend to claims involving the state's
strictly commercial acts.7 1 A number of foreign states attempted to apply
a more restrictive view of sovereign immunity where foreign sovereigns
engaged in commercial activities.72
In 1952, the State Department formally adopted this view in a
document known as the "Tate Letter." In this letter, the Department
announced its policy "to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity[.1" 7 3 Implementation of the policy by the State Department
65. See 28 U.S.C.. §§ 1602, 1603 (West 2001). The FSIA also reserves immunity for the
activities of foreign nations that have little or no connection to the United States. See id. at
§§ 1602-11.
66. 11 U.S. 116 (1812). On sovereign immunity with regard to foreign parties, see
Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486 ("[Schooner Exchange] came to be regarded as extending
virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns."); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271
U.S. 562 (1926).
67. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137.
68. Id. at 126.
69. For a general discussion of this evolution of international law, see Verlinden B.V.,
461 U.S. at 486-89. See John W. Borchert, Tribal Immunity Through the Lens of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. A Warrant for Codification, 13 Emory Intl. L. Rev. 247, 263-64
(1999); Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 Colum. J.
Transnatl. L. 33, 39-40 (1978).
70. Borchert, supra n. 70, at 264 (citing Richard B. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic
Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 Va. J. Intl. L. 9, 25 (1970)).
71. VerlindenB.V., 461 U.S. at 487.
72. Borchert, supra n. 70, at 264. Belgium and Italy, for example, adopted this view of
foreign immunity.
73. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) (reprinted in 26 Dept. St. Bull. 984-985
(1952); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (Appendix 2 to opinion
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and the courts proved to be complicated, with foreign nations placing
diplomatic pressure on the State Department and courts struggling to
determine whether sovereign immunity existed.74 In the end, the FSIA
resolved and codified some of the changes in American policy with
respect to foreign nations.
III. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A
MATTER OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. Contemporary Recognition of the Doctrine: Kiowa Tribe
The Supreme Court has been consistent in recognizing and
protecting tribal immunity from suit. In fact, it is one of the aspects of
tribal sovereignty that has remained intact even as the current Supreme
Court has diminished tribal authority in other areas. 75 Accordingly, the
Court has set forth principles that authorize suit against tribes or tribal
entities in only a few narrowly construed circumstances such as where
Congress expressly abrogates suit immunity or where a tribe clearly
waives its immunity from suit.
In one of its most recent articulations of the doctrine of tribal
immunity, the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign
immunity from civil suits on contracts even if those contracts were made
off the reservation and regardless of whether those contracts involved
commercial or governmental activities. In that case, the Kiowa Tribe's
Industrial Development Commission contracted with Manufacturing
Technologies, a private entity, for the purchase of certain stock.77 The
Tribe executed and delivered a promissory note sealing the transaction
to the company in Oklahoma City, outside the exterior boundaries of the
of White, J.)); see VerlindenB.V., 461 U.S. at 487 n. 9.
74. Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487-88 ("[S]overeign immunity determinations were made
in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors, sometimes including diplomatic
considerations. Not surprisingly, the governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly
applied."). For a more in-depth discussion of this period of American history, see Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901, 905-09 (1969).
75. For instance, the Rehnquist Court has circumscribed tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over cases arising from the activities of nonmember defendants. See e.g.
Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (A tribal court may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a
personal injury action between two non-Indians that arose from an accident on a state
highway, even though the highway was on tribal trust land within the exterior boundaries
of the reservation.). Other examples of this phenomenon are set forth below. See infra
Part III.D.3.
76. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751. A more recent opinion by the Supreme Court also
addresses the issue of tribal immunity; however and as set forth more fully below, the case
did not significantly alter the Court's jurisprudence with respect to tribal immunity. See C
& L Enter., 532 U.S. 411. Rather, it addressed whether an arbitration clause contained
within a construction contract to which the Citizen Band was a party constituted a clear
waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity against a suit to enforce an arbitration award. See
id.
77. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 753-54.
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Tribe's lands, and the note provided that the Tribe render payments in
Oklahoma City.7 8 The Tribe then allegedly defaulted, and the company
sued in state court based on the note. In response, the Tribe moved to
dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction, relying in part on its sovereign
immunity from suit. Denying the Tribe's motion, the trial court entered
judgment for the corporation. "The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed, holding [that] Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for
breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct." The
Oklahoma Supreme Court chose not to review the matter, and the
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari. v9
In reversing the holding of the state appellate court, the Supreme
Court grounded its decision upon its own precedent, stating the
principle that "[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to
suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived
its immunity."80 It noted also that its precedents had never drawn a
distinction between commercial and governmental activities of a tribe for
the purposes of immunity;8 1 nor had the Court drawn a distinction
based upon where the tribal activities had occurred.8 2  Moreover, in
holding that states may "apply their substantive laws to tribal activities"
in some circumstances, 83 the Court emphasized that it had always
recognized the difference between "the right to demand compliance with
state laws and the means available to enforce them."84
Although it then proceeded to criticize "the wisdom of perpetuating
the doctrine"8 5 and suggested Congress might circumscribe tribal
78. Id. at 754. In a section entitled "Waivers and Governing Law," the contract provided
that "[nlothing in this Note subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of FL Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engr., 476 U.S.
877, 890 (1986); Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58; U.S. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,
512 (1940)).
81. Id. at 754-55. Proponents of restricting sovereign immunity often distinguish
between commercial and governmental activity and argue for the elimination of immunity
whenever a sovereign entity engages in commercial business relations with outside entities.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, for instance, preserves immunity with respect to
foreign nations only when they are acting as government, rather than commercial, entities.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (West 2001). As discussed more fully below, however, this
justification for waiving immunity may be criticized on the grounds that commercial
activity involves a mutual contractual relationship in which remedies available in case of
default, including waivers of immunity, generally may be bargained for and incorporated
into written agreements.
82. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
83. Id. at 755 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973);
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962)).
84. Id. (citing Okla. Tax Commnm v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 514 (1991)).
85. Id. at 758. In fact, despite the Court's ultimate endorsement of tribal immunity, the
Court questioned the validity of its original precedent, describing how it "developed almost
by accident" and rests, in some of its opinions, upon a case in which sovereign immunity
was tangentially at issue. Id. at 756-57 (citing Turner v. U.S., 248 U.S. 354 (1919)). See
Fidelity & Guar., 309 U.S. at 506, 512 (citing, among others, Turner, 248 U.S. at 358)
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immunity, 86 the Court ultimately deferred to Congress as the sole entity
with power to reform tribal immunity. The Court concluded that:
[i]n light of these concerns, we decline to revisit our case law and choose
to defer to Congress. Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts,
whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and
whether they were made on or off a reservation. Congress has not
abrogated this immunity, nor has petitioner waived it, so the immunity
governs this case.87
Despite its concerns regarding the doctrine, the Supreme Court's
decision in Kiowa Tribe is solid in its endorsement of tribal immunity.
Not only does it preserve and uphold Congress's exclusive power to
abrogate it, but it refuses to limit the scope of the doctrine based upon
considerations that have justified intrusions on sovereign authority in
other contexts. For instance, it refuses to extend the exception to
commercial activities of sovereign entities that has been created as a
matter of federal law with respect to foreign nations, thereby limiting
such nations' ability to defend themselves from suit for disputes
stemming from commercial transactions. It declines also to limit tribal
immunity in the face of off-reservation conduct involving non-Indian
entities, resisting the dissent's efforts to distinguish previous precedent
protective of tribal immunity on the ground that such cases involved
88
controversies arising on reservation territory. And it upholds tribal
("IThese Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization."). The
Kiowa Tribe Court also challenged the underlying rationale behind the doctrine as
"inapposite to modem, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond traditional
tribal customs and activities." Id. at 757-58. As the Court explained:
At one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit might have been thought
necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from encroachments by States.
In our interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends
beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance.... This is evident
when tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now include
ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians.... In this economic
context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a
tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter,
as in the case of tort victims.
Id. at 758.
86. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758-59. Acknowledging that tribal sovereignty immunity is
a matter of federal law, the Court suggest that Congress might reform tribal sovereign
immunity as it has with respect to the sovereign immunity of foreign nations: namely, by
confining tribal immunity to reservation or noncommercial governmental activities. See id.
With regard to the latter form of immunity, the Court cites a 1952 State Department letter
announcing a federal policy of denying immunity for the commercial acts of a foreign
nation that was later codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1602-1611 (West 2001).
87. Id. at 760.
88. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 762-64 (Stevens, J., joined by Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting) ("In sum, we have treated the doctrine of sovereign immunity from judicial
jurisdiction as settled law, but in none of our cases have we applied the doctrine to purely
off-reservation conduct. Despite the broad language used in prior cases, it is quite wrong
for the Court to suggest that it is merely following precedent, for we have simply never
considered whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the
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immunity in the face of argument by the dissenting justices that the rule
articulated by the court with respect to immunity is both unjusts9 and a
form of judicial law-making.90 The result is that the sovereign immunity
and sovereign authority of American Indian tribes is reinforced by this
decision, possibly to the extent acknowledged by the dissent, that tribes
may enjoy broader immunity than states, the federal government, and
foreign nations.91 Moreover, the decision resolves a conflict between
state courts regarding the proper deference to be given to tribal
immunity in the context of commercial dealings.
92
Tribe's land or its sovereign functions.").
89. The dissent unequivocally proclaims that the rule enunciated by the Court "is
unjust." Id. at 766. It argues that the injustice is particularly great with respect to tort
victims who do not have the opportunity to contract for a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Id. The dissent explains: "[Nothing in the Court's reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits
arising out of voluntary contractual relationships. Governments, like individuals, should
pay their debts and should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious conduct." Id.
90. According to the dissent, "The Court is not merely announcing a rule of comity for
federal judges to observe; it is announcing a rule that pre-empts state power.... By
setting such a rule .... the Court is not deferring to Congress... -rather, it is creating
law." Id. at 764-65. The dissent argues that in the absence of a congressional statute or
treaty defining tribes' sovereign immunity, the Court would have had to identify more
significant federal interests "supporting its extension of sovereign immunity" in order to
justify its pre-emption of state power. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 765 (Stevens, J., joined by
Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
91. Id. at 765 ([T]he rule [articulated by the majority] is strikingly anomalous. Why
should an Indian tribe enjoy broader immunity than the States, the Federal Government,
and foreign nations?"). The dissent describes further how the federal government "[als a
matter of national policy" has waived its immunity from tort liability and from liability
arising out of commercial activities, and limited the scope of immunity with respect to
foreign nations. Id. Moreover, it emphasizes how "a State may be sued in the courts of
another State." Id. 'The fact that the States surrendered aspects of their sovereignty when
they joined the Union does not even arguably present a legitimate basis for concluding that
the Indian tribes retained-or, indeed, ever had-any sovereign immunity for off-
reservation commercial conduct." Id.
92. The supreme courts of two states-Oklahoma and New Mexico-have held that
tribes lose their immunity from suit when they engage in commercial activities outside of
reservation boundaries. See Aircraft Equip. Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 939 P.2d 1143 (Okla. 1997);
Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1988). Both decisions were rendered
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Kiowa Tribe. The Oklahoma case,
Aircraft Equipment was the very case overturned by the Supreme Court in that opinion.
See Kiowa Tribe, 939 P.2d 1143, 1148 (Okla. 1997), overruled, Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751.
In Padilla, in a suit between a private roofing contractor and the pueblo doing business as
a construction firm, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that off-reservation business
conduct by the Pueblo of Acoma was not clothed with the standard immunity afforded by
tribes. Padilla, 754 P.2d at 850. Each of these decisions arose within a state with a
significant tribal presence, and as such, lends insight into the ways in which at least some
state courts would be inclined to reconcile their authority with that of tribes operating
within their boundaries but for federal precedent and Congressional regulation.
Aside from these two cases, however, the prevailing view among federal and state
courts about tribal sovereign immunity is that tribes enjoy immunity from suit (in state
court) whether acting in a commercial or governmental capacity and regardless of whether
the disputed contract or activity took place on or off the reservation. See e.g. Sac and Fox
Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.
1992); Morgan v. Colo. River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968).
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B. C & L Enterprises: Interpretation of a Tribal Arbitration Clause
Following Kiowa Tribe, the Supreme Court decided a dispute
between a construction company and the Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma. The Court construed arbitration provisions
set forth in a contract with the Tribe as constituting a clear waiver of the
tribe's suit immunity to enforce a resulting arbitration award.93  That
decision, however, was limited to an interpretation of a specific
contractual arrangement and did not alter the Court's fundamental
position with respect to tribal immunity. 94 The fact that the Court in C
& L Enterprises declined to revisit the basic tenets of its doctrine
regarding tribal immunity even after Congress had considered, but
rejected, legislation that would have dramatically limited tribal immunity
indicates further its ongoing support of tribal immunity.9"
C. Tracing Historical Roots
In interpreting the impact and durability of the Court's decision in
Kiowa Tribe with respect to federal law, it is also useful to assess the
doctrine's historical roots and the judicial precedent upon which it is
based. The Court in Kiowa Tribe suggested that its precedent, although
clearly protective of the doctrine of tribal immunity, may not have been
well-founded, particularly to the extent it is based upon the Court's
opinion in Turner. A number of commentators have similarly criticized
the precedent upon which the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been
premised.96 Some have gone so far as to suggest that the doctrine is a
judicially created doctrine, without sound foundation for its
development.
97
93. C&LEnter., 532U.S. 411.
94. Id. at 414, 418-19. ("This case concerns the impact of an arbitration agreement on a
tribe's plea of suit immunity.") In fact, the Court reiterates its holding in Kiowa Tribe to
support its interpretive rule that "to relinquish its immunity, a tribe's waiver must be
'clear.'" Id. at 418. Moreover, it purports to resolve a conflict between the Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals below that determined that the arbitration clause was insufficiently clear
to constitute a waiver of immunity and a number of other state and federal courts that
have interpreted similar arbitration provisions to the contrary. See Sokaogon Gaming
Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assoc., 86 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1996); Native Village
of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 760 (Alaska 1983); Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court,
703 P.2d 502, 508-09 (Ariz. App. 1985). But see Pan Am. Co. v, Sycuan Band of Mission
Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1989).
95. The proposed legislation and Congressional enactments regarding tribal immunity
are discussed in more detail below, see infra Part IV.C.
96. See e.g. Thomas P. McLish, Student Author, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for
Sensible Limits, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 173 (1988) ("[The principles upon which the doctrine of
tribal immunity is based do not justify the current breadth of the doctrine."): Ryan T.
Koczara, Student Author, American Indian Law-Sovereign Immunity-Indian Tribes Erjoy
Sovereign Immunity from Suits on Contracts, Whether Those Contracts Involve Governmental
or Commercial Activities and Whether They Were Made On or Off A Reservation. Kiowa Tribe
v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700, 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 927 (1999).
97. McLish, supra n. 97, at 178 ("The doctrine of tribal immunity... is a judicially
created doctrine that the federal courts have independently fashioned."): David B. Jordan,
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A careful review of judicial precedent, however, when evaluated
against the backdrop of Congressional action with respect to tribes and
their sovereignty, indicates that the doctrine is neither judicially created,
nor exclusively rooted in Turner. Rather, the doctrine has long been
recognized by all three branches of the federal government as an
essential and inherent element of tribal sovereignty.
1. Early Colonial Contact
A fundamental attribute of the sovereignty of American Indian
nations, including many of its theoretical premises under federal law, is
that the concept of tribal sovereignty predates the ratification of the
Constitution and formation of the United States. It arose out of a history
in which distinct communities of American Indian peoples lived, created
institutions and systems, and governed themselves, sharing territories
within North America prior to European contact. It emerged from a
tradition of early European contact in which discourse, commercial trade
and intercourse, negotiation, and treaty-making regulated interactions
and relationships between Indian nations and their people, on the one
hand, and European nations and their colonial settlers, on the other
hand. As one scholar of Indian law has set forth: "At the time of
European discovery of America, the tribes were sovereign by nature and
necessity; they conducted their own affairs and depended on no outside
source of power to legitimize their acts of government."98 Chief Justice
Marshall explained in an early opinion: "America, separated from Europe
by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into
separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world,
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own
laws."99 Many of the principles defining the relationship and division of
power between the American Indian tribes and the United States were
developed in the context of the English colonizing experience in North
America, although other colonial influences contributed as well. 10 0
Student Author, Federal Indian Law: Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Why Oklahoma Businesses
Should Revamp Legal Relationships with Indian Tribes After Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc., 52 Okla. L. Rev. 489, 492 (1999). See generally Scott D. Donahy,
License to Discriminate: The Application of Sovereign Immunity to Employment Discrimination
Claims Brought By Non-Native American Employees of Tribally Owned Business, 25 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 679, 701 (1998) (advocates Congressional abrogation of immunity with respect
to the rights of non-Native American tribal employees); Brian Lake, Student Author, The
Unlimited Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribal Businesses Operating Outside the
Reservation: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 1996 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 87, 107 (1996)
(arguing that principles of fundamental fairness to off-reservation and non-Indian
businesses and individuals warrant abrogation of immunity with respect to off-reservation
business activities); David M. LaSpaluto, Student Author, A 'Strikingly Anomalous,'
'Anachronistic Fiction': Off-Reservation Sovereign Immunity for Indian Tribal Commercial
Enterprises, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 743 (1999).
98. Canby, supra n. 8. at 68.
99. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542-43.
100. David H. Getches et aL, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 52 (4th ed., West
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Prior to the formation of and assertion of independence by the
United States, the British Crown interacted with tribes as foreign
sovereigns.1 0 1  English colonists purchased title to land from local
tribes. 10 2 Britain negotiated treaties with various tribes, as did a number
of the colonies. English and European settlers recognized the
importance of cooperating with the powerful Indian tribes, treating them
as sovereigns possessing full rights of ownership of lands and requiring
negotiation and treaty-making. 10 3 As Felix Cohen explained about land
acquisition:
Whatever theoretical conflicts existed concerning the nature of the
respective ownership rights of Indians and Europeans to land in America,
practical realities shaped legal relations between the Indians and
colonists. The necessity of getting along with powerful Indian tribes, who
outnumbered the European settlers for several decades, dictated that as a
matter of prudence, the settlers buy lands that the Indians were willing to
sell, rather than displace them by other methods.... For all practical
purposes, the Indians were treated as sovereigns possessing full
ownership rights to the lands of America. ° 4
As tribes reacted to growing pressure for land and resources exerted
upon them by early colonists, the Crown assumed a more protective
relationship with respect to tribes, insulating them from encroachments
by the colonists.
Early in the nation's history, the newly formed United States
followed Britain's example and recognized and interacted with
indigenous Nations as separate sovereigns whose existence necessitated
nation-to-nation diplomacy and treaty-making. As with the Crown, the
federal government asserted control over the regulation of Indian affairs.
The Constitution granted to Congress-and only Congress-the power
to "regulate Commerce with the Indian tribes." 1°5 The President acquired
the constitutional power to make treaties, including those with tribes,
with the consent of two-thirds of the members of the Senate.10 6 Federal
Wadsworth 1998). Some scholars, however, have traced theoretical influences such as the
doctrine of discovery to the Spanish colonial era and other episodes of European
colonization. See id. at 42-52. See generally Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origins of Indian
Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 Geo. L. J. 1 (1942); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
American Indian in Western Legal Thought 317 (Oxford U. Press 1990); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination against Indigenous
People's Rights of Self-Determination, 8 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 51 (1991); Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and
Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219; Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in
Western Legal Thought, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
101. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 52-55 (Mitchie 1982).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 55.
105. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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agents, usually employed within the War Department, were appointed to
represent the federal government in its dealings with the various
tribes.10 7  Hundreds of treaties were entered into with tribes by the
United States government. 0 8 These treaties and the processes utilized
in negotiating them across colonial and indigenous cultures form the
foundation for much of federal Indian law. As one notable Native
American scholar has explained:
[T]hroughout the nearly two centuries-long period of their initial
multicultural encounter, Indians and whites negotiated hundreds of
treaties, and engendered a set of legal traditions that today, at least
according to the Indian side of the story of Indian rights in this country,
forms much of the core of our Federal Indian Law.1
0 9
Over time, the federal government, through its Executive Branch,
continued to centralize and aggregate its power over Indian Affairs,
abrogating the involvement of states in this process. While treaties
resolved some of these tensions in interests and provided important
foundational sources for interpreting and implementing relationships
between the various tribes and other entities such as states and the
federal government, the federal law regarding the relationship of tribes to
other governmental entities developed in other directions as well. Both
the Supreme Court and Congress began to define, qualify, and in some
circumstances circumscribe tribal sovereignty.
Between 1790 and 1834, Congress enacted a series of Trade and
Intercourse Acts that established an early framework for regulating
relations between the Indian people and their governments and non-
107. See Canby, supra n. 8, at 13.
108. Id. at 96. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States Where They Are
Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and
Federalism, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 981, 988 (1996).
109. See Williams, supra n. 108, at 988. Arguing that "White Man's Indian Law" does not
adequately account for the preservation of tribal sovereignty and Indian rights, Professor
Williams sets forth an "Indian side of the story" wherein ancient Indian legal traditions of
treaty-making form the foundational principles. Id. at 982. "In telling the Indian side of
the story of the source of the principles in our Indian law that have protected tribes from
their deadliest enemies-'the people of the states'-we resituate Indians... as a dynamic
force in the perpetuation of the core protective principles of Indian rights in America." Id.
at 987 (citing U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)). The Court in Kagama stated:
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the
treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power. This has always been recognized by the executive and by
congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
Kagara, 118 U.S. at 384. Specifically, Williams attributes the lasting protection of tribal
sovereignty, at least vis-a-vis the states and their non-Indian residents, to the tribes'
involvement and leadership in the creation of a "legal tradition of a treaty as creating a
relationship of sacred trust and protection" across indigenous and colonial cultures.
Williams, supra n. 108, at 994.
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Indians or non-tribal entities." 0 Among other things, these statutes
made trade with Indians the subject of federal regulation. They also
established tribal boundaries and attempted to regulate and prevent
encroachments by non-Indians upon Indians or their lands or affairs.
Significantly, these Acts did not address matters internal to tribal self-
governance, such as the conduct of Indian people or their government
structures and systems."'
In 1871 Congress unilaterally announced a change in federal policy
from one of diplomacy to one of legislative regulation112 The Supreme
Court subsequently held that Congress had the plenary power to
determine the appropriate boundaries of tribal relations with states and
the federal government, including the power to abrogate treaties with
tribes. u 3 Tribes nonetheless continued to enjoy some form of inherent
sovereignty derived from their status as self-governing peoples that pre-
existed the drafting of the Constitution. Following early Congressional
action, the Supreme Court also attempted to resolve some of the
tensions between tribal sovereignty and colonial assertion of right and
power.
2. The Marshall Trilogy"
14
In one of its first articulations of tribal sovereignty, the Supreme
Court recognized that tribes did not surrender the independence and
sovereignty inherent in their status as self-governing people." 5  In
holding that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" for the
purposes of diversity jurisdiction under the Constitution, thereby
depriving the Cherokee Nation of subject matter jurisdiction over a claim
against the State of Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall defined tribes as
"domestic dependent nations" with rights to occupy their lands subject
110. See e.g. 1 Stat. 137 (1790); 2 Stat. 139 (1802); 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
111. Canby, supra n. 8, at 12.
112. The legislation provided that "[n]o Indian nation or tribe... shall be acknowledged
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States may
contract by treaty[." 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871). It did not disturb existing treaties but ended
the process of treaty-making with tribes in favor of Congressional legislation or agreements
approved by both houses of Congress, thereby aggregating the federal power over Indian
Affairs more fully into the hands of Congress. See id.
113. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903). For general information about
treaty abrogation and judicial interpretation of such abrogation, see generally Charles F.
Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation "As Long as
Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 Cal. L. Rev.
601, 623-34 (1975).
114. These opinions are also sometimes referred to as the Cherokee Cases. See e.g.
Williams, supra n. 108, at 982. They consist of a trilogy of cases, each authored by Chief
Justice Marshall. In the world of Federal Indian Law or, in the words of Professor Williams'
"White Man's Indian Law", they are "sacred texts as far as Indian scholarship is
concerned." Id. Although Williams' criticizes this grounding and characterization of tribal
sovereignty, even he begins his article with a recitation of the trilogy, albeit under the
heading -Their Side of the Story." Id. at 982-84.
115. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19-20.
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only to the federal government's power to abrogate, define, or alter that
right. 1 6 The Chief Justice explained that "[tihe condition of the Indians
in relation to the United States is... marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist nowhere else."'17  Although the Indians were
"acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore,
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government," Justice
Marshall accorded them a unique sovereign status. The legal status of
tribes, according to the Chief Justice, was different from that of foreign
nations and subject to the sovereignty and authority of the United
States, but different also from the states; and such status was derivative
of indigenous claims to land and powers of self-governance."18
Eight years earlier, in Johnson v. Mclntosh,k " 9 the Supreme Court
had acknowledged the existence of tribal sovereignty and the legal and
moral right to retain possession and occupancy of tribal lands, subject,
however, to the power of the discovering colonial nation to extinguish
title to indigenous lands.
[The tribes were] the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion .... [However], their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive
title to those that made it.'
20
These cases, taken together, established the foundation for federal
recognition of a limited yet unique form of inherent sovereignty with
respect to Indian nations, that by claim of discovery remained subject to
the authority or usurpation by the United States of America.
A year after its holding in Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court
further refined its articulation of the relevant jurisdictional boundaries
between tribes, states, and the federal government. In Worcester v.
Georgia, the Court held that an Indian tribe was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the state in which it was located. 12' The case arose out of
a state court conviction of a non-Indian minister who resided within the
116. Id. at 17.
117. Id. at 16.
118. Id. at 17.
119. 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
120. Id. In a subsequent opinion, Marshall explained that the doctrine of discovery was
needed to resolve legal claims to land between European nations, thereby avoiding "bloody
conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543 ("The great
maritime powers of Europe discovered and visited different parts of this continent at nearly
the same time. The object was too immense for any one of them to grasp the whole; and
the claimants were too powerful to submit to the exclusive or unreasonable pretensions of
any single potentate.").
121. 31 U.S. at 595-96.
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Cherokee Nation and engaged in preaching to the Cherokee Indians but
had failed to abide by a state statute requiring him to procure a license
or take an oath to defend Georgia's laws and constitution. 122  The
minister argued that he was present in the Cherokee Nation "with the
permission and approval of the Cherokee nation, and in accordance with
the humane policy of the government of the United States, for the
civilization and improvement of the Indians"t and, hence, could not be
indicted or prosecuted under the laws of Georgia. Furthermore, he
maintained that the numerous treaties entered into between the United
States and the Cherokee Nation constituted acknowledgement by the
United States that the Cherokee Nation was a sovereign nation,
"authorised [sic] to govern themselves, and all persons who have settled
within their territory, free from any right of legislative interference by the
several states composing the United States of America.
" 124
Chief Justice Marshall found the Georgia statute to be inapplicable
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and the fact that the Cherokee Nation
was a separate sovereign subject only to regulation by the United States.
The Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation was "a distinct
community, occupying its own territory... in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity
with treaties and with the acts of congress."25 Furthermore, concluded
the Court, the "whole intercourse between this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."26
Thus, after these three early cases several foundational principles
are acknowledged by the Supreme Court: (1) based upon their
indigenous claims to land and political status, tribes enjoy certain
sovereignty that preexisted the formation of the United States of
America, and (2) this sovereignty is subject to abrogation or diminution
only by the federal government, not the states. Furthermore, from the
latter principle, together with the Court's determination that the tribes
were dependent upon the United States for protection, the principle that
the United States owed to tribes a trust responsibility also emerged as a
matter of Supreme Court precedent. 127 While the sovereignty enjoyed by
122. Id. at 537. The state legislation required that all white persons residing within the
boundaries of the Cherokee nation procure a license and take an oath from the governor or
his agent by a certain date or be guilty of a high misdemeanor, punishable upon conviction
by confinement in the state penitentiary with hard labor for a term of not less than four
years. Id. at 542. The minister refused to obtain such a permit.
123. Id. at 529.
124. Id. at 530.
125. Id. at 561.
126. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
127. While the notion of the United States as a fiduciary to the tribes may have emerged
as a matter of Supreme Court precedent, it is important to acknowledge that this principle
long predated the Supreme Court's first involvement in the development of American
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tribes under early federal common law was not absolute, the fact that a
form of inherent sovereignty was recognized is significant to the
development of other principles of tribal sovereignty such as the doctrine
of tribal immunity. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original rights, as the undisputed
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of
that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse
with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of
the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians.
The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a people
distinct from others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties already made,
as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and
consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of
making treaties. The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have
applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to other nations of the
earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
128
3. Early Protection of Tribal Governments from Suit:
Jurisdictional Beginnings
While these early Supreme Court cases provided a framework for
acknowledging and defining basic tribal sovereignty as a matter of
federal law, other federal cases provided the foundation for the doctrine
of tribal immunity. As early as 1895, for instance, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a decision by a territorial court of the United
States in Indian Territory that dismissed a suit brought against the
Choctaw Nation, its principal chief, and its treasurer by "a white man,
and citizen of the United States," to recover attorney's fees alleged to be
due for professional services rendered to the Nation. 129  The Court
concluded that since Congress had not conferred on the court
jurisdiction over an action against the Nation or any of its chief executive
officers for an alleged debt or liability, no suit could be maintained
against the tribal entities. It noted, however, that Congress had
Indian/federal relations and federal recognition of tribal sovereignty. As Professor Williams
has stated: "Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee Cases are not the
foundational sources of the original principles guiding our Federal Indian Law. Marshall
was simply perpetuating the principles of a much older tradition originating in the
Classical Era of treaty negotiations between Indians and whites on the continent, a
tradition which regarded a treaty as a relationship of sacred trust and protection."
Williams, supra n. 108, at 996.
128. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-60.
129. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe ofIndians, 66 F. 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1895).
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authorized suit to be brought against the Choctaw Nation in other
circumstances. 30 The Court stated:
The constitutional competency of congress to pass such acts has never
been questioned, but no court has ever presumed to take jurisdiction of a
cause against any of the five civilized Nations in the Indian Territory in the
absence of an act of congress expressly conferring the jurisdiction in the
particular case. The political departments of the United States
government, by treaties, by acts of congress, and by executive action, have
always recognized the Choctaw Nation 'as a state, and as a distinct
political society, separate from others, and capable of managing of its own
affairs and governing itself; and the courts are bound by these acts of the
political departments of the governments. 131
Although the Court did not expressly refer to the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity in so many words, 32 its holding was clearly
influenced by the longstanding assumption that immunity is essential to
the sovereign authority of Indian nations. Moreover, it expressed that it
was the policy of the United States to permit suits against an Indian
nation or tribe only in a few rare and specified circumstances. The
Court explained:
Being a domestic and dependent state, the United States may authorize
suit to be brought against it. But, for obvious reasons, this power has
been sparingly exercised. It has been the settled policy of the United
States not to authorize such suits except in a few cases, where the
subject-matter of the controversy was particularly specified, and was of
such a nature that the public interests, as well as the interests of the
Nation, seemed to require the exercise of the jurisdiction. It has been the
policy of the United States to place and maintain the Choctaw Nation and
the other civilized Indian Nations in the Indian Territory, so far as relates
to suits against them, on the plane of independent states. A state, without
its consent, cannot be sued by an individual. 'It is a well-established
principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot
be sued in its own courts or any other without its consent and permission;
but may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege, and permit itself to be
made a defendant in a suit by individuals or by another state."
33
The Court further clarified its recognition of the doctrine of tribal
130. The Eight Circuit referenced, for instance, acts of Congress conferring jurisdiction in
the territorial courts over controversies arising between the railroad companies authorized
to construct roads through the Indian Territory and the Choctaw Nation and other Indian
nations and tribes. It also referred to congressional legislation authorizing suit to be
brought by or against Indian Nations to settle controversies between them and the United
States and between themselves. Id. at 373-74. See infra Part IV.B.
131. Id. at 374 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1). In support of its conclusion that the
Choctaw Nation was an independent sovereign nation, the court also cited the treaty
between the United States and the Choctaw Nation of September 27, 1830 (7 Stat. 333
(1830)) and a variety of other cases.
132. In fact, the case primarily involved subject matter jurisdiction.
133. Thebo, 66 F. at 375 (citing Beers v. Ark., 61 U.S. 527 (1857)).
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sovereign immunity by emphasizing its importance to the exercise of
sovereignty by states and the federal government.134  The Court
concluded by identifying the practical importance of maintaining the
doctrine with respect to tribes such as the Choctaw Nation, stating: "As
rich as the Choctaw Nation is said to be in lands and money, it would
soon be impoverished if it was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts,
and required to respond to all the demands which private parties chose
to prefer against it."35
Thirteen years following its ruling in Thebo, the Eighth Circuit
extended its recognition of tribal sovereign immunity to a suit in equity
brought against the principal chief of the Creek Nation seeking specific
performance of a written contract and attorneys' fees allegedly owed by
the nation for services rendered to it pursuant to the contract. 13 In that
case, the attorney, who had been terminated from employment by the
Nation, sought to enjoin the principal chief from signing or issuing any
warrants upon the general fund of the Creek Nation, or otherwise
issuing payment to the subsequently hired attorney or any other person
except the plaintiff.137 Declaring he had no remedy at law by which he
could sue or recover salary and damages from the Creek Nation, he also
sought to enjoin the subsequently hired attorney from accepting any
payment from the Nation and requested that the court declare him the
legally constituted national attorney for the Creek Nation, entitled to
perform the duties and receive the salary of such position.
138
What is interesting about the case is that the Eighth Circuit
extended its holding in Thebo to claims for injunctive relief against an
individual tribal officer.' 39 Ordinarily, explained the court, an action at
134. In fact, the court explained that the states, after originally claiming no immunity
from suits, soon refused to "submit themselves to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals," ratifying the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. Thebo, 66 F. at 375.
Unless the "'honor and good faith of the state itself" should permit such judicial recourse,
"fo]ne claiming to be creditor of a state is remitted to the justice of its legislature." Id. at
376 (citing ExparteAyers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1881)).
135. Id. at 376.
136. See Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908). Pursuant to the contract, which
provided for cancellation by either party with thirty-days notice "upon good cause shown,"
the tribe had attempted to terminate its relationship with the plaintiff based upon an
unfavorable report it received issued by special inspectors to the federal government. The
report indicated that the attorney had been unduly influenced by strong sentiments
against another person engaged in service in Indian country so as "to render his
statements untrustworthy and to impair his usefulness as a public officer." Id. at 307.
Thirty days after serving notice on the attorney, the tribe entered into an identical contract
with another attorney. Upon receiving notice of the termination, the plaintiff filed the
equity action that is the basis for the case.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. With respect to state officers, the Supreme Court has held that suits for injunctive
relief brought against individual state officers or agents do not constitute a violation of the
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law for damages would constitute a complete remedy for breach of
contract for professional employment. The Creek Nation, however, is
exempt from civil suits to recover damages or compel performance of
contracts; and the courts cannot compel the principal officer of the
Nation to perform acts which would constitute performance of the
contract by the Nation if voluntarily undertaken by him.
[Plolitical societies, like private corporations, can act only through agents,
and to constrain those agents is to constrain the society. To say that this
tribe is exempt from civil suit on its contracts, and yet compel its principle
chief, by judicial process, to take funds from its treasury and turn them
over to the court to be applied in discharge of its contracts, is to destroy in
practice the very exemption which at the outset is conceded as a legal
right. 140
Moreover, to allow a party to circumvent the law's denial of a remedy of
law out of consideration for public policy, "would be a scandal to our
jurisprudence, and render equity less just than the law."141
In support of its position, the Eighth Circuit relied on precedent,
including the underlying policy rationales recognized therein,
established in Thebo. Like Thebo, it acknowledged that the public policy
that Indian tribes are exempt from civil suit "has been the settled
doctrine of the government from the beginning. "142 The Court also noted
that "[i]f any other course were adopted, the tribes would soon be
overwhelmed with civil litigation and judgments."143 The United States
court in the Indian Territory, therefore, had no jurisdiction to enforce
performance of the attorney's contract with the Creek Nation.
One more case confirmed the federal government's longstanding
position with respect to tribal sovereignty and liability to suit prior to the
Supreme Court's first formal recognition of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. In Turner v. United States and the Creek Nation of Indians,I44
the Supreme Court rejected another claim filed against the Creek Nation
for damages sustained by three bands of Creek citizens to an extensive
fence-line erected by the plaintiff. Although it hinged its decision on the
lack of a substantive right to recover the damages from a governmental
entity rather than sovereign immunity, the Court upheld the principle
that Indian nations enjoyed immunity from liability unless expressly
imposed upon them by Congress. 45 In doing so, it relied upon the fact
that the Creek Nation had been recognized by the United States "as a
distinct political community, with which it made treaties and which
140. Adams, 165 F. at 308.
141. Id. at 309. The public policy referred to by the court is that Indian tribes are exempt
from civil suit. Id. at 308.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Turner, 248 U.S. at 356.
145. Id. at 357-58.
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within its own territory administered its internal affairs." 146 As such and
like other governments, including state and municipal governments, it
was immune from liability from suit, at least with respect to injuries to
persons or properties sustained as a result of mob violence or other
failure to keep the peace.
4 7
Insofar as the case involved mob activity by tribal members, none of
whom officially represented the Creek Nation and only one of whom was
employed by the Creek Nation as its treasurer, the Supreme Court in
Kiowa Tribe was accurate in diminishing the authority of Turner as the
original source of its precedent on tribal immunity. The opinion does
focus upon the general presumption that, absent legislation to the
contrary, government entities should not be held liable for failure to
maintain the peace, including the spontaneous and destructive actions
of a group of individuals, even where certain tribal officers may have
been involved. It is important to note two points, however. First, Turner
was not the exclusive basis for the Supreme Court's first articulation of
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as something separate and
distinct from subject matter jurisdiction. In United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Court hearkened back to a "public
policy which exempted the dependent as well as the dominant
sovereignties from suit without consent" recorded in a number of
previous decisions of the federal courts.1
48
Second, the Court in Turner undeniably upheld dismissal of a
private action brought against the sovereign Creek Nation even where
Congress had enacted legislation that directly addressed the plaintiffs
dispute with the Nation. Enacted in 1908, the legislation authorized the
Court of Claims to "consider, and adjudicate and render judgment as law
and equity may require" the claim of plaintiff, Turner, against the Creek
Nation for destruction of personal property and the values of loss to
pasture for the actions of "any of the responsible Creek authorities, or
with their cognizance and acquiescence. " 149 The Act did not, however,
expressly address the fact that the governing structure of the Creek
Nation had been dissolved in a prior act of Congress. 5 0 Although
authority to sue the Creek Nation was implied by the act of 1908, the
Court held that there was nothing in the Act that indicated an intent to
create a new substantive right. The Court explained:
Without authorization from Congress, the Nation could not then have been
146. Id. at 357.
147. Id.
148. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512 nn. 10-11 (citing Turner, 248 U.S. at 385;
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 8; Adams, 165 F. at 308; Thebo, 66 F. at 372).
149. Turner, 248 U.S. at 356-57 (citing The Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 444, 457
(1908)).
150. The Court refers to The Act of March 1, 1901, § 46, 31 Stat. 861, 872 (1901).
Turner, 248 U.S. at 356.
2002] 693
33
Seielstad: Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity under Fede
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
sued in any court; at least without its consent .... The words of the
act.., merely identify claims which the court is authorized to consider.
Authority to sue the Creek Nation is implied; but there is nothing in the
act which even tends to indicate a purpose to create a new substantive
right. 151
What these early cases demonstrate is that the federal government
has long recognized and respected what amounts to tribal immunity
from suit even if the Supreme Court did not name the doctrine in so
many words until 1940. They demonstrate also that Congress has long
been recognized as the only entity with authority to authorize suits
against tribal governments. The cases indicate, moreover, that these
principles are fundamentally rooted in and derived from an
understanding that tribes, like other sovereign entities, possess distinct,
political authority over their territory, members, and matters affecting
their territory and internal self-governance. As such, tribes possess
natural immunity from suit, a fundamental attribute of the sovereign
power of any government entity possessing cognizable sovereignty.
Tribal immunity, then, emerges in these early cases as a well-established
immutable truth, rooted in public policy and well-established custom
and tradition between the different branches of the federal government
and integrated over time into judicial precedent.
4. Development of Federal Common Law of Tribal Immunity
Between 1940 and 1998, the Supreme Court first named, then
clarified, refined and firmly established, the doctrine of tribal immunity
as a principle of federal common law. In the first of these cases, Fidelity
& Guaranty, the Supreme Court refused-in the name of tribal
sovereign immunity-to uphold a judgment in federal bankruptcy court
fixing a credit obtained against the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.
152
The disputed decision involved a bankruptcy proceeding wherein the
United States, as trustee of the Nations' interest, sought to recover
royalties under a coal-mining lease on behalf of the tribes; the defendant
coal company, via its surety, filed a cross-claim against the Nations. 1
53
Consistent with its previous rulings, the Court held that the Indian
Nations were exempt from suit without Congressional authorization. "It
is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed to the
United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did."'5
4
Moreover, concluded the court, in filing for relief in the bankruptcy
151. Id. at 358.
152. Fidelity & Guar., 309 U.S. 506.
153. Id. at 510. The court instituted reorganization of the coal company pursuant to
federal bankruptcy law and offset the debtor's cross-claim against the Nation's claim for
royalties, leaving a net balance in favor of the debtor. Id.
154. Id. at 512.
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proceedings before the federal courts, the Nations in no way waived their
immunity from cross-claims. The Court stated:
The sovereignty possessing immunity should not be compelled to defend
against cross-actions away from its own territory or in courts, not of its
own choice, merely because its debtor was unavailable except outside the
jurisdiction of the sovereign's consent. This reasoning is particularly
applicable to Indian Nations with their unusual governmental organization
and peculiar problems."5
Although the Court does cite Turner and two lower court decisions in
support of its holding,15 6 it also refers to the "public policy which
exempted the dependent and the dominant sovereignties from suit
without consent" originally set forth in Chief Justice Marshall's seminal
opinion, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. '5 Therefore, pursuant to the
holding of the case, the United States could recover for the Nations
royalties from the surety in federal court, but the surety could not
maintain its cross-claims against the Nations. The Court concluded that
"[plossessing... immunity from direct suit, we are of the opinion that
[Indian Nations] possess similar immunity from cross-suits.
Following its decision in Fidelity & Guaranty, the Supreme Court
further refined its articulation of tribal sovereign immunity. In Puyallap
Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washington,5 9 wherein a state had
asserted jurisdiction over tribal fishing both within and outside the
reservation boundaries, the Court sustained tribal immunity from suit
without distinguishing where the tribal activities had occurred. In Three
Affiliated Tribes,16  wherein the Three Affiliated Tribes sued Wold
155. Id. at 513.
156. Id. at 512 (citing Turner, 248 U.S. at 358 and others).
157. Fidelity & Guar., 309 U.S. at 512 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1).
158. Id. at 513.
159. 433 U.S. 165 (1977). In Puyallup the State of Washington sought injunctive and
declaratory relief in state court to limit the number of steelhead trout that tribal members
could catch with nets both on and off the reservation and to compel the Tribe to report to
the state Department of Game the names of members authorized to exercise treaty fishing
rights together with the number of steelhead caught by its treaty fishermen each month.
The Tribe resisted the authority of the state court order on its own behalf as a sovereign
entity and on behalf of the affected tribal members. Although the Court held that the state
could regulate the off-reservation fishing activities of individual tribal members over whom
it properly obtained personal jurisdiction, it maintained that tribal sovereign immunity
protected the Tribe from regulation and suit in state court to compel it to monitor and
convey to state authorities the number of fish caught by tribal members. The Court stated:
"Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise
jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe." Id. at 172. It relied upon its own precedent as
well as that of the Washington Supreme Court. Id. (citing Fidelity & Guar., 309 U.S. 506;
State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Ct., 356 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Wash. 1960)). The Court also
referred to the conclusions of "the commentators." Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of Interior, Federal
Indian Law 491-94 (U.S. Govt. 1958)).
160. 476 U.S. 877. In that case, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation brought suit in state court against a non-Indian engineering firm for
negligence in the design and construction of a water system for an Indian village located
within the external boundaries of the reservation. The firm moved to dismiss the suit for
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Engineering in state court for negligence and breach of contract, the
Court held that tribes maintain immunity from suit even from
counterclaims and that states cannot condition state court jurisdiction
of suits brought by tribes against non-Indians upon a waiver of the tribe
of its immunity. The Court explained, "The common law sovereign
immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian
sovereignty and self-governance.... [fin the absence of federal
authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty is
privileged from diminution by the States." 6'
In perhaps one of its most dramatic interpretations relevant to
sovereign immunity yet to date, the Court in 1978 even preserved the
doctrine with respect to a claim brought by an individual tribal member
against her tribal government for allegedly violating a federal substantive
right to equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights
Act ("ICRA"). 162 In 1968, Congress enacted the ICRA, legislation that
makes certain substantive rights contained in the United States Bill of
Rights and made applicable to states via the Fourteenth Amendment
binding on American Indian tribal governments.163
Pursuant to ICRA, Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo, and her daughter Audrey Martinez, who was not a member of
the Pueblo, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court to
bar the enforcement of a tribal ordinance that denied tribal membership
and its associate rights and benefits to the children of female members
of the Pueblo who married outside of the tribe, but not to the children of
male members who married outside. Julia Martinez had married a
member of the Navajo Nation, and her children were ineligible for
membership in the Santa Clara Pueblo even though they were raised in
lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon a state statute that barred the tribe from
maintaining its suit in state court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity; and both the
trial court and the state's supreme court held that dismissal was appropriate. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision, however, on the grounds that the federal statute
governing state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country, Public Law 280, was
designed to expand state jurisdiction over Indian country and to encourage states to
assume such jurisdiction and that no federal provisions had been made for state
disclaimers of jurisdiction. Id. at 844-45. The Court also held that the jurisdictional
scheme imposed by the state unduly interfered with federal and tribal interests in self-
government and autonomy and federal interest in ensuring access to the courts. Id. at
898-90 (-This result simply cannot be reconciled with Congress's jealous regard for Indian
self-governance."). With respect to state statutory provisions that conditioned tribal court
access to state court upon a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court held that Congress-
not the states-had the authority to diminish and impose conditions upon "the common
law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe" and necessary for Indian sovereignty and
self-governance. Id& at 890.
161. ILat890-91.
162. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (holding that although Congress had rendered several
enumerated civil rights applicable to tribal governments, it failed to create a cause of action
except where it should become necessary to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus). See
generally Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. (West 2001).
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that community, participated in its life, spoke the Tewa language, and,
for all practical purposes, were culturally Santa Claran Indians.
164
Significantly, she filed suit in federal court only after exhausting a
number of efforts at challenging and amending the relevant ordinance
within the political and governing systems available within the Santa
Clara Pueblo. Her suit named the Tribe and its Governor, Lucario
Padilla, as defendants.
Following a full trial, the District Court found for the tribal
defendants on the merits, indicating that tribal membership rules were
squarely within the self-governing powers of the tribe, that the tribe was
in the best position to determine whether its membership ordinances
were consistent with the equal protection clause of ICRA, and that
cultural identity would best be promoted by deferring to the tribes'
interpretation of this provision. 165 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld
the District Court's determination that the federal courts had
jurisdiction 6 6 but determined that the tribe's interest in the ordinance
was not substantial enough to justify its discriminatory intent. 167
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and
held that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
Martinez' claim. Enforcement of ICRA, it held, is limited to a petitioner
seeking a writ of habeas corpus "to test the legality of his detention by
order of an Indian tribe."168 After Martinez, individuals seeking
enforcement of substantive rights guaranteed to them by Congress in
ICRA in circumstances other than detention must turn to remedies and
measures available within the relevant tribal system of government.
In 1991, the Court again pronounced its commitment to tribal
sovereign immunity, holding that tribes enjoy immunity from suit in
state courts for recovery of state taxes on the off-reservation sale of
cigarettes to non-Indians by tribal commercial entities, even where the
state may have the substantive right to collect the tax.169 As in Three
Affiliated Tribes, the tribe in this case initiated suit against Oklahoma's
Tax Commission in state court seeking injunctive relief from the
assessment of taxes on cigarette sales made in tribally owned
164. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 54 n. 5 (citing Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5,
18 (D.N.M. 1975)).
165. Id.
166. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 54 (citing Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1042
(10th Cir. 1976)). The Tenth Circuit determined federal jurisdiction based upon Title 28,
section 1343(4) of the United States Code, which confers subject matter jurisdiction over
.any civil action authorized by law.., to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(4) (West 2001)).
167. Id. While it recognized that the standards of analysis developed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were not necessarily controlling in the
case, it concluded that the gender-based classification was presumptively discriminatory
and could be sustained only if justified by a compelling tribal interest. Id. at 1047-48.
168. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (West 2001).
169. Okla. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. 505.
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convenience stores located on tribal land. The state counterclaimed for
all of the unpaid assessed taxes. Although the Court held that the state
did have the right under federal law to collect a state-imposed cigarette
tax on cigarette sales to nonmembers, it precluded the state from
seeking judicial enforcement against the tribe based upon the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.
The opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, illustrates once
again the Court's deep-seated commitment to preserving tribal sovereign
immunity. The Court begins its analysis, for instance, with the following
proposition: "Indian tribes are 'domestic dependent nations' that exercise
inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories.
" 170
Suits against tribes "are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a
clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation."17 1 The logic is
direct and simple: all sovereign entities are immune from suit by virtue
of their sovereignty; tribes are (and have always been) sovereign entities;
therefore, tribes enjoy immunity from suit. Immunity flows naturally
and logically from the sovereignty retained by Indian Nations. Aside
from the logical elegance of the doctrine, the Court ties its holding also
to previous precedent. 17
2
Moreover, reasoned the Court, "Congress has consistently reiterated
its approval of the immunity doctrine. "173 Although free to dispense with
immunity or limit it, Congress has only occasionally authorized limited
classes of suits, and never to enforce tax assessments. 7 4 At the same
time, it has consistently reflected a desire to promote Indian self-
governance, including tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.
"Under these circumstances," the Court announced, "we are not
disposed to modify the long-established principle of tribal sovereign
immunity."175  Thus, as a result of tribal immunity, the state of
Oklahoma would have to seek collection of the relevant taxes through
other means. 76 Seven years later, the Court re-articulated its position
on tribal immunity, extending its holding in Oklahoma Tax Commission
to efforts by private business entities to enforce contracts stemming from
170. Id at 509 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1).
171. Id- at 509 (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58).
172. Id. at 510 ("The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was originally enunciated by
this Court and has been reaffirmed in a number of cases." Id. (citing Turner, 248 U.S. at
358 and others).
173. Id. at 510.
174. Id. (citing Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (West
2001), and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25
U.S.C.A. § 450 et seq. (West 2001)).
175. Okla. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. at 510.
176. Id. at 514. The remedies suggested by the Court include: (1) suing individual tribal
agents or officers, (2) "seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation," (3) assessing
wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores, (4) entering into
agreements with the tribes for a mutually satisfactory scheme for tax collection, or (5)
seeking redress from Congress. Id. at 514 (internal citations omitted).
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tribal commercial activities engaged in outside of the boundaries of tribal
lands. 
177
D. Current Contours of Federal Common Law Regarding Sovereign
Immunity
1. Summary of Basic Legal Principles Regarding Immunity
In each of its decisions regarding tribal immunity, the Court has
consistently upheld the principle that "an Indian tribe is subject to suit
only where Congress has authorized suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity." 178  It has adhered to that principle whether the claim
asserted against a tribal government is brought directly against the tribe
or as a cross- or counter-claim to a suit maintained by the tribe in the
first instance. 179 It has refused to distinguish for sovereign immunity
purposes between tribal activities that take place within reservation
boundaries and those that take place elsewhere.1is Moreover, the
doctrine has been upheld whether the challenged tribal activity involved
commercial or governmental actions by the tribe.18 1 In fact, immunity
has been extended to agencies of the tribe 8 2 as well as, in some
circumstances, to tribally-chartered corporations.183 With the exception
of suits brought by the federal government, tribes maintain immunity
from suit vis-A-vis all other entities. States must respect tribal
immunity, even where they may have waived their own immunity from
liability.184 The doctrine protects tribes from suit in federal court, state
177. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760.
178. Id. at 752. See generally Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. 877; Martinez, 436 U.S. 49.
While this general principle protects tribal immunity from suit vis-&-vis state and private
parties, however, lower circuit courts have determined that tribes additionally are not
immune from suits by the United States. See e.g. U.S. v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians, 827 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Yakima Tribal Court 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th
Cir. 1986). Consistent with the dependent sovereign status created and recognized by the
federal government, the power of tribes to sue the United States has not similarly been
recognized, however. See e.g. Yakima Tribal Court 806 F.2d 853.
179. See e.g. Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. 877.
180. See e.g. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754.
181. Id. See Doe v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 756 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 2001) (he fact that
the plaintiff sustained injury at a commercial establishment, a hotel, outside the
reservation was irrelevant because tribes are immune from suits arising from their
commercial activities, whether conducted on or off the reservation.).
182. See e.g. Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.
1986).
183. See e.g. Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. and Community Fund, Inc., 658 N.E.2d
989, 994-95 (N.Y. 1995). Corporations operating independently of tribal government, who
may not be construed as extensions of the tribe, however, may not qualify for immunity.
See generally Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (1989).
184. See e.g. Okla. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. 505. See generally Morgan, 443 P.2d 421.
Tribes of course are barred from suing states in federal court without their consent.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44; Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261. The Ninth Circuit has
determined that the inherent sovereignty of the tribes does not abrogate the states'
immunity, even where a state has waived its own immunity. See e.g. Mont. v. Gilham, 127
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court, and tribal court.18 5
In short, the Supreme Court has firmly recognized and established
that so long as a tribe is formally recognized by the federal government,
it enjoys the protection of the doctrine of tribal immunity. 186 Only where
clear and unequivocal waiver may be construed from the actions and
agreements of an authorized representative of a tribe187 or where
Congressional legislation unmistakably authorizes a breach in
immunity'88 may the doctrine of tribal immunity be abrogated under law
established by the federal judiciary. While tribes did not always have the
unfettered authority to waive their own immunity, federal law now
generally presumes such authority. 8 9 Some degree of interpretive
latitude now exists for courts faced with determining whether certain
contractual or statutory terms should be construed as waiving tribal
immunity. 190 Aside from these possibilities, the question remains: what
F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 1997).
185. See e.g. Pan Am., 884 F.2d 416 (state and federal courts).
186. The federal government maintains a Federal Register list of recognized tribes. Since
1994, Congress has required the Secretary of the Interior to annually publish, in the
Federal Register, a list of tribes recognized and eligible for federal services by virtue of their
Indian status. 25 U.S.CA. § 479a-1 (West 2001). Inclusion on this list is important for
the purposes of sovereign immunity. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d
1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
187. The C & L Enterprises case, for instance, is an example of how a federal court may
permit suit against a tribe based upon an arbitration clause or other contractual
arrangement in which the tribe waives immunity from suit. C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411 (2001).
188. Not only must Congress express a clear and unmistakable intent to abrogate tribal
immunity, but Congress must also provide for a cause of action. See Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(Court determined that no suit under ICRA, other than a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 25 U.S.C.A. § 1303, could be maintained in federal court even as against
tribal officers because no cause of action could be implied from the legislation.).
189. In and prior to 1895, for instance, it appeared that tribes could not agree to be
subjected to suit without Congressional approval. See e.g. Thebo, 66 F. 372. Later,
decisions implied first that tribes might be able to waive immunity without congressional
approval, and later, that tribes had unfettered authority to waive immunity. See e.g.
Turner, 248 U.S. at 358; Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. For a more detailed discussion of this
progression in the law as well as of contemporary judicial interpretations of tribal waivers,
see William V. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three "S"es: Secretarial
Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 169, 173-85
(1994).
190. The proceedings culminating in C & L Enterprises demonstrate the possible range of
interpretive latitude that exists with respect to whether a tribe has voluntarily waived its
immunity from suit. While the lower court determined that the arbitration provisions set
forth in the contract between the parties was not sufficiently clear to warrant waiver of
immunity, the Supreme Court held otherwise. Since the Court's holding is limited to a
particular arbitration clause in a particularized set of circumstances, it does not foreclose
the ability of other courts-state, federal, or tribal-to reach different conclusions with
respect to how to interpret tribal contracts, ordinances, constitutions, or other documents
that may indicate an intent to waive sovereign immunity. See e.g. Buchanan v. Sokaogon
Chippewa Tribe, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (General "sue and be sued"
clause that authorized tribal housing authority "to agree by contract to waive any
immunity from suit which it might otherwise have[,J" may not be construed as a tribal
waiver of immunity absent a contract containing express waiver.). See generally Dillon v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that similar "sue
and be sued clause"-required before the tribe can receive HUD assistance-did not
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additional interpretive latitude exists post-Kiowa Tribe for those who
desire to pursue remedies against American Indian nations?
2. Post-Kiowa Tribe Interpretive Possibilities
First, claims against particular tribal officers in some
circumstances may provide a way for outside entities to influence or
circumscribe the exercise of tribal power. The Supreme Court, for
instance, has indicated that tribal immunity does not always protect
tribal officers. 191 If tribal officers or employees act within the boundaries
of their lawful authority, they may be entitled to immunity from suit
under the doctrine of tribal immunity192 If their official acts lie beyond
the boundaries of their own authority, though, or exceed what the tribe
has the legal authority to confer, some courts have held that individual
officers or employees may be subject to suit. 93 Tribal judges routinely
are subjected to suit in federal court in suits challenging the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction by tribal courts.1 94 A number of courts have
held that tribal immunity bars claims for damages against tribal
officials.' 95 Variability therefore exists in judicial determinations about
constitute a voluntary waiver of immunity); Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 105 F. Supp.
2d 12 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (HUD-mandated "sue and be sued" language contained in tribal
ordinance did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity in the absence of effectuation
by a separate contract).
191. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59. As Martinez indicates, however, suits against
individual officers for injunctive relief may not always be permitted, at least under the
Indian Civil Rights Act, where subject matter jurisdiction is confined by Congressional
legislation to review of petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Cf. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala
Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the doctrine of tribal
immunity bars claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages); Snow v.
Quinault Indian Nation, 709 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1983) ("tribal immunity extends to
tribal officials acting in their representative capacity and within the scope of their
authority").
192. See e.g. Fletcher v. U.S., 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997); Hardin v. White Mt.
Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985).
193. Tribal officials may be subject to suit for declaratory and injunctive relief just like
state officers, who may be sued pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123. See Baker Electric Coop. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1471-72 (8th Cir.
1994); Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac and Fox Tribe, 725 F.2d 572, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1984). See
generally Comstock Oil & Gas Inc. v. Ala. and Choushatta Indian Tribes of Tex, 261 F.3d
567, 574 (5th Cir. 2001) (tribal council members not immune from suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief); 7TEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
194. The Supreme Court opened the way for challenges to tribal court jurisdiction in Iowa
Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) and National Farmers Union Inc. v. Crow
Tribe ofIndians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Since these decisions, the numbers of challenges in
federal court to tribal court jurisdiction have blossomed. As the federal courts have
accepted such challenges to tribal court jurisdiction pursuant to their powers under
federal question or diversity jurisdiction, the immunity of tribes vis-&-vis their judiciaries
and judges constructively has been waived in these actions, at least with respect to
declaratory and injunctive relief requested by non-Indian defendants sued in tribal court.
An exploration of this phenomenon is worthy of further exploration, but lies beyond the
scope of this paper.
195. See e.g. Buchanan, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe,
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whether and to what extent the official actions of tribal officers may be
subject to suit.
Additionally, interpretive latitude may exist within specific
legislative enactments that may provide for suit against tribes. For
instance, under the ICRA, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court, determinations of whether a person is "in custody" for the
purpose of habeas review may provide some opportunity for persons
injured by tribal action and deprived of liberty to maintain suit in federal
court. 196 Regulatory legislation -like that contained in many
environmental statutes- provides another context for examining
variation in judicial interpretation over the scope of tribal immunity. 19 7
Litigation has resulted in divergent rulings over whether other legislative
enactments should be construed as abrogating tribal immunity or
creating a cause of action against tribes or tribal officers. 198
Another area ripe for interpretation is whether different tribal
business entities or agencies constitute an arm of the tribe for the
purpose of sovereign immunity.' 99 Whether a tribally-owned or operated
196. Some courts, for instance, have been more proactive in extending the definition of"in
custody" under ICRA to include banishment of tribal members, probation, and other
situations that do not constitute actual penal confinement. See e.g. Poodry v. Tonawanda
Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). Others have been more resistant to
such expansive interpretations. Differences in the interpretation of other pieces of
Congressional legislation may allow for similar latitude in interpretation. See e.g. In re
NatL Cattle Cong., 247 B.R. 259 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2000) (for the proposition that Indian
tribes' sovereign immunity has not been unequivocally abrogated, under the Bankruptcy
Code, by Congress).
197. See infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
198. See e.g. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (Congress
did not waive tribal immunity in enacting Rehabilitation Act, nor did Tribal Chief waive
sovereign immunity when he accepted federal funds contingent upon compliance with the
Act; therefore, tribal employee could not maintain suit against the tribe for compliance
with the Act.); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000)
(citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59) ("[nlothing on face of [the federal] Copyright Act 'purports
to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions' brought by private
parties.... and a congressional abrogation... cannot be implied"); Fla. Paraplegic Assn.,
v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Americans with
Disabilities Act does not abrogate tribal immunity, and therefore that private entities may
not sue tribes under the Act); Fla. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 1999)
(The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did not abrogate tribal immunity from state action to
compel compliance with the Act and State had no implied right of action under IGRA for
declaratory or injunctive relief against Class III tribal gaming allegedly being unlawfully
conducted without a Tribal-State compact.); Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Authl, 928
F.2d 542, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1991) (Seneca Nation immune from suit under 1985 Act
regulating the lease of tribal lands because the Act "fails to unambiguously express
Congress's intent to subject the Nation to lawsuits .... "). In short, every piece of
Congressional legislation applied to tribes may be analyzed-often times with different
results-to ascertain whether Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity. As these
cases indicate, most post-Kiowa Tribe interpretations of Congressional legislation have
been protective of tribal immunity, declining to imply waivers or causes of action where
none are clearly expressed on the face of the legislation.
199. A number of courts have held that the principle of sovereign immunity applies to
tribal entities that are arms of the tribe. See e.g. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuornuck Hous. Autl, 207 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) ("We see no reason why the
Authority (an arm of the Tribe, not separately incorporated) should be treated any
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casino, gaming facility, convenience store, housing authority, or other
entity engaged in business with non-tribal entities, may be the subject of
litigation and diverse judicial outcome, depends on the circumstances.2 °0
Finally, another significant interpretive issue may arise for
individuals who may be barred from seeking redress against tribes but
may desire to pursue claims against tribal officers or other private
entities involved in the underlying basis for the suit: namely, whether
the Tribe is an "indispensable party" pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 19(b) such that the suit against the remaining parties should
be dismissed. Rule 19(b) enumerates a number of factors to guide
courts in determining whether a party is indispensable.20 ' It also
provides for judicial determination of whether "in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it."202 As
such, it provides courts with considerable latitude in deciding whether
and, in what circumstances, to allow a suit to proceed against other
officers when the doctrine of tribal immunity bars a tribal defendant
from the proceedings. While some courts have allowed suits to proceed
against connected non-tribal defendants notwithstanding tribal
203immunity, others have been more restrictive. Although holdings
under Rule 19 do not affect the doctrine of tribal immunity per se, they
do affect whether a party may be able to pursue a judicial remedy
against anyone involved in a disputed action where a Tribe would also be
differently [than the Tribe itself] for jurisdictional purposes."); Warrall v. Mashantucket
Pequot Gaming Enter., 131 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (D. Conn. 2001) (Tribal law establishes
that the Gaming Enterprise is an economic subdivision of the tribe, has never been
separately incorporated under federal, state, or tribal law, is subject to supervision by the
tribal council, and, hence, "is an agency of the Tribe entitled to benefit from the Tribe's
sovereign immunity.").
200. See generally Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Community College, 205 F.3d 1040, 1043
(8th Cir. 2000) (Tribe-operated community college run as a non-profit corporation, whose
goal was making post-secondary education available to tribal members on reservation, was
governed by board co-consisting of one enrolled member per tribal district. Court held the
community college to be "an arm of the tribe and not.., a mere business [, and therefore
was] entitled to tribal immunity" from employee's discrimination claims.); Bassett, 204
F.3d at 358 (holding that tribe was not an indispensable party with respect to claims for
copyright infringement brought against tribally-administered, non-profit museum, the
court stated: "It may be that the district court will conclude.., that the museum is an
agency of the Tribe and, as such, is entitled to benefit from the Tribe's immunity... If so,
plaintiff would need to amend its pleading to seek the injunction against the
administrators of the Museum, rather than the museum itself.").
201. These include whether the absent party might be prejudiced by a judgment rendered
in its absence, whether plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were
dismissed, etc. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (West 2001).
202. Id.
203. See e.g. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 358-59 (holding that tribe was not indispensable to suit
to enjoin museum from showing a tribally-produced film on the grounds that plaintiffs
copyrights had been infringed and stating: "But whether the suit to enjoin infringement of
the plaintiffs copyright is directed against the Museum or its administrators, we see no
reason why the Tribe should be considered indispensable to that claim."). Cf. Fluent 928
U.S. 542 (dismissing action against Seneca Nation and non-tribal defendants associated
with the Seneca because the tribe was immune and was found to be an indispensable
party under Rule 19(b)).
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a party but for its immunity.
Despite the existence of an array of interpretive possibilities,
including the potential mechanisms for reviewing or challenging the
exercise of tribal power described above, the doctrine of tribal immunity
is well-established as a matter of federal common law. It sets forth a
general presumptive rule aimed at protecting the treasuries and self-
governing powers of tribal governments and derives its existence from
the presumed and long-recognized inherent sovereignty of Indian
nations. The doctrine is not easily disturbed, and interpretive deviations
from the general rule should be cautiously undertaken. As the Second
Circuit explained following the Court's decision in Kiowa Tribe:
In a line of cases decided over a period of more than 150 years, the
Supreme Court has recognized that Indian tribes 'retain[] their original
natural rights' which vested in them, as sovereign entities, long before the
genesis of the United States.... Although Indian tribes are 'domestic
dependent nations' whose sovereignty is not absolute but may be limited
by Congress .... federal encroachment upon Indian tribes' natural rights
is a serious undertaking, and we should not assume lightly that Congress
intended to restrict Indian sovereignty through a piece of legislation. This
respect for the inherent autonomy Indian tribes enjoy has been
204particularly enduring where tribal immunity from suit is concerned.
3. The Supreme Court's Willingness to Limit Tribal Sovereignty in
Other Areas of the Law: Tribal Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
Another interesting feature of the doctrine of tribal immunity is that
it has been preserved and perpetuated by the modern Supreme Court
even as other aspects of tribal sovereignty have been altered or even
diminished by the Court. While a full analysis of this incongruence in
the Court's jurisprudence goes beyond the scope of this Article, the
Court's preservation of the doctrine of tribal immunity is noteworthy.
20 5
In a series of other opinions related to tribal jurisdiction and self-
governance, the Court has opted to shift longstanding presumptive rules
of interpretation about tribal sovereignty, thereby delimiting tribal
authority and demonstrating a striking propensity for judicial activism
with respect to defining the boundaries of tribal sovereignty. Recent
changes in the Court's jurisprudence have primarily focused on tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
204. la. Paraplegic Assr, 166 F.3d at 1130 (internal citations omitted for clarity).
205. The discrepancy, for instance, presents a number of general questions about the
consistency in the Court's jurisprudence and analytical methods, the role of politics injudicial decision-making, the impact of the Court's jurisprudence with respect to state
immunity upon the doctrine of tribal immunity and vice versa, as well as more particular
questions such as the various meanings that may be accorded to the Court's
pronouncements. For instance, the cases beg the question: what meaning, if any, can be
extrapolated about the Court's intentions or views about tribal sovereignty in Kiowa Tribe
in light of its decisions in other areas?
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In 1997, the Supreme Court took its first step toward altering the
status quo with respect to tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors,06 the Court held that a tribal
court could not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action for negligence
brought against a driver and the driver's employer, neither of who were
members of the tribe, for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident
that occurred on a state highway that traversed reservation land. The
accident occurred on tribal trust land within reservation boundaries on
a public highway maintained by the state pursuant to a federally granted
right-of-way.
Expressing no view on where the proper forum would lie where an
accident occurs on a tribal road within a reservation, the Court
concluded that "tribal courts may not entertain claims against
nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a
statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of
nonmembers on the highway in question."207 Neither the holding nor the
Court's analysis was based upon any Congressional legislation, nor did
the Court point to precedent that supported the limiting of tribal
sovereignty in the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 2 s  Rather, the
206. 520 U.S. 438. The original suit was filed in tribal court by Gisela Fredericks, a non-
Indian widow of a deceased tribal member, and her five adult children, all tribal members.
Id. at 443-44. The opinion, delivered by Justice Ginsburg, was unanimous.
While Srate may have marked the first time the Supreme Court moved to shift the
presumptive burdens about tribal sovereignty in the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction,
two previous decisions marked a shift in the Court's jurisprudence regarding tribal
authority over criminal jurisdiction and regulatory jurisdiction. In Oliphant v. Suquamish,
435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Court held that tribes have no general criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. While the tribe in that case argued that it had inherent, albeit long-
unexercised, jurisdiction over non-Indians that had not been diminished by treaty or
statute, the Court determined that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was not
consistent with the status of tribes as dependent sovereigns.
In Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981), the Court held that a tribe generally lacks
inherent power to regulate hunting and fishing conducted by non-Indians on non-Indian-
owned land within a reservation. Others have documented the role of Oliphant and
Montana in divesting tribal sovereignty as well. See e.g. Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces
Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 Buff.
Pub. Int. L.J. 147 (2000) (arguing that the Court has moved increasingly from a
territorially-based to a consent-based conception of tribal sovereignty that limits the
exercise of tribal sovereignty to tribal members and, to some extent their land, who have
agreed to become and remain tribal members and attributing this development in part to
the Court's "preoccupation with liberal goals in the decades following the Civil Rights
Movement").
207. Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
208. Prior to Strate, distinctions in the federal law describing tribal sovereignty existed
depending on whether the matter involved criminal jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction, or
taxation or regulatory authority. For instance, William Canby's seminal treatise divides the
discussion of American Indian Law into a number of distinct topics, including "Present
Division of Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country," "Present Division of Civil Jurisdiction
in Indian Country," and "Taxation and Regulation in Indian Country." Canby, supra n. 8,
at 142-69, 173-212, 243-81. After Oliphant and a number of Congressional enactments
such as the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2001) and the General Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West 2001), tribal authority over criminal jurisdiction was most
restricted. Montana imposed some restrictions on regulatory authority, at least with
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Court referred to Oliphane0 9 and Montana,210 two cases that addressed
tribal jurisdiction in other, markedly different, contexts; and it made a
number of pronouncements that seemed to change important
interpretive principles that emerged from previous precedent.2 11
While a few federal courts relied on Strate to justify delimiting tribal
212
adjudicatory jurisdiction in other circumstances, many interpreted the
opinion more narrowly, with limited applicability to certain rights-of-
way21 3 or otherwise circumscribing its effect on tribal sovereignty.
2 14
respect to non-members and activities occurring on fee land. No express restrictions,
either statutory or pursuant to Supreme Court opinion, existed with respect to the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal courts.
209. Oliphant 435 U.S. 191 (holding Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians). The Court also referred to its decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684-85
(1990) in which it held that Indian tribes also lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 446 n. 5. Congress responded to Duro by expressly
providing for tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. See generally 25
U.S.C.A. § 1301(2) (West 2001).
210. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. (holding that the Crow Tribe had authority to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within reservation boundaries owned in fee
simple by non-Indians but indicating that tribes may exercise regulatory authority-i.e.,
through taxation, licensing, or other means-over non-Indians "who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements," or where the conduct of non-Indians "threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe).
Despite the fact that Strate involved neither fee land, nor regulatory jurisdiction, and the
underlying facts indicated that the Strate defendants had entered into commercial dealings
with the tribe toward repair of the road, the Court relied heavily on Montana and declined
to extend either of its exceptions to the circumstances.
211. The analytical methods and assumptions relied upon by the Court in Strate and its
progeny before the Supreme Court, although worthy of further discussion, go beyond the
scope of this Article and are the subject of a separate work in progress by the author. As
an example of how the Court's unsupported pronouncements or characterizations of the
law lay the foundation for fundamental change in its jurisprudence, however, consider the
following introduction to its analysis in Strate. "Our case law establishes that, absent
express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction over the conduct of
nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances." Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. There is no
citation that follows this sentence in the opinion. Although the Court subsequently refers
to Oliphant and Montana, neither of these cases establishes such a general proposition. In
fact, the opposite presumptive rule may actually be more readily derived from prior
precedent: namely, pursuant to their inherent sovereign power that pre-existed the
formation of the United States of America, tribes retain the power to exercise jurisdiction
over people and lands within their reservations unless Congress or treaty takes it away.
Indeed, notwithstanding the current Supreme Court's interpretation of the case, Montana
offers the following statement about this matter: "To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."
Mont., 450 U.S. at 565.
212. See e.g. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999); County of
Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998) (relying extensively on Strate in holding tribal
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against county defendants for assault,
batter, false imprisonment and other claims stemming from arrest of member of Nez Perce
tribe that took place on fee land within exterior boundaries of reservation); Hornell Brewing
Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal CL, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Marchington, 127
F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (extending holding in Strate to civil suit brought by a tribal
member against a nonmember arising from an accident on a state highway through the
reservation) (emphasis added); Mont. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1999); Big Horn
County Elec. Coop., v. Adams, 53 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Mont. 1999).
213. Even the Supreme Court initially indicated that Strate should be narrowly confined
to the facts of that case. In El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Netzsosie, 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999),
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Whatever interpretive leeway Strate once left with respect to tribal
adjudicatory-or even regulatory-jurisdiction, however, was narrowed
in two subsequent opinions.
• 215
In Atkinson T-ading Company v. Shirley, the Court extended the
interpretive framework it established in Strate and Montana to the power
of tribes over taxation. It held that the Navajo Nation lacked authority to
impose a tax on nonmember guests of a hotel located near the Grand
Canyon on non-Indian fee land within the reservation. In doing so, it
rejected argument based on other precedent that the power of taxation is
unique, rooted in precedent separate from the Montana-Strate line of
reasoning, and critical to the power of a sovereign to generate revenue
and control economic activity within its jurisdiction. '6 Instead, the
Court elected to "apply Montana straight up."21 7 The Court concluded
that "[blecause Congress has not authorized the Navajo Nation's hotel
occupancy tax through treaty or statute, and because the incidence of
the tax falls upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land, it is incumbent
upon the Navajo Nation to establish the existence of one of Montana's
"218
exceptions. It declined in the end, however, to find that either of
Montands exceptions applied to the tax at issue in Atkinson21 9 Thus, it
Justice Souter makes the following response in rejecting a challenge to tribal court subject
matter jurisdiction raised by defendant in a nuclear tort action: "But Strate dealt with
claims against nonmembers arising on state highways, and 'express[ed] no view on the
governing law or proper forum when an accident occurs on a tribal road within a
reservation.' By contrast, the events in question here occurred in tribal lands." Id. at 1436
n. 4.
214. See e.g. Nev. v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020, rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2304, (2001) (declined to
extend the holding in Strate to a civil rights and tort action brought by tribal member
against state officials in response to their seizure of big-horn sheep head trophies on
Indian-owned allotted land within a reservation).
215. 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001). The opinion was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Souter flied a concurring opinion in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined.
216. Respondents relied on Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), a case
decided one year after Montana that upheld a severance tax imposed by the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe upon non-indian lessees authorized to extract oil and gas from tribal land.
The Court in Atkinson, however, distinguished Merrion-or, by another interpretation
rather, dismissed it without careful reasoning-and pronounced: "An Indian tribe's
sovereign power to tax-whatever its derivation-reaches no further than tribal land."
Atkinson, 121 S. Ct. at 1832. Furthermore, announced the Court, rather coy in its choice
of words: "We therefore do not read Men-ion to exempt taxation from Montana's general rule
that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.
Accordingly, as in Strate, we apply Montana straight up." Id.
217. Atkinson, 121 S. Ct. at 1832.
218. Id.
219. Id. With respect to the first exception, the Navajo Nation presented a number of
factors suggesting that Cameron Trading Post had established a "consensual relationship"
with the Nation. These included the fact that the Navajo Tribal Police, Tribal Emergency
Medical Services, and Fire Department responded to emergencies and otherwise provided
services to the hotel owner and its guests. The Trading Post also had long conducted
business with the Navajo Nation and its members such that it was required to obtain a
license to transact business pursuant to regulatory rules promulgated by the United States
Indian Affairs Commissioner and set forth at 25 C.F.R. pt. 141 (2000). Id. at 1832-33. The
Court in Atkinson, however, determined that "Montana's consensual relationship exception
requires that the tax or regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the
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concluded that the Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax upon
nonmembers on non-Indian fee land is "presumptively invalid," and
because it found also that the Nation failed to established grounds to
satisfy either Montana exception, it reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision
to uphold the tax.22
As in Atkinson, the Supreme Court in Hicks narrowed tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians one step further. In Hicks, the
Court, reversing decisions by both lower courts, held that the Fallon
Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over a tribal member's civil rights and
tort claims arising from a search and seizure by state game wardens that
took place on Indian land within the reservation.2 The claims
considered by the Supreme Court involved the state defendants in their
individual capacities, as the Tribal Court granted plaintiffs motion to
voluntarily dismiss the state defendants in their official capacities. 2
consensual relationship itself.... A nonmember's consensual relationship in one
area... does not trigger tribal civil authority in another-it is not 'in for a penny, in for a
Pound.'" Id. at 1833-34 (citing E. Ravenscroft, The Canterbury Guests; Or a Bargain
Broken, act v, sc. 1.) Focusing, instead on the tribe's relationship with the nonmember
guests, the Court concluded that the Trading Post "cannot be said to have consented to
such a tax by virtue of its status as an 'Indian trader.'" Id. at 1834.
The Court similarly declined to extend Montana's second exception to the hotel
occupancy tax even in light of evidence demonstrating, in addition to that set forth above,
that the Cameron Trading Post employs nearly 100 members of the Navajo Nation, derives
business from tourists visiting the vast reservation lands which surround the Trading
Post's isolated property, and that the Cameron Chapter of the Navajo Nation possesses an
"'overwhelming Indian character.'" Id. (citing Brief for Respondents 13-14). "[W]e fail to see
how petitioner's operation of a hotel on non-Indian fee land 'threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Id. (citing Mont., 450 U.S. at 566).
The Court further distinguished Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yaktma Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 440 (1989) in which the Court held that the Yakima Nation
had the power to zone a small, non-Indian parcel located in the heart of over 8000,000
acres of tribal land. "[W]e think it plain that the judgment in Brendale turned on both the
closed nature of the non-Indian fee land and the fact that its development would place the
entire area 'in jeopardy.'" Atkinson, 121 S. Ct. at 1834-35 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at
443). Whatever the percentage of non-Indian fee land or the effect operation of the
Cameron Trading Post might have had on surrounding Navajo land, according to the
Court, "it does not endanger the Navajo Nation's political integrity." Id. at 1835.
220. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, indicated that the presumptive rules set forth in Montana should be applied to all
issues regarding tribal jurisdiction over non-members regardless of the status of the
underlying land. Atkinson, 121 S. Ct. at 1835 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas,
JJ., concurring).
221. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. 2304. The opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia. The complaints
that precipitated the litigation alleged a variety of federal and tribal law claims, including
wrongful civil proceedings, unreasonable search and seizure, trespass to land, trespass to
chattels, abuse of process, infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Indian Civil
Rights Act and other federal civil rights. According to the decision of the federal district
court, the parties proceeded as if the federal civil rights claim alleged was a Section 1983
claim for a fourth amendment violation, and the district court assumed such a claim was
included for the purposes of its analysis. See Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455.
222. Initially, Hicks, a member of the Fallon-Paiute Shoshone tribe, filed suit in Fallon
Tribal Court against the State of Nevada, the Tribal Judge who approved a state search
warrant, the tribal officers who assisted in executing the warrant, and the state officers in
their official and individual capacities. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2306. The State of Nevada,
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The Court extended its holdings set forth in Montana and Strate to the
circumstances set forth in Hicks.22 3 Avoiding the question as to whether
the nature and scope of tribes' adjudicative jurisdiction are equivalent to
tribes' legislative jurisdiction, the Court determined that the Fallon
Tribal Court lacked even legislative jurisdiction under the circumstances
set forth in Hicks.2 m Although Montana involved regulation of non-
Indian activity on non-Indian-owned land and Strate involved activity on
a public right-of-way held by the state, the Court in Hicks concluded:
"[T]he existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough to support
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers. "2 2 Moreover, continued the
Court, the tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction over the state game
wardens was neither necessary to protect tribal self-governance or
internal relations, nor conferred by Congress.2 6 Instead, the opinion
elevated the interests of the State in investigating and enforcing its own
laws over and above any interests that Mr. Hicks, a tribal member, or
the Fallon-Paiute Tribe might have in protecting themselves from
intrusions into tribal lands and homes due to wrongful searches and
seizures by state officials.2 27 In doing so, the Supreme Court effectively
administrator for the State Division of Wildlife, and state game wardens subsequently
sought a declaration in federal court that the Fallon Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over
Hicks' claims against the State of Nevada and its officers and employees, whether in their
official or individual capacities. Id. The latter action formed the basis of review by the
Supreme Court in Hicks.
223. The Court observed upfront that "[t]he principle of Indian law central to this aspect
of the case is our holding in Strate .... That formulation leaves open the question
whether a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendants equals its legislative
jurisdiction." Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2309. However, it addressed first whether the tribe
would even have legislative authority over the state wardens executing a search warrant for
evidence of an off-reservation crime.
224. Id. The Court cited Strate for the proposition that "'a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.'" Id. (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 453). It
declined, however, to resolve whether the two types ofjurisdiction would be equal.
225. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2310. The Court cited no authority in support of this
proposition. Indeed, it acknowledged that according to previous precedent, including
Montana, the ownership status of the underlying land was a factor-albeit "only one
factor"-in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers was necessary
to protect tribal self-government or internal relations. Id.
226. The opinion interestingly did not address the first Montana exception that applied
when a non-member entered into a consensual relationship with the Tribe; nor did it
contain analysis explaining in what ways the regulation of state wardens (or other police
officers) who enter tribal lands for the purposes of investigating or arresting tribal members
would fail to implicate tribal self-government and internal relations. Rather, the Court
simply announced that "Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed by them
does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation." Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at
2311. It proceeded thereafter to discuss state sovereignty, emphasizing that "[s]tate
sovereignty does not end at the reservation's border." Id. This discussion of state
sovereignty departs from the analysis consistently applied by the Court in its precedent
regarding tribal sovereignty, including its decision in Montana.
227. Instead of following the traditional analysis for determining questions of tribal
sovereignty, the Court in Hicks injects a discussion of the state's interests in entering the
reservation to pursue investigation and enforcement of state laws against tribal members.
The state's interests, then, override the tribal interests in self-governance, including the
regulation of internal relations, even though the Court itself concedes that "it is not entirely
clear from our precedent whether the last mentioned authority entails the corollary right to
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completed reversal of a longstanding presumption previously recognized
in its precedent: namely, that tribes possess inherent sovereign
authority unless and until such presumption can be rebutted by
evidence of express divestiture by Congress. 228 After Hicks and in view of
Strate and Atkinson, the presumptive interpretive rule articulated by the
current Supreme Court now seems to be that tribes lack regulatory and
adjudicatory authority over nonmembers regardless of where the activity
occurs unless Congress expressly bestows such authority upon them or
one of the Montana exceptions applies. 229 This is more consistent with a
consent-based conception of tribal sovereignty in which tribes may
exercise power over members, and to some extent their lands, but are
limited in their ability to do so absent Congressional delegation with
respect to non-members.23 °  In four years, then, the Court has
powerfully divested the tribes of much sovereign authority with respect
to a significant manifestation of tribal sovereignty.
231
enter a reservation (including Indian fee lands) for enforcement purposes... " Hicks, 121
S. Ct. at 2312. The Court elevates the interests of the State in this case even in the face of
Hicks' argument that such impact was minimal because the case involved a suit against
state officials in their individual capacities. Id. at 2313. "We think... the distinction
between individual and official capacity suits is irrelevant." Id. Moreover, the Court refers
sui generis to the "States' inherent jurisdiction" that can "be stripped by Congress" but had
not happened with respect to execution of state warrants. Id.
228. This presumption was articulated, for instance, in cases such as Willis v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (recognizing authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs
involving non-Indians) and U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (affirming that tribes
possess attributes of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty, statute, or by implication from
their status as domestic dependent sovereign nations). The federal district court in Hicks
acknowledged the longstanding and traditional presumption set forth in Wi/liams and
Wheeler, concluding that Montana "seemed to inexplicably reverse the traditional
presumption" set forth in those cases. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. at 1464. The Supreme Court,
however, declined to follow its reasoning in Williams or Wheeler.
229. In light of Hicks, the presumption clearly appears to be the rule where a state or one
of its law enforcement officers is a defendant in a tribal court or the subject of tribal
regulation or legislation. It is unclear, however, how lower courts or the Supreme Court
itself in future opinions will apply the presumption with respect to other types of
nonmember defendants, particularly since the Court in Strate took such pains to
emphasize the non-Indian character of the status of the land involved. It is also unclear
what will become of the Montana exceptions in view of the fact that (1) the Court in Hicks
failed to do an analysis of the "consensual relations" exception, and (2) the Court in the
trilogy of cases discussed above consistently determined that the exceptions did not apply.
230. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Court's evolution, see generally
Tweedy, supra n. 206.
231. Aside from limiting the tribes' adjudicatory and legislative authority in these cases,
the Court in Hicks also held that tribal courts-unlike state courts-are not courts of
general jurisdiction and, hence, absent Congressional legislation to the contrary, may not
entertain federal Section 1983 suits against nonmembers. Hicks, 121 S. Ct. at 2314
('Tribal courts, it should be clear, cannot be courts of general jurisdiction .... for a tribe's
inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its
legislative jurisdiction."). Furthermore, the Court held that the State defendant-petitioners
were not required to exhaust their jurisdictional claims in tribal court before bringing them
in federal district court because "'no federal grant provides for tribal governance of
nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana's main rule,' so the exhaustion
requirement 'would serve no purpose other than delay.'" Id. at 2315 (citing Strate, 520
U.S. at 459-60 n. 14). The case, then, is devastating to tribal sovereignty while beneficial
to the sovereignty of states.
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4. Reflections on the Supreme Court's Consistent Preservation of
the Doctrine of Tribal Immunity
In light of the Court's recent inclination to divest tribes of certain
aspects of their sovereignty, the Court's decision to uphold the doctrine
of tribal immunity in Kiowa Tribe is noteworthy. Considerable
conjecture would be necessary to understand why the Court preserved
immunity while limiting sovereignty in other areas. Nonetheless, the
question arises: why would the Supreme Court preserve sovereign
immunity, deferring to Congressional discretion to resolve the debate
over whether to maintain tribal immunity, at the same time it has
exhibited a willingness to be proactive in divesting tribes of other aspects
of their sovereignty? Is there a legitimate basis for distinguishing
immunity from legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction?
One possible explanation is that the members of the Court knew
that Congress was actively considering changes in the law of tribal
immunity-may even have been confident that the legislation would
pass-and elected to postpone making a change in its precedent until it
could see what Congress would ultimately do. Congress was actively
debating legislation that would effectively eliminate tribal sovereign
• . 232
immunity, and the Court was aware of this fact when it rendered its
decision.2 3 Members of the Court may even have predicted that their
decision could have been instrumental in moving Congress toward
making changes in the federal policy toward tribal immunity. All nine
justices express in Kiowa Tribe displeasure with the doctrine of tribal
immunity. The majority is clear, moreover, in advising Congress to
232. See infra Part V.C.3.
233. During the oral argument, the following colloquy took place between one of the
justices and Edward Dumont, the Assistant to the United States Solicitor General:
QUESTION: Well, let's talk about the practical importance a minute. With
increasing commercial activity between tribes and nontribal members off the
reservation there may be, indeed, a need for some waiver of sovereign immunity to
make it possible for tribes to have-enter into business dealings with people off
the reservation. Is Congress considering legislation about this right now, do you
know, Mr. DuMont?
MR DUMONT: They are actively considering it. Hearings, extensive hearings
were held in 1996. There was a bill which passed the Senate which would have
waived immunity in certain circumstances in '97. That provision was removed on
the premise, publicly stated, that hearings would be held by April 30 of 1998,
and those hearings have been tentatively scheduled by the Committee on Indian
Affairs of the Senate.
QUESTION: But Congress is debating the desirability, or lack thereof, of certain
waivers of sovereign immunity.
MR. DUMONT: That's absolutely correct.... Congress has thought about this
and has addressed it in the past, and they're preparing to think about it again.
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 1998 WL 15116 at **14-15 (Jan. 12, 1998) (Oral
Argument of Edward Dumont, Assistant to the United States Solicitor General, as Amicus
Curiae in support of the petitioner).
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reconsider the doctrine in light of contemporary circumstances. The
Court's decision to communicate its concerns over the ongoing viability
of tribal immunity directly with Congress, rather than reverse
longstanding precedents, might therefore indicate the Court's sense that
it could adhere to some consistency in its precedent while accomplishing
in the end the public policy objectives with which it agreed. Under the
circumstances of the case, after all, at least two fundamental and
deeply-rooted doctrines of federal common law were at stake: namely,
the plenary power doctrine and the doctrine of tribal immunity.
Depriving Congress of the right to exercise its plenary power over Indian
affairs might have been particularly objectionable in light of Congress's
active deliberations in the area.
Another possibility is that the general principle that immunity is a
natural corollary of sovereignty is so firmly engrained in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that the Court was unwilling to change the default rules
about sovereign immunity, even as it has changed rules in other
contexts. This theory is consistent with views expressed in another
exchange during oral argument between the Court and the United States
Assistant to the Solicitor General over the default rule that would apply
with respect to foreign nations. In that exchange, the Court asked Mr.
Dumont whether it could by judicial decision have adopted "as part of
our domestic law of foreign sovereign immunity" the commercial acts
exception later recognized by Congress in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act."' Mr. Dumont responded unequivocally that the Court
could not have done that, even if circumstances in contemporary society
had changed, because its original common law and relevant precedent
thereafter "had made clear consistently that the default rule was going to
be absolute immunity, and it was then up to Congress to vary that."235
Although he conceded that the tribes are different from foreign
nations, Dumont demonstrated also that the common law default rule
with respect to tribes is also absolute immunity unless Congress
articulates a different standard. He responded to the Court's suggestion
that his argument rested upon a "rule of prudence, self-administered by
this Court"23 6 and is inconsistent with the many new roles tribes play in
234. Id at *17.
235. Id. at **17-18. In response to a question about the State Department's involvement
in changing the course of federal policy with respect to the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
Dumont emphasizes that the State Department is a political branch with some
constitutional authority over foreign affairs and while the Court may have had the power to
recognize changes in the common law suggested by the State Department, it had not done
so. Id. 'The Court said we have always applied a rule of absolute immunity. We see no
reason to make an exception for commercial property just because it's owned by a
sovereign. That's going to be a rule. Now, of course, in situations where the political
branches which are responsible under the Constitution for foreign affairs tell us to do
something different, then we will do something different, but the default rule is going to be
immunity .... " Id- at * 19.
236. Kiowa Trbe, 1998 WL 15116 at *22.
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I think that because the Court has recognized the tribes are sovereigns,
and because immunity from suit is such a central part of the inherent
background of the rule of sovereignty-and we see this in cases like Coeur
d'Alene, we see it in cases under the Eleventh Amendment before the
States, we see it in cases involving the United States. Those principles of
sovereign immunity aren't written down somewhere. They are simply part,
a constitutive part of our law....
The Court, firmly aware of its precedent and freshly reminded of the
default rules it had consistently applied with respect to sovereignty and
immunity, clearly affirms this notion of sovereign immunity in the Kiowa
Tribe decision.ma
Whatever the answers to these questions may be, the Court's
persistence in preserving the doctrine of tribal immunity in Kiowa Tribe
easily may be interpreted as further proof of the immutable strength of
the doctrine as a matter of federal law. The decisions of the federal
judiciary post-Kiowa Tribe demonstrate the strength of the doctrine as
an interpretive backdrop.2 9 It is possible, of course, that the Court
could do to tribal immunity what it has done in the area of legislative
and adjudicatory jurisdiction, eliminating the doctrine and changing the
presumptive rules of interpretation with a sleight of its hand. However,
in light of the historical development of the doctrine, including the
consistent way in which it has been integrated into the federal common
law and the context in which the court rendered its opinion in Kiowa
237. Id. at *23.
238. Aside from these possibilities, other factors may have influenced the Supreme
Court's decision as well. For instance, the quality of the lawyering might have played a
role, as might have the fact that the case involved a contractual matter in which the issue
of immunity could have been addressed through negotiation and drafting. In particular,
the Court may have been influenced by the fact that a contract was at the crux of the
Kiowa case and the lawyers for Manufacturing Technologies. Inc. had failed to adequately
negotiate for terms-including a potential waiver of sovereign immunity that would have
protected them in the case of a dispute. In the appellate proceedings before the Supreme
Court, counsel for the United States entered appearances that supported the tribe's
position, and counsel for the manufacturing attorneys appears to have been less effective
in his advocacy. For instance, in the midst of oral arguments, when challenged about why
the company had not insisted on a tribal waiver as a matter of contract law before
accepting a promissory note, the attorney reads the relevant contractual language from the
contract and the following colloquy takes place:
MR. PA'TERSON: If I might, Justice O'Connor, reading from the record at page
14, the language is, nothing in this note subjects' or limits the sovereign rights of
the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, and we don't have any argument with that
language. I'm not sure what it means, but it's based on a premise-
QUESTON: Well, it's a little like buyer beware. I mean, if in fact the law is, as
this Court seems to have recognized in the past, that the tribe enjoys sovereign
immunity from private suits, then someone dealing with the tribe should protect
himself in the contractual arrangements that he makes.
Kiowa Tribe, 1998 WL 15116 at **31-32 (Oral Argument of John E. Patterson, Jr., on
behalf of the Respondent).
239. Supra nn. 190-203 and accompanying text.
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Tribe, it is reasonable to conclude that the doctrine is an intrinsic part of
the jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty and likely to resist dramatic
change in the hands of the federal judiciary. Kiowa Tribe and its
predecessors reflect the federal government's long-time recognition of
tribal sovereignty and its inherent attributes and are enduring proof of
the strength and durability of tribal sovereignty.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND INTERPRETATION OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY
A. Congressional Plenary Power Over Tribal Relations
As the Supreme Court recognized in Kiowa Tribe, any federal
restrictions on tribal sovereign immunity must be implemented by
Congress, not the federal judiciary. This power, often referred to as
"congressional plenary power," is another fundamental principle of
federal Indian law.240 While treaties originally constituted the primary
means of structuring relationships with Indian tribes, Congress
unilaterally asserted its power to legislate tribal affairs in 1871. 24 1
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,242 the Supreme Court formally recognized
the plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes and tribal relations.
Specifically, it declared that Congress even had the authority to abrogate
240. The Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with Indian
tribes, has been recognized as the source for this doctrine. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Despite its primacy, though, the plenary power doctrine is not universally accepted as
legitimate, particularly by Indian people and particularly as it gets interpreted to justify
imposing federal limits on tribal sovereignty and self-determination. As one American
Indian advocate has articulated:
Many Indian people do not like the notion of the plenary power of Congress on the
subject of Indian affairs, in large part because they have been misled as to the
meaning of that legal doctrine. The 'Plenary Power of Congress' does not mean
that Congress can do anything it wants to Indians. It merely means that when
the subject of legislative consideration legitimately falls within the aegis of 'Indian
affairs', Congress has the power to legislate without relying on one of the
enumerated Constitutional powers. It does not mean that there is no limit on the
powers of Congress.
Testimony of Philip S. Deloria, infra note 367 (Senate Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 396895 (July
15, 1998)). As another scholar of tribal jurisprudence and federal Indian has explained:
"The Indian Commerce Clause by its own terms acknowledges Indian tribes as sovereigns,
sovereigns other than states for which the federal government needs delegated authority to
regulate. Broad as the authority conferred in the Indian Commerce Clause might be, it
cannot include the right to annul or otherwise unfairly limit the right of tribes to exist and
to exercise reasonable authority within their borders." Frank Pomrnmersheim, Braid of
Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary Trbal Life 121 (U. Cal. Press 1995). See
Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 365 (1989).
See generally McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Commn., 411 U.S. 164, 172 n. 7 (1973); Robert N.
Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 1055 (1995). A
comprehensive analysis of the debate over the plenary power doctrine, though, goes
beyond the scope of this piece.
241. The Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 565 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.CA. §
71 (West 2001)). See Antoine v. Wash., 420 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1975) (describing
circumstances that contributed to the adoption of the 1871 Act). The Act also prohibited
the Executive Branch from entering into treaties with the tribes.
242. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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treaties with Indian nations. The Court stated:
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government.... The power exists to abrogate the
provisions of an Indian treaty.243
Congress first tested the limits of its plenary power by enacting the
Major Crimes Act in 1885, bestowing federal courts with power to
exercise jurisdiction over certain enumerated and serious offenses
committed by or inflicted upon reservation Indians. 244 In response to a
state challenge to the Act on that theory that punishing such crimes was
properly a state function, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Act. The Court held that tribes were separate sovereign entities with no
allegiance to the states that enjoyed a special relationship with the
federal government that stemmed from their location with national
borders and their status as dependent sovereign nations. 2 Since then,
Congress has exercised its power to enact legislation in a few specific
areas, regulating a diverse range of matters affecting Indian people and
their nations but leaving many aspects of tribal government unregulated.
B. Limits on Congressional Plenary Power: Comity, Trust & Political Will
The power of Congress to regulate Indian tribes and tribal relations
is not absolute. 46 A number of other principles limit Congress's power
to intrude on tribal sovereignty. First, principles of comity and deference
to the indigenous, inherent sovereignty of Indian nations that preceded
the peopling of North America by European nations, circumscribe the
power of Congress to limit tribal authority vis-a-vis other interests. The
established principle that tribes, by virtue of their original sovereignty,
enjoy a substantial measure of inherent sovereignty over their territory,
their members, and, in some circumstances, others who enter upon
their lands, cannot be easily overcome.
The federal trust doctrine further limits the action Congress may
take with respect to Indian nations, at least as to action that diminished
or interfered with tribal sovereignty.2 7 It defines a fiduciary relationship
243. Id. at 553-66.
244. The Act of March 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1964)).
245. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375.
246. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 881 n. 8. See generally Shoshone Tribe v. U.S., 299 U.S. 476, 497
(1937).
247. See U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415-16 (1980); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 555 (1979); Del. Tribal Bus. Cornr. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977). Chief Justice
John Marshall's characterization of tribes as "domestic dependent nations" in Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, provided the conceptual basis for the evolution of the federal trust
doctrine. As Marshall further clarified about the tribes: "[T]hey are in a state of pupilage[;]
their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Id
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in which the United States acts as trustee, and the tribes as
beneficiaries. 4  Pursuant to the doctrine, the United States is expected
to protect the lands, natural resources, and funds of Indian nations
249
and, in some circumstances, to preserve the Native American's right to
occupancy, self-determination, and welfare.25 °
The primary responsibility for exercising the federal government's
trust obligation lies with the Executive Branch, through the Department
of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 1 The trust relationship has been
recognized with respect to the congressional plenary power doctrine as
well.25 2 In fact, Congress is entitled to establish the contours of the trust
253
responsibility through statute. Legislation must be rationally
connected to Congress's trust obligation to the welfare of Indian
nations .2 4 The political will of the American people and the ability of
248. See e.g. Dept ofInterior v. Klamath Water Users Assn., 121 S. Ct. 1060 (2001); U.S. v.
Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987); U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225
(1983); Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). See generally infra Part IV.B.
249. These items comprise the "trust corpus." In determining the federal government's
role in managing forest resources on Indian allotments, for instance, the Court stated: "[A]
fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elaborate
control over forests and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements are
present: a trustee (the United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a trust
corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds)." Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225. A number of other
decisions have defined the federal government's role in managing tribal lands and natural
resources. See id. Some lower courts have held that the trust responsibility requires the
federal government to undertake litigation to protect tribal lands or resources. See e.g.
Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); U.S. v.
Oneida Nation of N.Y., 576 F.2d 870 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,
592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979).
250. While the federal judiciary has been somewhat resistant to expanding the trust
responsibility beyond protection of tribal lands and resources, the trust doctrine has
influenced the decisions of cases brought on grounds other than land and resources.
Canby, supra n. 8, at 45 (citing McNabb v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987)). For a
general discussion of the judiciary's development of the trust doctrine, see Reid Payton
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 1213 (1975).
251. Canby, supra n. 8, at 46-47 ("At one time the Bureau represented virtually the entire
governing authority in Indian country, particularly during those times when assimilation
was the goal of federal Indian policy and tribal self-government was discouraged. Today
the activities of the Bureau are more narrowly directed toward the fulfillment of the federal
trust responsibility to the tribes, although its overall influence on tribal affairs remains
great."). Consistent with its trust responsibility, the Bureau provides education and
assists with the management of tribal resources and lands, among other administrative
duties. Id. It also has assisted with the establishment of tribal justice systems,
constitutions, and ordinances. Id. at 53. Other agencies that play a significant role in
tribal development include the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education,
Housing and Urban Development, and the Legal Services Corporation. Id. at 52.
252. See Lone Wolf 187 U.S. 553, 564 (To uphold claims by tribal members that the
statute in question contradicted a prior treaty "would be to adjudge that the indirect
operation of the treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of
Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians....").
253. Canby, supra n. 8, at 44 (citing U.S. v. Wilson, 881 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir. 1989)).
254. Poodry, 85 F.3d at 881 n. 8. Many years earlier, in upholding the Major Crimes Act,
which defined as crimes certain offenses committed by Indians on reservations, the Court
articulated the following:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent
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Indian nations to access and influence national and local politics have
also contributed to limits on Congressional plenary power. 255
C. Congressional Legislation
Historically, Congress has exercised its plenary power in regulating
tribal sovereign immunity conservatively, expressly abrogating tribal
immunity in a few specific contexts.' In many circumstances in which
Congress has deemed it necessary to provide remedies for those injured
by tribes, Congress bestowed the federal government with responsibility
for facilitating or making redress on behalf of tribes.
1. Historical Legislation-Indian Depredation Statutes & Railroad
Indemnity
In 1891, in the face of increasing conflict between Indians and non-
Indian settlers, agents, or speculators who entered Indian territory,
Congress enacted the Indian Depredation Act.256 Building upon
procedures developed in the context of redressing violations of "wrongs
257
and depredations" clauses in treaties with Indian tribes, the Act
on the United States-dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government
with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty
of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the
executive, and by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
Kagarna, 118 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
255. For instance, the conglomerate organization, the National Congress of American
Indians, and a significant number of representations of tribal interests testified at the
Congressional hearings over tribal immunity. See infra Part IV.C. Senator Ben Nighthorse
Campbell, a Native American, in turn, sponsored legislation that was more favorable to
tribal interests than the legislation sponsored originally by then-Senator Slade Gorton, see
infra Part IV.C. Others have noted the impact Native Americans have had in the political
processes of this country in recent times. For instance, the Director of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, recently recognized that "[Indian people] fare better in Congress than a lot of
people recognize..." Kevin Gover, "There is Hope": A Few Vtoughts on Indian Law, 24
Am. Indian L. Rev. 219, 222 (2000). He conceded however, that Congress is "not a place to
look for a lot of aggressive, progressive movement in the field of Indian law." Id. Still, to
the extent they have been instrumental in reminding Congress of its trust responsibility
and preserving a status quo that acknowledges the basic tenets of tribal sovereignty, self-
determination, and economic self-sufficiency, Native Americans have enjoyed success in
the legislative process.
256. Indian Depredation Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 851-854 (1891). For a detailed
summaiy of the Act, see U.S. v. Gorham, 165 U.S. 316 (1897).
257. Such treaty provisions generally provided that claims for damages caused by "bad
men among the Indians" could be filed with and passed upon by the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs and reimbursed from moneys due or to become due to the tribes under any
treaties with the United States. See e.g. Treaty with the Navajo, June 1, 1868, art. 1, 15
Stat. 667, 667-68 (1868) (cited in relevant part in Tsosie v. U.S., 825 F.2d 393 (Fed. Cir.
1987)). Claims and criminal prosecutions also could be filed in response to wrongs
committed by "bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to the authority
of the United States." For further discussion of claims for damages stemming from Indian
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provided a mechanism for victims of "wrongs" committed by Indians to
obtain compensation for their injuries.5 8 Its title indicated that it was
"[a]n act to provide for the adjudication and payment of claims arising
from Indian depredations." 25 9 It authorized citizens of the United States
to file claims with the United States Court of Claims for property "taken
or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band or tribe or nation in amity
with the United States, without just cause or provocation on the part of
the owner or agent in charge, and not returned or paid for (sic)."26 0 The
Attorney General of the United States was responsible for appearing and
defending the interests of the government and of the Indians in each
claim filed. The Court of Claims was bestowed with the responsibility for
assessing the value of the property taken or destroyed, determining
which person or tribe committed the damage, and rendering judgment.
Where the identity and tribal affiliation of the Indians committing
proven violations of the Act could be ascertained, the Act provided a
mechanism for recovering judgments rendered by the Court of Claims
from the tribe whose members or governing agents were responsible for
the depredation. Any judgments attributed to specific tribes or bands
were to be paid in the following manner: (1) first, from annuities due
such tribe from the United States, (2) if no such annuities were
available, from any other funds due the tribe from the United States
(e.g., arising from the sale of their land), and (3) in the event neither of
the preceding sources of funds were available, from any federal
appropriations designated for the benefit of the tribe, other than
appropriations for their current and necessary support, subsistence, and
261education. In the event no such annuity, fund, or appropriation was
due or available or where the identity of the Indian deemed responsible
for the depredation was unknown, the United States was responsible for
paying the judgment.2 6 2
Thus, while the Act set forth some circumstances in which tribes
could be made to pay for damages incurred by the actions of their
representatives or members, it dramatically limited the scope of potential
tribal liability. Specifically, it bestowed the United States with primary
responsibility for satisfying judgments incurred by individuals injured by
depredation under both treaty and federal statute, see Joranko, infra n. 263.
258. Gorham, 165 U.S. at317.
259. See Cohen, supran. 101; Gorham, 165 U.S. at 317.
260. Gorharn, 165 U.S. at 317-18.
261. Id. at 319.
262. Id. The Act also limited claims to those accrued on or after July 1. 1865, unless
such claims previously had been presented to Congress or any other officer (e.g.,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs) authorized to acquire into such claims. Thurston v. U.S.,
232 U.S. 469, 476-77 (1914) (citing § 2, 26 Stat. 851 (1891)). According to the Supreme
Court, there were a number of other statutory and treaty provisions regulating the manner
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depredations committed by Indians who were affiliated with tribes,
bands or nations in amity with the United States. Under principles of
international law, those that were at war with the United States could
not be held liable to compensate the victims of their actions.26 3 Indeed,
some decisions held that amity with the United States was a
jurisdictional prerequisite such that the claimant had the burden of
establishing that such a relationship existed.26 Moreover, amity referred
to "condition[s] of peace and friendship," not mere treaty relations.265
In addition, the Act conditioned direct payment by tribes upon the
economic viability of tribes. More specifically, it provided that tribes
need be responsible for making payment of judgments rendered under
the Act only to the extent that federal annuities, payments, or
appropriations may be available and, significantly, only to the extent
such federal moneys may exceed amounts necessary for subsistence,
education, or other support. Tribal lands or resources or indigenous
economic enterprises could not be attached or otherwise compromised to
satisfy such judgments. Even those tribes that were at peace with the
United States were not expected to offer payment from their own
treasuries. Rather, the federal government remained ultimately liable for
their payment; where moneys were due and owing to tribes, judgments
could be satisfied through the federal government's directing such
moneys to injured parties rather than the tribes. The Act's structure
and collection mechanisms, therefore, although piercing the veil of
complete immunity, nonetheless preserved the governing structures,
land and resource base, and economic systems of tribal entities.
2. Twentieth Century Legislation (1968-1999)
Congress has enacted legislation limiting tribal immunity from suit
in a few context-specific areas of regulation. One of the first and most
dramatic encroachments on the doctrine occurred with the enactment of
the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") in 1968. This Act imposes on tribal
entities a number of civil rights applicable to states and the federal
government under the Bill of Rights and authorizes federal court review
of petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed to test the legality of any term
of detention authorized by an Indian tribe.26 6 The statute, however, also
limits the circumstances in which judicial remedy may be sought to
those where an individual has been detained pursuant to tribal authority
263. Timothy W. Joranko, Tribal Self-Determination Unfettered. Toward a Rule of Absolute
Tribal Official Immunity From Damages in Federal Court, 26 Ariz. St L.J. 987, 998 (1994)
(citing Montoya u. U.S., 32 Ct Cl. 349, 355, 362 (1897)).
264. Montoya, 32 Ct. Cl. at 355, 362; Leighton v. U.S., 29 Ct. CI. 288 (1894).
265. Leighton, 29 Ct Cl. 288.
266. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1983). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the
Act, see generally Student Author, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of
Tribal Governments, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1969).
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and a petition for writ of habeas corpus need be filed.267 In Martinez, the
Supreme Court definitively held that Congress did not intend the Act to
abrogate tribal immunity from suit in cases involving alleged violations
of its substantive provisions where no detention or deprivation of liberty
warranted petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. 268 Considerable
deference therefore remains with the tribes to interpret and craft
remedies for individuals whose rights under ICRA may have been
violated by a tribe.
Besides ICRA, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides for a
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for suits by states brought to enforce
the terms of a compact entered into by a tribe under the Act. 2 6 9  A
number of environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act,2 7 0 the
Safe Drinking Water Act,271 and the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act, 272 have been construed by federal courts as waiving tribal
sovereign immunity for suits brought by citizens, although there is
disagreement over whether in those statutes Congress evidenced clear
and unmistakable intent to abrogate tribal immunity.273 The Eighth
267. ICRA provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus may be maintained in federal
court by any person unlawfully deprived of liberty by any one of the federally recognized
tribes. 25 U.S.C.A. §1303 (West 2001).
268. Martnez, 436 U.S. at 58-59. For a discussion of the Martinez case, see supra notes
163-69 and accompanying text.
269. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(7)(ii) (West 2001)). See Maxam v. Lower Sioux Indian
Community of Minn., 829 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1993); Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux
Tribe, 809 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1992).
270. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 2001).
271. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300J-9()(1)(C) (West 2001).
272. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 2001).
273. See e.g. Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989)
(citizen-suit provisions of RCRA that authorizes compliance suits against "person[s]"-
defined to include "municipalities," whose definition in turn includes "Indian tribes"-
expressly waive the sovereign immunity of tribes); A. States Leg. Found. v. Salt River Pima
Maricopa Indian Community, 827 F. Supp. 608 (D. Ariz. 1993) (citizens suit provisions of
RCRA and Clean Water Act waive tribal immunity); Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dept. of
Lab., 187 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (employee permitted to file suit against tribe under
whistle blower protection provisions of the SDWA, which defines "persons" against whom
complaints may be filed to include "an Indian tribe").
Notwithstanding these cases, at least one commentator has set forth the argument
that none of the citizens' suits provisions of federal environmental statutes analyzed in the
above-referenced cases actually demonstrate clear and unmistakable congressional intent
to abrogate tribal immunity. See Michael P. O'Connell, Citizen Suits Against Tribal
Governments and Tribal Officials Under Federal Environmental Laws, 36 Tulsa L.J. 335,
347 (2000) [hereinafter O'Connell, Citizen Suits] ("None of the cases considering the issue
have pointed to any clear and unambiguous congressional intent that the limited resources
of tribal governments and tribal taxpayers be obligated to pay fees to private attorneys in
citizen suit litigation. Lacking evidence of clear and unmistakable congressional intent to
waive tribal sovereign immunity to citizen suits under federal environmental laws, federal
courts lack jurisdiction over citizen suits against tribal governments.").
Another commentator has discussed the absence of clear waiver of sovereign
immunity in the context of the Clean Air Act. See 0. Wes. J. Layton, The Thorny GtiA
Analysts of EPA's Intent to Empower Indian Tribal Governments with Clean Air Act
Regulatory Authority over Non-Tribal Lands and Immunize Tribal Governments from CAA
Citizen Suits, 7 Envtl. Law 225, 280-81 (2001) [hereinafter Layton, The Thorny Gifti. EPA
regulations similarly exclude tribal governments from the CAA's citizens suit provisions.
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Circuit determined that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 74
275
also waived tribal sovereign immunity. There is a waiver of tribal
276immunity for the purposes of adjudicating water rights. Congress
expressly waived sovereign immunity of tribal governments in the
Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act as well.
277
With respect to tribal corporations established under Section 17 of
the Indian Reorganization Act, 7  the presence of "sue and be sued"
clauses in tribal charters have been construed as waivers of sovereign
immunity.2 7 9  Similarly, the Indian Self-Determination Act ("ISDA")2 80
applies the federal tort claims procedures to claims against Indian tribes
or tribal organizations that assume responsibility for certain contracts
covered under the Act.2s1 The ISDA also authorizes the Secretaries of
Interior and Health and Human Services to provide insurance for Indian
tribes, tribal organizations and tribal contractors who enter into
contracts under the Act, provided the carrier agrees to waive certain
rights it may have to claim immunity from suit on behalf of the tribe for
claims brought within the limits of the insurance policy.
28 2
While Congress has acted in some circumstances to limit tribal
sovereign immunity, it has expressly refused to extend waivers in other
circumstances. For instance, with respect to claims brought under the
insurance waiver contained in the ISDA, Congress has provided that no
insurance carrier shall have the right to waive sovereign immunity over
See Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7253 (Feb. 12, 1998)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 49, 50, 81 (2000), discussed in Layton, The Thorny Gift at 280-
97. Citizen suits, however, may be brought against tribal officials in their individual
capacities, and suits to compel enforcement of environmental statutes may be brought by
the United States. O'Connell, Citizen Suits at 347.
274. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq. (West 2001).
275. N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d
458 (8th Cir. 1993). See generally Public Serv. Co. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d
1203 (9thCir. 1994).
276. 43 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 2001). See Metropolitan Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. U.S., 830
F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1987).
277. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3308 (West 2001) (person, for the purposes of the Act, includes
.an Indian tribe"). See U.S. v. Weddell 12 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D.S.D. 1998).
278. 25 U.S.C.A. § 477 (West 2001). See Boe v. St Belknap Indian Community of the FL
Belknap Reservation, 455 F. Supp. 462, 463 (D. Mont. 1978).
279. See e.g. Boe, 455 F. Supp. at 463.
280. 25 U.S.C. § 450 etseq. (West 2001).
281. 25 U.S.C.A. § 450f(d) (West 2001). Provisions and procedures related to tribal
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act are set forth more fully below. See infra Part
IV.C.
282. 25 U.S.CA. § 450f(c)(3)(A) (West 2001) (Insurance policies obtained or provided by
the Secretary pursuant to self-determination contracts awarded under the Act shall
contain provisions in which insurance carrier agrees to "waive any right it may have to
raise as a defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe from suit[;]" however, no
waiver shall be authorized to limit tribes' sovereign immunity outside of the coverage of the
policy.). Additionally, no waiver shall apply to punitive damages, interest prior to
judgment, or with respect to any other limits on liability imposed by the state in which the
alleged injury occurs. 25 U.S.CA. § 450f(c)(3)(B) (West 2001).
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and beyond whatever may be covered by the policy. 28 3 The ISDA
explicitly provides, moreover, that it should not be construed as
"affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sovereign
immunity from suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe."284  The ISDA also
precludes the availability of waiver for any potential tribal liability for
pre-judgment interest, punitive damages, or "for any other limitation on
liability imposed by the law of the State in which the alleged injury
occurs." 2 5 The Indian Financing Act28 6 imposes similar restrictions on
the waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. The federal judiciary has been
active in determining whether Congress has intended to abrogate tribal
immunity in a wide array of legislative contexts, contributing to
variations in the law regarding abrogation.28 7
3. Legislation for the New Millennium
On March 14, 2000, Congress enacted legislation that explicitly
addresses the issue of tribal sovereign immunity. Provisions narrowly
modifying the immunity of Indian tribes were set forth in the Indian
Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of
200028 and the Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 2 0 0 0 .28 9
Both pieces of legislation represented a compromise between tribal
interests in maintaining internal control over sovereign immunity, on the
one hand, and the interests of individual and commercial entities,
primarily non-Indian in identity, in abrogating such immunity, on the
other hand. The context in which the legislation was enacted and its
legislative history indicate Congress's intent to preserve tribal immunity
in recognition of the inherent sovereignty of tribes. Both pieces of
legislation were sponsored by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of
Colorado.29 °
a. The Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract
Encouragement Act
The Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract
Encouragement Act ("ITEDCA") amends a piece of Congressional
legislation, 25 U.S.C. § 81, first enacted in 1872 and amended in
1958.291 Prior to the 2000 Amendments, the 25 U.S.C. § 81 provided a
283. 25 U.S.C.A. § 450fic)(3)(A) (West 2001).
284. 25 U.S.C.A. §450n(1) (West 2001).
285. 25 U.S.C.A. § 450f(c)(3)(B) (West 2001).
286. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (West 2001).
287. See supra nn. 270-77.
288. Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000) (amending 25 U.S.C. § 81 (Mar. 14, 2000)
(to be codified at 25 U.S.C. § 81)).
289. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 101(e), 112 Stat. 2681-335 to 2681-337 (1998).
290. S. 2097, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 613, 105th Cong. (1998).
291. The ITEDCA was enacted in furtherance of paternalistic goals derived from the
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number of technical drafting requirements on the parties, and required
endorsement by the Secretary of the Interior.292 The Act provided also
that contracts made in violation of its terms shall be null and void and
authorized the United States to bring suit to recover any money or "other
thing of value" paid.293
The 2000 amendments apply to contracts and agreements with
Indian tribes that "encumber Indian lands for 7 or more years."
2 94
Covered agreements must be endorsed by the Secretary of the Interior. 95
Additionally, the Secretary must refuse to approve any agreement that
violates federal law296 or fails to include a provision that:
(A) provides for remedies in the case of a breach of the agreement or
contract;
(B) references a tribal code, ordinance, or ruling of a court of competent
jurisdiction that discloses the right of the Indian tribe to assert sovereign
immunity as a defense in an action brought against the Indian tribe; or
(C) includes an express waiver of the right of the Indian tribe to assert
sovereign immunity as a defense in an action brought against the Indian
tribe (including a waiver that limits the nature of relief that may be
federal government's trust responsibility and set forth requirements for regulating
contracts between tribal and non-tribal parties that involved Indian lands. See Act of Aug.
27, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-770, 72 Stat. 927 (1958) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 81 (West
2001)). It "is intended to protect Indians from improvident contracts and is concerned
primarily with federal control over contracts between Indian tribes or individual Indians
and non-Indians." H.R. 50, 106th Cong. (1999).
It applied to agreements made by non-tribal individuals with tribes or individual
Indians "for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in
prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person in
consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any claims growing
out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or
thing, under laws or treaties with the United States... or in any way connected with or
due from the United States." Id. For a more detailed discussion of the history of its
enactment and of its amendments, see Anna-Emily C. Gaupp, The Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000: Smoke Signals of A New Era in
Federal Indian Policy, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 667, 668-71 (2001).
292. 25 U.S.C.A. § 81 (West 2001). For instance, all contracts had to be in writing and
were required to contain identifying information about the parties and their authority for
entering into the contract. Id. The Act also required contracts covered under the Act to
"state the time when and place where made, the particular purpose for which made, the
special thing or things to be done under it, and, if for the collection of money, the basis of
the claim, the source from which it is to be collected, the disposition to be made of it when
collected, the amount or rate per centum of the fee in all cases; and if any contingent
matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract or agreement, it shall be specifically
set forth." Id. Expressly stated time limits on the duration of the contract were also
required. Id.
293. Id. Although the language of the Act emphasized suits brought to protect Indian
tribes, it also was interpreted to authorize suit by the United States against tribes. See e.g.
U.S. v. D & J, 1993 WL 767689 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
294. Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46, 47 (2000) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 81(b)
(West 2001)).
295. Id.
296. 25 U.S.C.A. § 81(d)(1) (West 2001).
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provided or the jurisdiction of a court with respect to such action).297
These provisions represent a narrow capitulation to more restrictive
measures considered by Congress.298 As specified in the House Report,
the legislation also serves to eliminate a major portion of federal control
over tribal contracts previously required under federal law.299 The
Senate Report confirms this interpretation of the Act.3 °  Thus, while it
provides for the disclosure of Indian tribal sovereign immunity in certain
contracts involving Indian tribes, the legislation also enhances the tribes'
power of self-governance with respect to other issues and types of
contracts, previously subjected to federal control.
To the extent it forces tribes to waive their sovereign immunity in
order to engage in contracts with non-tribal parties under the
circumstances set forth in the act, however, the ITEDCA does pose
restrictions on tribal sovereignty and self-determination. It also replaces
goals set forth in the original Act (e.g. of protecting tribal sovereignty,
297. 25 U.S.C.A. § 81(2)(d)(2) (West 2001).
298. Senator Slade Gorton authored several pieces of legislation that would eviscerate
tribal sovereign immunity in virtually all areas of potential authority. See infra Part
IV.C.4.g.
299. H.R. Rpt. 106-501 (Feb. 29, 2000). One way the Act serves to reduce federal control
is by limiting federal oversight and approval of tribal contracts under Section 81 of Title 25
of the United States Code to those with a life of seven or more years. It also amended
Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 476, by eliminating the
requirement that the Secretary of the Interior approve the choice of counsel and the fixing
of fees by the Tribe in tribal contracts subject to federal oversight.
300. S. Rpt. 106-150 (Sep. 8, 1999). The Senate Report documents in more detail than
its House counterpart the statutory evolution of the federal government's self-assumed role
as legal trustee for Indian lands. The report states: "Enacted in 1872, Section 81 reflects
Congressional concerns that Indians, either individually or collectively, were incapable of
protecting themselves from fraud in the conduct of their economic affairs." (citing In re
U.S. ex reL Hall, 825 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (D. Minn. 1993). affd, 27 F.3d 572 (8th Cir.
1994)). As such, Section 81 is inherently paternalistic in nature. It contravenes other
legislation enacted subsequently, such as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, that
emphasizes tribal self-determination, autonomy, and economic development.
The Senate Report describes the tension between these two pieces of Congressional
legislation, emphasizing how federal policy has increasingly favored tribal self-
determination. "As federal policy increasingly emphasized tribal self-determination by
reducing or eliminating federal review of tribal decisions, Congress has both directly and
indirectly addressed concerns about Section 81." Id. For example, states the Report,
Congress in 1958 removed a provision from Section 81 that required that a judge witness
the execution of these agreements. In further support of its proposition that Congress has
increasingly favored self-determination and tribal economic development over federal
oversight and control, the Report refers to a number of other legislative amendments and
enactments in which Congress has attempted to empower Indian tribes to "engage in
business transactions without needing to conform to requirements that were intended to
shield them from 'their own improvidence and the spoliation of others.'" Id. The Report
concludes that the legislation's provisions limiting federal oversight were consistent with
this trend in increasing federal support of tribal self-determination and economic
development.
As discussed more fully below, the Report's discussion of the legislation's provisions
regarding sovereign immunity indicates that they are borne out of a mutual recognition-
as an economic and policy matter-that Indian tribes and those with whom they contract
"are generally best served if questions of immunity are addressed, resolved, or at least
disclosed when a contract is executed." Id.
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self-determination, and economic development) with ones that appear to
be more protective of non-Indian interests and, hence, may be
interpreted as contradicting the federal government's role as trustee in
protecting tribal interests.'9 1  While this may be the case when
considered in light of the Act in its entirety, including the way in which it
leaves a vast area of tribal contracts unregulated, the 2000 amendments'
intrusion on tribal sovereignty, while significant, is relatively minimal. 30 2
b. The Indian Tort Claims and Risk Management Act
In comparison with its legislative companion, The Indian Tort
Claims and Risk Management Act is even more narrow in its
encroachment upon tribal sovereignty. It is devoid of substantive impact
on tribal immunity or self-governance; its purpose is to "provide for a
study to facilitate relief for a person who is injured as a result of an
official action of a tribal government."3 3 Toward this end, it directs the
Secretary of the Interior to conduct a comprehensive survey of "the
degree, type, and adequacy of liability insurance coverage of Indian
tribes.... ."304 Under its provisions, the Secretary is required to submit
a report to Congress that contains legislative recommendations deemed
by the Secretary to "(1) be appropriate to improve the provision of
insurance coverage to Indian tribes; or (2) otherwise achieve the purpose
of providing relief to persons who are injured as a result of an official
action of tribal government."305
Although the legislation does represent a Congressional intent to
evaluate and, in a very limited set of circumstances, restrict tribal
sovereign immunity, what is most significant about it is that it leaves the
power of tribes to control their susceptibility to lawsuits largely intact.
The degree to which it signals an ongoing intent by Congress to preserve
301. See Gaupp, supran. 291, at 686-87:
The 2000 Section 81 does violence to existing rights of the Tribal Party's
sovereignty, and can not be justified as a measure moving away from paternalism
and promoting the self-governance and economic self-determination of Tribal
Parties.... [T]he congressional solution to the problem of perceived sovereign-
immunity-induced lawlessness in contracting with Non-Tribal Parties reflected in
the 2000 Section 81 is directly at odds with the stated purpose of promoting
economic self-determination. Despite the fact that the 2000 Section 81 seems to
suggest that the bargaining positions of the Tribal and Non-Tribal Parties have
transposed, the Tribal Party is being treated as if it must be lead (sic) through the
mysterious labyrinth of the white man's' market yet again.
ICL
302. This is particularly so when one considers the legislation in the broader context of
congressional policy, including legislative bills proposing to impose broader restrictions on
tribal immunity and Congress's history in protecting tribal sovereignty. See infra Parts
III.C.4-5 and III.D.
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tribal sovereignty, including tribal immunity, may be illuminated when
considered in light of the congressional hearings and debate that
preceded the enactment.
3. Proposed Legislation by Slade Gorton
At the time the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Kiowa,
Congress was actively considering a number of pieces of legislation that
would markedly restrict tribal immunity. Senate Bill 1691, introduced
by Senator Slade Gorton of Washington on February 27, 1998 and
dubiously titled the "American Indian Equal Justice Act," was the most
far-reaching of the proposals. °6  It provided for original federal
jurisdiction over "any civil action or claim against an Indian tribe" that
might present a federal question or present a claim for damages for
"cases not sounding in tort that involve any contract made by the
governing body of the Indian tribe or on behalf of an Indian tribe."30 7
Recommending also an expanded tort claims procedure for Tribes,
308
Senate Bill 1691 expanded federal jurisdiction over claims for injury or
loss of property, personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of an Indian tribe, "if a private individual or
corporation would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the State where the act or omission occurred."30 9  Moreover, the
legislation proposed, "to the extent necessary to enforce this section, the
tribal immunity... of the Indian tribe... involved is waived."
In addition to restricting immunity with respect to torts, contracts,
and federal claims in the context of federal courts, Senate Bill 1691 also
authorized suits against tribes in state courts of general jurisdiction for
claims:
arising within a state, including [those] arising on an Indian reservation or
Indian country, in any case in which the cause of action-
306. S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998).
307. Id. at § 4(a).
308. These procedures expand the definition of "Indian tribe" beyond those governmental
entities recognized by the Department of the Interior to include officer or employees of an
Indian tribe; any person acting on behalf of a tribe in an official capacity, temporarily or
permanently and with or without compensation; and anyone who is employed by a tribe to
carry out a self-determination contract under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 450b0) (West 2001). Liability relating to tort claims brought
in federal court against any of these tribal entities, according to Senator Gorton's proposal,
would be "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual or
corporation under like circumstances." S. 1691, 105th at § 5(a). The only exceptions to
this latter principle included (1) an exemption for Tribes from pre-judgment interest or
punitive damages, and (2) in wrongful death cases, a provision that Tribes be liable for
actual or compensatory damages, not punitive damages. Id. Cases "relating to a
controversy relating to membership in an Indian tribe" were also excluded. Id. The
measure authorized tribes or their designees to arbitrate, compromise, or settle any claims
cognizable under the Act. Id
309. S. 1691, 105th Cong. at§ 4(d).
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(1) arises under Federal law or the law of a State; and
(2) relates to-
(A) tort claims; or
(B) claims for cases not sounding in tort that involve any contract
made by the governing body of an Indian tribe or on behalf of an Indian
tribe.
3 10
Significantly, the legislation also proposed to expand remedies under the
ICRA, providing for federal court jurisdiction and waiver of tribal
immunity "in any civil rights action alleging a failure to comply with
rights secured by the requirements under [ICRA." 3n Altogether, then,
Senate Bill 1691 was a sweeping piece of legislation that had the
potential to significantly restrict the power of tribes to determine the
nature and scope of their liability to suit. The findings upon which it
was premised, moreover, embody an erroneous description of a
fundamental principle of the law with respect to tribal sovereign
immunity. 3 1 They suggest also that concern for non-Indian residents of
Indian reservations were a primary driving force behind the proposed
legislation. 313
4. Legislative Response by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
In the wake of Senate Bill 1691, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
of Colorado introduced Senate Bill 2097, referred to as the "Indian Tribal
Conflict Resolution and Tort Claims and Risk Management Act." Unlike
its predecessor, Senator Campbel's bill recognized the importance and
unique nature of tribal sovereignty and immunity. It found, for instance,
that "Indian tribal sovereignty predates the formation of the United
310. Id. at § 6(a). As with claims brought in federal court, the bill provided that Indian
tribes were to be liable "to the same extent as a private individual or corporation under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment on punitive damages.
Id. at § 6(b). Additionally, actions brought in state court were not removable under 28
U.S.C. § 1441. Id at § 6(d).
311. S. 1691, 105thCong. at§7.
312. One finding, for instance, represents that "the only remaining governments in the
United States that maintain and assert the full scope of immunity from lawsuits are Indian
tribal governments." S. 1691, 105th Cong. at § 1(b)(5). In contrast, "the Government of
the United States and the States have dramatically scaled back the doctrine of sovereign
immunity without impairing their dignity, sovereignty, or ability to conduct valid
government policies." Id. at § 1(b)(4). As discussed more fully below, these statements
simply and unequivocally are not true. Many tribal governments provide for waivers of
their sovereign immunity and other remedies, judicial and otherwise, for persons aggrieved
by official action of the tribe or one of its agents or employees. See infra Part IV.D.2.f.
Conversely, neither the federal government nor every one of the states provide for judicial
remedy and waiver of immunity in all circumstances. See supra Parts II.A. 1-2. The states
vary in the degree to which they waive their immunity and the areas in which they agree to
such waivers. See e.g. supra n. 93.
313. '[Aiccording to the 1990 decennial census conducted by the Bureau of the Census,
nearly half of the individuals residing on Indian reservations are non-Indian." S. 1691,
105th Cong. at§ 1(b)(5).
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States and the United States Constitution" and that "through treaties,
statutes, Executive orders, and course of dealing, the United States has
recognized tribal sovereignty and the unique relationship that the United
States has with Indian tribes."3 14 It recognized the value of harmonious
intergovernmental relationships and alternative dispute resolution in
resolving disputes that may arise. It noted that "Indian tribes have
made significant achievements toward developing a foundation for
economic self-sufficiency and self-determination, and that economic self-
sufficiency and self-determination have increased opportunities for the
Indian tribes and other entities and persons to interact more frequently
in commerce and intergovernmental relationships."315 Finally, the bill
underscored the need to improve the availability of adequate liability
insurance coverage in order to "allow[ I the economy of Indian tribes to
grow and provide[ I compensation to persons that may suffer personal
injury or loss of property."316
The bill focused on two primary areas of concern: (1) intergovernmental
agreements between states and tribes, and (2) tort liability insurance. It
proposed the formation of an intergovernmental alternative dispute
resolution panel that would assist in resolving disputes between
government entities. Compacts entered into by governmental entities
under the Act would have to specify their consent to litigation to enforce
the agreement, if necessary, "and to the extent necessary to enforce that
agreement, each party waives any defense of sovereign immunity."
31 7
With respect to tort liability, Senate Bill 2097 proposed to require the
Secretary of Interior to secure adequate tort liability insurance or
equivalent coverage for each tribe that receives a priority allocation from
the federal government. 318 In addition, each policy must contain a
provision waiving any right to raise sovereign immunity as a defense to
claims for damages that would arise within the limits of the policy.31 9
Thus, Senator Campbell's bill attempted to address Senator
Gorton's concern about unfettered tribal sovereign immunity in a more
holistic fashion. Not only did it emphasize improved intergovernmental
negotiation and dispute resolution between states and tribes as critical
to resolving many issues, it recognized the federal government's trust
responsibility to the tribes. The legislation attempted to foster both
tribal accountability and continued tribal economic and governmental
development.
Just after the introduction of Senator Gorton and Senator
314. S. 2097, 105th Cong. at § 2(a)(1), (3).
315. Id. at § 2(a)(10).
316. Id at § 2(a)(13).
317. Id at§ 104(a)(2).
318. Id. at§ 201(B)(1).
319. Id. at § 201(C).
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Campbell's bills, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiowa. This
caused Senator Gorton to introduce additional legislation that directly
incorporated the court's views on immunity into its findings.3 20  This
legislation focused on the need to waive tribal immunity in commercial
dealings and contractual matters. Senate Bill 2300 provided for the
collection of certain state taxes from non-Indians buying goods and
services from tribal entities. 2 1 Senate Bill 2302, which referenced the
Kiowa decision, provided for tort liability insurance and mandatory
waivers of immunity up to the limits of each policy.32 2 Senate Bill 2298
provided for expanded civil rights enforcement under the Indian Civil
Rights Act.3 2 Senator Campbell subsequently introduced Senate Bill
613, which was designed to encourage Indian economic development
and provide for disclosure and waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in
contracts involving Indian tribes that require approval by the Secretary
of the Interior.3 24
In the end, and after considering much testimony, the Congress
passed into law Senator Campbell's Senate Bill 613 and Senate Bil
2097, as amended. As discussed above, both were signed by the
President on March 14, 2000, thereby ending the debate on tribal
sovereign immunity for the time being.
D. The New Legislation in Context
1. Testimony in Favor of Gorton's Proposal to Eviscerate Tribal
Immunity
Between 1996 and 1998, Congress held a number of hearings on
the topic of tribal sovereign immunity.3 25  Representatives of tribal
governments and broader tribal conglomerates testified at the
hearings.326  Non-governmental Indian and non-Indian persons and
320. American Indian Contract Enforcement Act, S. 2299, 105th Cong. § 1(a)(1)-(2) (1998)
("the only remaining governmental entities that maintain and assert the full scope of
immunity from lawsuits in the United States are Indian tribal governments; ... in a recent
decision, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc .... the Supreme
Court recognized several reasons why tribal immunity should not be perpetuated ... ..
321. S. 2300, 105th Cong. (1998).
322. S. 2302, 105th Cong. (1998).
323. S. 2298, 105th Cong. (1998).
324. S. 613, 105th Cong. (1998).
325. Unless otherwise noted in Parts lV.D.l.a-h, the following testimony is based on
information on file with the author. The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs conducted
hearings on September 24, 1996 (tribal rights in private property cases), March 11, 1998
(sovereign immunity with respect to contracts and collection of state taxes), April 7, 1998
(field hearing in Seattle on sovereign immunity with respect to property rights and
individual civil rights), May 6, 1998 (tribal sovereign immunity and revisions to Indian legal
systems), and July 15, 1998 (tribal reconciliation and tribal sovereign immunity as set
forth in Senator Campbell's S. 2097), and May 19, 1999 (sovereign immunity and contracts
for development of Indian lands as amended In S. 613).
326. For instance, W. Ron Allen, chairman of the National Congress of American Indians
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entities, and representatives of various states and the United States
government also submitted testimony. The hearings fostered debate
over tribal sovereign immunity in the context of private property, civil
rights, contractual disputes, torts, and collection of state taxes. While
the views expressed were predominantly protective of the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity, Congress did receive and consider significant
testimony in support of Senator Gorton's proposed legislation to
eliminate the doctrine.
a. Property and Land Use
Testimony that supported federal restrictions on tribal immunity
raised a variety of themes. Some focused on the perceived impact of
tribal immunity on the interests of non-Indian private property owners
forced to interact with tribes by virtue of tribes' successful assertion of
treaty rights or of the location of private fee land within the boundaries
of Indian reservations. 3 27 For instance, off-reservation property owners
who believed they may have someday been obliged under a recent Ninth
Circuit ruling to permit tribal members to enter or cross upon their
waterfront property to collect shellfish imagined unrecoverable property
damage and injuries to personal and civil rights. 32 The inability, in the
face of tribal immunity, of "fee land" owners within reservation
boundaries to protect themselves against, and seek judicial remedies to
compensate for, damages sustained from tribal interference with the
unfettered use of their property (e.g. by shutting off water supplies,
blocking access to roads, taxing and regulating fee lands, etc.) was also
emphasized.
3 2 9
A grass-roots community action group, Citizens for Safety and
Environment, concerned about the development of a large-scale
amphitheater project by the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe in partnership
with a private enterprise, argued that tribal immunity prohibits citizens
of an area affected by major tribally-sponsored business development
projects from "compelling] ... compliance with land use, zoning, and
regulatory requirements normally associated with a project of this scale
testified on several occasions and a number of attorneys from firms that specialize in the
representation of tribal governments and business entities provided general testimony as
well. See e.g. Testimonies of Eric D. Eberhard, Esq., attorney with Williams & Janov, P.C.,
Albuquerque, N.M., S. Comm. on Indian Affairs 1998 WL 278315 (F.D.C.H.) (Apr. 7, 1998);
Douglas B. L. Endreson, Esq., attorney with Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson.
Attorneys at Law, Washington, D.C., S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Sept. 24. 1998): and
Susan Williams, Esq., attorney with Williams & Janov, P.C., Albuquerque, N.M., S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 278315 (F.D.C.H.) (Apr. 7, 1998).
327. See e.g. Testimony of Alan Montgomery, Chairman of United Property Owners of
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and impact."330 Furthermore, testified the organization, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, when combined with federal joinder rules, often
may preclude suit even against non-Indian partners and contractors on
the basis that the tribe is a "necessary and indispensable party" to such
legal action. At the very least, challenges to the environmental and
land use impact of major development projects may generate volumes of
litigation, resulting in massive and expensive costs to citizens affected by
such development; waiving tribal immunity could eliminate critical
barriers to the relief available to private and public interest groups like
Citizens for Safety and Environment.
b. Protection of individuals: Personal Injuries and Civil Rights
In addition to public and private property advocates, individuals
also provided testimony to Congress indicating that waiving tribal
immunity would enhance protections available to individuals injured by
official tribal action. Some provided examples of personal injuries
caused by agents of American Indian governments that could not be
redressed through ordinary judicial remedies on account of tribal
immunity.3 32  Others argued that immunity allows tribes and tribal
330. Testimony of Jill Jensen, Citizens for Safety and Environment, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs (Apr. 7, 1998).
331. Id. ("The result is that the courts then dismiss the suits on the basis that tribes are
assumed to be immune from law suit").
332. See e.g. testimony of Bernard J. Gamache, Resident of Wapato Washington, S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs (May 6, 1998). Mr. Gamache is the parent of a child who was
killed on his way home from school in a vehicular accident caused by a Yakama Nation
tribal police officer who was enroute to a robbery scene. Although the family was able to
recover damages from the United States, who owned the vehicle and provided funding for
the tribal police department, Mr. Gamache maintained that he was unable to seek redress
against the tribe itself. He referred also to another case in which a child was struck and
killed by a tribal police officer and a lawsuit fled by his family was thwarted by a sovereign
immunity defense. He did, however, concede that he never tried to bring suit in tribal
court based upon the law of the Yakama Nation. His testimony, although ill-informed, is
passionate, angry, and hostile in its discussion of the Yakama Nation and its residents.
A number of attorneys testified to other examples of individuals being injured in
tribal facilities or by tribal agents. See e.g. Testimony of Gregory Abbott, Esq., S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs (May, 6 1998) (describing the case of an 83-year-old client who sustained
a broken hip falling from a chair while visiting a tribal casino and was unable to recover
damages in state court because the state courts of Minnesota upheld dismissal of the suit
on the grounds of tribal sovereign immunity); Dennis A. Ferndon, Esq., S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs (May 6, 1998) (describing two cases: one involving a client injured while
working on a construction project sponsored by a tribe, and another involving a client who
slipped and fell on ice and snow in the parking lot of the tribal gaming establishment
where he was employed, suffering serious back injury and restricting his ability to work for
many months, and recovering only workers' compensation benefits from his employer). In
the latter case, tribal ordinances had provided for waiver of immunity with respect to the
client's claim of injuries, but the attorney elected not to file in tribal court because the
legislation limited the amount of damages that could be recovered (to $132,000 by the
attorney's calculations) and provided for trial in civil cases by judge not jury. His client
would then have been required to reimburse the workers' compensation bureau for
benefits paid to him. Id.
One attorney claimed to have received calls from prospective Indian and non-Indian
clients with regard to "every imaginable type of civil case against tribes and tribally owned
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officials to engage unchecked in abusive, corrupt, and illegal actions that
violate the civil rights of their members. 3 3  The result, in some
circumstances, is that tribal courts sometimes participate in the
oppression of their own people. As one tribal member described:
[Miany tribal governments have become corrupt with unchecked power
and money; tribal government themselves, in some cases, are keeping
their people in the bondage of poverty and oppression.... The Indian
Civil Rights Act mandates that no Indian tribe in exercising its powers of
self-government shall violate various basic civil rights. However, when
there is no separation of powers within tribal governments and tribal
sovereign immunity protects tribal government from civil rights claims,
334tribal members are left without recourse.
As a result, testified some tribal members, cronyism, nepotism,
and ballot-box rigging is pervasive in some of their communities.335
There are no guarantees that civil rights, including age or gender
discrimination, will be honored, no guarantee of freedom of press or of
speech, no assurance that one will be provided with due process before
being deprived of employment, housing, liberty, or other essential life
needs.336 In short, testified another American Indian lawyer and owner
and publisher of the Native American Press/Ojibwe News,
where one tribal government may extend some rights to its citizens, the
next regime may not be so kind and can instantly reverse or ignore any
business." Testimony of Craig D. Greenberg, Esq., S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL
278315 (F.D.C.H.) (Apr. 7, 1998). The list included: sexual harassment, retaliatory
termination, age discrimination, disability or medical condition discrimination, racial
discrimination (including discrimination between Native Americans based upon tribal
affiliation), gender discrimination, sexual preference discrimination, defamation, whistle-
blower terminations, assault and battery, car accidents and numerous personal injury
cases, dram shop cases, wrongful death cases, including one arising out of murder, false
imprisonment, breach of contract, tribal membership issues, reservation property disputes,
theft, labor law violations (e.g., retaliation for unionization efforts), denial to individual
tribal members information about their own tribes' operations, and denial of due process
and other "constitutional (sic) guaranteed rights." Id. The attorney concluded:
The vast number and variety of calls to my office, together with the abnormally
severe and egregious nature of many of these cases, have lead me to an
unavoidable conclusion. There is a severe systemic problem with tribal sovereign
immunity. Abuse and corruption occur at an alarming rate because tribal
sovereign immunity, and the associated sense of being 'above the law,' creates a
'petri dish' habitat for numerous legal wrongs against tribal members, employees
and patrons of tribal business. This is not the fault of Indian people, it is the
fault of a governmental system which gives total immunity.
Id. The testimony does not substantiate any of these allegations; nor does it discuss the
remedies that are available to individuals under tribal law. As such it is rash and ill-
informed. Nevertheless, it was received into evidence and considered by Congress in its
deliberations over tribal immunity.
333. See e.g. Testimonies of William J. Lawrence, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs and Roland
Morris, Sr., Board Member, Citizens Equal Rights Alliance, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs,
1998 WL 278315 (F.D.C.H.) (Apr. 7, 1998).
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tribal law or tribal constitutional protection they want, in the name of self-
determination, and with the defense of sovereign immunity.... Tribal
sovereign immunity gives Indian people less rights and more poverty,
discord, government corruption and abuse of power.3
37
Another participant concluded that the ability of Indian people to
transition from a state of wardship to full and effective citizenship and
self-determination would actually be promoted by restricting tribal
immunity.
338
c. Business and Gaming Implications
The Supreme Court in its decision in Kiowa emphasized the
commercial effects of tribal immunity, suggesting that the doctrine was
"inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well
beyond traditional tribal customs and activities."339  Some of the
Congressional testimony emphasized similar concerns about the
doctrine as it relates to the growth of tribal business enterprises in
national and local economies. As one private attorney opined:
[Wihen Congress first established the doctrine, over one hundred and fifty
years ago, Indian tribes were not gloriously successful entrepreneurs. It
was not foreseeable then by Congress that Indian tribes today would be
operating major casinos where thousands and thousands of people come
to play and work each day. The law must change with the times. In this
day and age, when Indian tribes are reaping the rewards of their
commercial success, they must also fulfill their responsibilities as property
owners.340
Others also attributed the need for limiting tribal sovereign immunity to
recent growth in Indian gaming, arguing that tribes should not be
permitted to use their governmental status for commercial gain.3 4 1 One
337. Lawrence, supra n. 333; testimony of Colonel Caleb H. Johnson, Hopi Tribal Council
Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 272446 (F.D.H.C.) (Apr. 7, 1998) (testifying
as "an individual citizen of the United States whose rights of 'due process' have been
violated by the Hopi Tribal Court").
338. Testimony of Lana Marcusson, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Sept 24, 1996). Ms.
Marcusson's argument seems to be that by reducing greed and corruption amongst tribal
officials and establishing civil rights enforceability, legislation limiting sovereign immunity
would stave the backlash of public opinion against tribal interests that has been generated
with tribal success in gaming and business development. This would enable Indian people
to promote healthy business development and better implement self-determination
policies.
339. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757.
340. Ferndon, supra n. 332. Although his facts are not accurate, the attorney's views
reflect a popular justification for limiting tribal sovereignty, including immunity.
341. See e.g. Abbott, supra n. 332 ("The advent of Indian gaming in the last 10 years has
radically changed the context in which tribal sovereign immunity is exercised. Indian
tribes now invite members of the general public by the thousands each day onto their land,
in order to conduct business with them. When tribes act as businesses, and not as
governments, they should not be able to use their status as a government body for
commercial gain."); Greenberg, supra n. 332 (concluding from purported conversation with
Native American friends that the exponential growth in Indian gaming since 1991 has
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attorney even suggested that the application of tribal immunity to
commercial activities creates "a profound constitutional problem" insofar
as it creates benefits for one race that are not available to members of
other races, thereby contributing to a "red apartheid."342  Another,
describing a pending copyright case between a film producer and the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 343 argued that all entities, including tribes,
should be accountable to federal laws regulating fair competition and
protection of intellectual and property rights upon entering into the
interstate free enterprise system.
Not only do these testimonials demonstrate their authors' failure to
understand basic principles of federal Indian law, few accurately
describe the existing state of the law. They appeal to a belief that it is
somehow unfair to allow tribes to enjoy protections guaranteed to other
sovereign entities within the United States, especially when such tribes
engage in successful economic development and become competitive in
national and international markets. Concern over the perceived unfair
competitive advantage enjoyed by tribes and tribal businesses vis-&-vis
other commercial and governmental business entities may in part
underlie the views expressed by these attorneys. There is also a sense in
their remarks, however, that there is an element of racism behind their
positions: namely, that there is something anomalous, even wrong,
about Indian nations and people successfully engaging in the free
enterprise system upon which the United States and world markets are
based.
&L Collection of State Taxes
Both early and late in its discussions of tribal immunity, Congress
considered the problem of tribal immunity as it relates to the states'
ability to collect state taxes on the sale of goods by tribal enterprises to
non-Indians. As clarified by the Supreme Court in Citizens Band of
caused non-Indians to experience the same injuries and intrusion on their "constitutional"
rights that tribal members have long encountered from their own tribal governments).
342. Abbott, supra n. 332. Abbott's "constitutional" argument is patently specious and
ill-informed. It is neither well-researched nor does it cite to authorities, other than by
reference to a dissenting Minnesota Supreme Court Justice's use of the word "red
apartheid" in an unnamed opinion. It is well-established as a matter of federal law that
Indian nations and their members have been classified as political, not racial, entities.
Sovereignty bestows benefits on tribal members and non-Indians alike, especially in the
gaming industry where tribes engage in contractual relationships with non-Indian
business entities and employees.
343. Bassett, 204 F.3d 343.
344. Testimony of Richard A. Goren, Esq. (May 6, 1998). Goren suggests also that federal
abrogation of tribal immunity is in the best interests of tribal economic development
because "[without the reciprocity of equal protection other businesses simply will not deal
with tribal operated enterprises." Id. He does not, however, address why the tribe's best
interests could not better be determined pursuant to tribal law under the current state of
the federal law of tribal immunity.
734 [Vol. 37:661
74
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 37 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss3/2
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Potawatormi, 4 while the states retain the power to collect such taxes,
they may not maintain an action in federal or state court to require the
tribal government to reimburse them for the taxes or assist in their
collection. A number of business entities presented testimony about the
problem before the House of Representatives' Resources Committee. In
particular, the Committee heard testimony about the impact of
immunity on petroleum marketers, who argued that the doctrine
promoted unfair competition between tribal and non-tribal fuel retailers
and denied the state funds critical for road construction or other public
works projects. 4  Congress also considered the impact of tribal
immunity on tobacco retailers and other retail markets such as truck
stops and convenience stores.347  Congressman Ernest J. Istook
presented testimony that emphasized the impact of tribal immunity
upon state roads, schools, and public health and safety due to
uncollected taxes. 4
2. Opposition to Restricting Tribal Immunity
While testimony in support of restricting tribal immunity relied
predominantly on anecdotal accounts of injuries and abuses that the
doctrine purportedly perpetuated, proponents of tribal immunity
emphasized broader themes and legal arguments, drawing from
longstanding principles of federal Indian law as well as the laws of
selected American Indian nations. Representatives of numerous Native
American tribes offered testimonym49 as did representatives from national
345. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
346. See e.g. Testimonies of J. Burton Black on behalf of the Petroleum Marketers
Association of America, H.R. Comm. on Resources (Oct. 12, 1999) and Paul D. Reid,
President, Reid Petroleum Corporation, representing the Society of Independent Gasoline
Marketers of America, H.R. Comm. on Resources (Oct. 12, 1999).
347. See e.g. Testimony of John M. MacDougall, President, Nice N Easy Grocery Shoppes,
on behalf of the National Association of Convenience Stores and the Society of Independent
Gasoline Marketers of America, H.R. Resources Comm. (June 24, 1998). Mr. MacDougall
testified from personal experience that he was forced to close a store "because of unfair
competition from a retail tobacco and gasoline outlet owned and operated by the Oneida
tribe." Id. Furthermore, he explained, "[t]his tribal truck stop is able, through evasion of
state excise taxes, to sell gasoline at retail at a price that is below my wholesale gasoline
cost. For tobacco, this smokeshop is undercutting my store's price on a carton of
cigarettes by $3.00-far below the cost that my store pays to its tobacco wholesaler." Id.
He purported that many other "non-Native American, taxpaying" convenience stores had
been similarly closed because of competition by the Oneidas, and that the Oneidas had
purchased an additional 5,000 acres of land upon, placed it in trust with the federal
government, and had begun building a large-scale truck stop that would compete with
other retail stores.
348. Testimony of Congressman Emest J. Istook, Jr., H.R. Comm. on Resources, 1998
WL 350256 (F.D.C.H.) (June 24, 1998) ("The threat is greater to the tax bases than to
business, because some businesses are protecting themselves by making agreements with
the tribes.").
349. Tribal entities represented in the testimony included the following: the Chickasaw
Nation of Oklahoma; the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation; the
Lummi Business Council and the Lummi Nation; the Mashantucket Pequot Nation; the
Mescalero Apache Tribe; the Menominee Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin; the Navajo Nation;
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coalitions of tribal interests such as the Native American Indian
Congress and a variety of major law firms that specialize in Indian
affairs. 350  The United States, through its Solicitor of Indian Affairs,
Department of Interior, advocated for the preservation of the doctrine of
tribal immunity as well.
a. Historical Basis for Tribal Sovereignty and Immunity
Much of the testimony described the development of tribal
sovereignty as a matter of federal law, emphasizing that such sovereignty
is inherent and has long and consistently been recognized by the United
States. Pursuant to this line of reasoning, tribal immunity exists by
virtue of the sovereign status of Indian nations because, for all
governments, "sovereign immunity.., is a vital part of the right of self-
government."351 It protects governments' right to determine how (e.g.
through legislation, judicial action, mediation, or other methods)
conflicts that inevitably arise in the exercise of their sovereign authority
may be resolved.3 5 2 As such, it has long been recognized in the United
States as an essential feature of any sovereign authority.
Testimony submitted by the United States recalled the historical
roots of the doctrine of tribal immunity. The Associate Solicitor stated,
"[F]rom the first days of our Republic, the United States has recognized
Indian tribes as governments."353  Over 500 tribes are presently
recognized by the federal government, varying in size of membership and
territory as well as type of organizational structure.3 54 Continued the
representative of the United States,
Despite this variety, one thing they all have in common is the sovereignty
that is inherent to government.... A corollary to these sovereign powers
of regulatory and judicial authority is the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Since a sovereign can mandate laws and create
courts to interpret and apply these laws, it follows that a sovereign cannot
be sued absent its consent.
355
As a matter of federal law, then, and from the perspective of the
Executive Branch, tribes are and have always been sovereign nations
that possess all the powers of government, including the power to
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe; and the Tulalip Tribes. There were also some individual
members of Native American tribes that presented testimony on their own behalf. See e.g.
Johnson, supra n. 337.
350. For attorney testimony, see e.g. Eberhard, supra n. 326.
351. Id. Mr. Endreson's law firm, Sanosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson represents
Indian tribes, Alaskan Native entities, and Indian and Native people throughout the United
States.
352. Id.
353. Testimony of Robert T. Anderson, Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs,
United States Department of the Interior, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Sept. 24, 1996).
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58).
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determine immunity from suit, "except those which have been expressly
extinguished by Congress or... are inconsistent with overriding
national concerns."35 6
Representatives from tribal governments emphasized the historical
foundation of the doctrine as well. The Chickasaw Nation described a
"mandate" of "government-to-government" dealings between itself and
the United State that is contained within every treaty entered into
between the two nations since 1787, the year of the first treaties between
the United States and tribal governments.3 5 7 The tenuous condition of
the fledgling United States of America forced it to seek and obtain tribes
as allies, and "tribal governments were accorded the same significance
and respect as any foreign nation."358 Although the United States,
through Congress, later sought to alter its relationship with the tribes
and circumscribe the resulting sovereign authority of Indian nations,
tribes like the Chickasaw survived threats to their existence, retaining
and regenerating their sovereign authority. Immunity from suit arises
from and is essential to that authority.
b. Federal Trust Obligation & Duty. to Honor Treaty Obligations
Related to the proposition that tribal immunity is historically rooted
and essential to the exercise of sovereign authority is the argument that
the federal government has a trust obligation to protect and nurture
tribal sovereignty and that protection of tribal immunity extends
naturally from that obligation.359 A number of commentators raised this
point in their testimony. In advocating for negotiated guidelines for the
establishment of insurance coverage with respect to tribal governmental
action, for instance, a representative of the United States Department of
Justice indicated that the federal trust responsibility required
consultation and consensus with tribal governments. 360 The governor of
the Chickasaw Nation in his defense of tribal immunity took a similar
view. The governor stated:
As the trustee for the tribal nations, it should be the responsibility of the
federal government to make sure that the sovereign powers and
356. Id. See Testimony ofThomas L. LeClaire, Director, Office of Tribal Justice, (July 15,
1998) ("In our work with Indian tribes, the Department of Justice is guided by fundamental
principles that have governed the relations between the United States and Indian tribes for
over two hundred years.").
357. Testimony of BflIAnoatubby, Governor of the Chickasaw Nation (Sept. 24, 1996).
358. Id.
359. A summary of the legal basis for the federal trust obligation is set forth above. See
supran. 127.
360. LeClaire, supra n. 356 ("Congress has recognized that 'the United States has a trust
responsibility to [Indian tribes] that includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal
government.' 25 U.S.C.A. §3601(2) (West 2001). Under the Federal trust responsibility to
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authorities of the tribes are not only protected, but expanded to at least
those of other governments insofar as regulatory powers within the tribe
itself are concerned.
36 1
The Chainnan of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin emphasized
that preserving tribal immunity was critical to the federal government's
policy of self-determination, including strengthening self-government
and economic development. 6
Beyond this common law trust obligation, the federal government's
duty to honor its treaties with certain tribes was also cited as grounds to
reject Senator Gorton's legislation. 63 For instance, the Lummi Nation
argued that one-sided Congressional legislation, not the mutual
contracts between the United States and sovereign Indian nations like
the Lummni Nation, could be blamed for the problems cited by Gorton as
grounds for enacting legislation. 36 Based upon "mutual consent and
respect between the Lummi nation and the United States government,"
the Treaty preserved the land and cultural integrity of the Lummi people,
who had "worked, played, and celebrated life on the shores and waters of
Puget Sound for uncounted generations" prior to European settlement
and statehood by the State of Washington.365
c. Policy and morality arguments
A number of commentators responded to policy and economic
arguments raised by proponents of Slade Gorton's bill. With respect to
whether legislation piercing tribal immunity was necessary to protect ill-
informed business entities in their commercial transactions with tribes,
several participants in the Congressional hearing process emphasized
that the matter should be left to the realm of private contract
361. Anoatubby, supra n. 357.
362. Wendell Askenette, Statement of Apesanahkwat, Chairman, Menominee Indian Tribe
of Wisconsin on S. 1691, 1998 WL 236824 (F.D.C.H.) (May 6, 1998). The Chairman also
testified as to the devastating effects previous termination policies had had on his tribe and
advocated for alternative legislation, similar to but even more far-reaching than the bill
ultimately proposed by Senator Campbell: namely, a compulsory tribal insurance program
and waiver as to tort liability. He expressed particular opposition to then-Senator Gorton's
suggestion that the principle of tribal sovereignty was an anachronism, saying
The reality... is that tribal sovereignty was recognized by the government of the
Senator's great-great-grandparents, and is no more an anachronism than the
sovereignty the United States achieved as a result of its separation from the
British Empire.... As I have already stated, the Menominee have had experience
with termination already and are facing a new onslaught in Senator Gorton's Bill
and in others that threaten the core existence of Indian tribes. Once again the
tribes face a deadly new attack, led by people who may have laudable goals, but
are using means that would destroy Indian people.
IcL
363. See e.g. Testimony of Henry M. Cagey, Chairman of the Lummi Nation, S. Comm. on
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negotiations rather than government regulation. Some pointed to
contracting processes that already incorporated consideration of tribal
immunity in anticipating methods of resolving future disputes between
tribes and other contracting parties. A representative of the Chickasaw
Nation, for instance, reported in the context of Senate Bill 613 that the
entities with whom that tribe regularly contracts were fully aware of the
doctrine of tribal immunity and that each agreement involving the
Nation squarely addresses tribal immunity, clarifying the remedies
available to both parties in the event of a breach.
366
Others who testified infused these concerns with moral and ethical
considerations. Philip Deloria, another tribal member and director of the
American Indian Law Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, urged
Congress to defer to the natural processes of the marketplace, which
would put economic and political pressure on tribes to limit their
reliance on sovereign immunity rather than on federal regulation.367
This representative also questioned the fairness of subjecting tribal
governments to limitations not imposed upon states and local
governments, questioning the motives and integrity of Republicans in
Congress who routinely rejected "Washington-dictated solution[s]" to
problems that might better be resolved privately and locally by the
people who know the situation best.36 Mr. Deloria stated that "[tihe
power of Congress over Indian tribes is not morally justified if it is more
often used to hamper them competitively and to force them to give
advantages to non-Indians than it is to protect them from the
overreaching by their neighbors which history amply demonstrates."
369
Consistent with Mr. Deloria's point of view, commentators argued
also that preserving tribal immunity was further justified because the
doctrine protects tribes' often weak economic foundations from erosion
by eliminating costs associated with defending lawsuits; it is therefore
critical to the development of strong tribal economics and other tribal
and federal interests. This theme was repeated in Congressional
hearings and is reflected in key federal precedent as well. 7 ° Senator
Campbell, the legislation's sponsor, emphasized the importance of
366. Testimony of David Tovey, Tribal Executive Director, Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1999 WL 321617 (F.D.C.H.) (May
19, 1999). A representative for the United States Department of the Interior similarly
argued that the law of tribal immunity, as articulated by the courts, serves as adequate
notice for anyone seeking to do business with Indian tribes to protect their own interests
through the negotiation of waivers of sovereign immunity. Anderson, supra n. 353.
367. Testimony of Philip S. Deloria, Dir. of Am. Indian Law Center, Albuquerque, N.M., S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 396895 (F.D.C.H.) (July 15, 1998).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See e.g. id.; Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512. A number of legal scholars have
articulated this justification as well. See e.g. Student Author, In Defense of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1058, 1072-73 (1982); Bruce A. Wagman, Advancing
Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Pathway to Power, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 419, 423 (1993).
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revitalizing tribal economies and criticized Senator Gorton's proposal to
waive tribal immunity because such a waiver would have a devastating
impact on tribes.3 7 ' Senator Campbell stated:
By removing tribal discretion and decision-making regarding waivers of
immunity, Sen. 1691 would step in and force tribes to accept what states
and the federal government have done voluntarily.... Think what this
could mean in an era when plaintiffs' lawyers can simply threaten to file a
lawsuit and force a lucrative settlement. I am against such tactics
whether aimed at small 'Mom and Pop' business or Indian tribes, and I
very much fear that they would be employed to bankrupt tribes in cases
that may be weak.... Just when we ought to be encouraging the
development of tribal economies and governments, Sen. 1691 would step
372in and I believe cripple them.
Other tribal representatives referred more expressly to Congress's
absence of moral authority to limit tribal immunity and, hence, self-
governance. As Stanley Crooks, Chairman of the Shakopee Mdwakanton
Sioux Community, proclaimed:
Despite the ancient roots of tribal sovereign immunity, Congress has the
raw power to abrogate that immunity. But raw power does not translate
into moral authority, and Congress has no moral right to interfere with
Indian tribes and their governments in this way. Stripping tribes of their
immunity would contravene the very essence of self-government, and
would treat tribes in a radically manner than states. If Congress is
committee to Indian self-governance, as it claims to be, then let us govern.
The days of paternalism are supposedly over; show us that that is true.
We will continue to develop our governments, our courts, and our
economies. When mistakes are made, we will learn from them, just as any
other government within the United States' borders learns from its errors.
In the final analysis, sovereignty is not and never has been a matter of
convenience; it is essential to governance. And so we repeat, let us
371. Statement of Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998
WL 223905 (F.D.C.H.) (May 6, 1998). Senator Campbell also points out the inequities that
would exist if tribes were forced to accept blanket waivers to their immunity and be
subjected to state and federal judicial forums while states and the federal government
would maintain the power to determine when and under what circumstances to waive
immunity.
372. Id. Other testimony confirms this point. See e.g. Testimony of Stanley M. Crooks,
Chairman, Shakopee Mdwakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs(May 6, 1998) ("The unfettered authority that would be conferred on state and federal
courts to hear any suits by virtually any person with any kind of complaint against a tribal
government would bankrupt most tribal governments"); Testimony of Wendell Chino,
President, Mescalero Apache Tribe, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 233919
(F.D.C.H.) (May 6, 1998) ("I find it amazing that during a time when many believe that the
litigation explosion has gotten out of control, Senator Gorton is looking for a way to
increase the number of lawsuits in our all ready (sic) overworked legal system. Right now,
many people see Indian Tribes as having deep pockets because of the misperception that
Tribes are getting rich off Indian Gaming. If you couple this public perception with this
new ability to sue Tribes with impunity, the consequence is going to be thousands of
people suing Indian Tribes in order to make a 'quick buck.'").
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c. Enhancing Tribal-State Cooperative Agreements
Some who testified before Congress demonstrated how deference to,
and encouragement of, tribal control over the development of
governmental processes could lead to creative, cooperative, and
responsible collaborations between tribes, federal, state, and county
governments, and other non-Indian interests.3 74 Those who testified on
this point provided examples of ways in which cooperative arrangements
had benefited tribal economic development and self-determination
initiatives while creating positive solutions and remedies for non-Indians
living within reservation boundaries. As the Chairman of the Lummi
Nation stated:
Unilateral US government legislation pending before the US Congress
threatens to overturn more than two centuries of developing government
to government relations between the United States, Indian Nations and
with state governments. This would mean financial devastation and the
end of tribal governments. If S. 1691 is enacted it is the future of our
children that you will be jeopardizing.375
Others demonstrated the ways in which tribes -sometimes in
collaboration with the federal government-already were protecting the
interests of non-Indians and non-members on reservations.7 6
373. Crooks, supra n. 372. As Mr. Chino stated:
This bill is MORALLY WRONG. When the Tribes of North America entered into
treaties with the United States they did so with the understanding that the Tribes
would retain their sovereignty. The United States entered into various treaties
with the same understanding. Simply put, the United States is going back on its
word to the Indian Tribes of North America if this Bill passes. However you
classify it, morally, legally, or economically, the sponsor's position is WRONG.
The Indian Tribes of North American (sic) have kept their end of the bargain, and
we expect the United States to do the same.
Chino, supra n. 372. See Testimony of Daniel Evans, representative of Lummi Nation, S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 272448 (F.D.C.H.) (Apr. 7, 1998) ("S. 1691 is a blunt
instrument whose effect would be to ravage tribal independence at a time when finally after
more than a century, tribes have been given the opportunity to create modem independent
governments, including responsible court systems"); Williams, supra n. 326:
Morally, passage of this legislation would be a reprehensible act by the United
States in breaking its solemn promises to protect tribal governments' authority in
their territories and would set in motion the destruction of American Indian
culture and Indian self-government Such a loss would be profoundly sad for
American culture.
IdL
374. Evans, supra n. 373; Testimony of Michael T. Pablo, Chairman, Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Nation, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 278313 (F.D.C.H.)
(Apr. 7, 1998). Examples included water/sewer agreements that provided for participation
and membership by non-Indian property owners, water agreement that guaranteed water
for all reservation property owners, thereby enhancing their property values, and other
transportation and shore reconstruction projects.
375. Evans, supra n. 373.
376. Williams, supran. 326.
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Ultimately, many who rendered statements before Congress concluded
that protection of tribal immunity was essential to the development of
strong tribal economies and was mutually beneficial to America and its
people.
e. Comparisons with State and Federal Sovereign Immunity
All of the indigenous governments of American Indian nations are
subject to a monolithic federal policy, comprised of judicial precedent,
executive orders, and legislative regulations that apply equally to each
tribal entity regardless of differences that exist between them.377 This
often means that efforts to amend or reform the entire federal law
regarding Indian nations and their relationship with states and the
federal government are driven by a very few examples -often the most
extreme or dysfunctional among them-drawn from a very small
sampling of tribal governments. At the same time, tribes are often
singled out from their federal and state counterparts as the only type of
entity that is susceptible of abusing power or otherwise violating the
rights of individuals. With respect to sovereign immunity, for instance,
those who advocated for the elimination of tribal immunity attempted to
justify the need for such reform by reporting to Congress presumed flaws
or injustices in a variety of tribal systems without contrasting those
378tribal contexts with their federal and state counterparts.
Some participants in the hearings on Senator Gorton's Senate Bill
1691 and Campbell's Senate Bill 2097 demonstrated the fallacy in
restricting tribal immunity while simultaneously preserving the right of
states and the federal government to determine when and under what
circumstances to waive their immunity. As one tribal representative
testified:
Sen. 1691 purports to restore fairness, equity, and due process to citizens,
both tribal and non-tribal members, by stripping Indian tribes of their
sovereign immunity. But the bill focuses only on the immunity of tribal
governments, and does so by setting up false comparisons with the
immunity retained by the states and the United States relating to personal
injury and other tort claims.379
Such testimony demonstrated to Congress the myriad circumstances in
which a person injured by a state or local government could be denied
redress because the respective entities' voluntary waiver of immunity
377. Indian nations differ in language, culture, history, treaty, and other diplomatic
relationships with the United States, governmental structure, laws, justice systems, and
many other respects. With respect to sovereign immunity, for instance, some tribes uphold
the principle completely or provide for no waivers of such immunity, while many others
allow for individuals to bring suit or otherwise seek redress from tribal governments
through a variety of means and pursuant to a variety of legal constructs.
378. See e.g. supra n. 333.
379. Crooks, supra n. 372.
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had a loophole, limit, or other barrier to a person's ability to file suit.38 °
In fact, "most states and the United States retain their sovereign
immunity from lawsuits and only allow for limited waivers of that
immunity in suits by persons who are wronged by those governments or
their employees."38 1 Numerous examples were cited where persons hurt
by state or local governments were unable to recover for their injuries
because of sovereign immunity retained by or granted to state and local
entities.3 82 Indeed, during Congress's deliberations on this matter, the
Supreme Court affirmed its support for absolute immunity of the acts of
government legislatures, including state, regional, and local legislative
branches,38 and Congress was reminded of this fact during its hearings
on Senate Bill 1691.
384
f Discussions of Tribal Remedies and Law of Sovereign
Immunity
Sovereign immunity is an inherent attribute of the Navajo Nation as a
sovereign nation and is neither judicially created by any court, including
the Courts of the Navajo Nation, nor derived from nor bestowed upon the
Navajo Nation by any other nation or government.385
One assumption underlying the legislative proposals to eviscerate
tribal immunity was that a federal waiver of immunity was necessary to
protect individuals from the negligent or wrongful actions of tribal
entities because tribes as a general rule were lagging behind states and
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. While local governments may not enjoy under federal law the type of inherent
immunity recognized in states, foreign nations, tribes, and the federal government, they
may nonetheless be entitled to immunity in certain circumstances (i.e., as a matter of state
law or when deemed to be acting as an arm of the state). See supra n. 26. For examples
cited in the testimony, see e.g. Jones v. Kearns, 462 S.E.2d 245 (N.C. App. 1995); White v.
City of Newport, 933 S.W.2d 800 (Ark. 1996) (suit alleging negligence for failure to
administer CPR filed by wife of deceased man who died on his way to the hospital in an
ambulance owned and operated by the city was dismissed based upon sovereign
immunity); Heaney v. New Castle County, 672 A.2d 11 (Del. 1995) (case involving man
killed when a tree fell on his car, following a county forestry employee's inspection of the
area and observation of dead wood dismissed because Delaware had only waived immunity
in three "narrowly construed' areas, none of which applied to "discretionary" acts);
Swieckowsld v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380 (Colo. 1997) (family of boy who became a
quadriplegic when the lane in which he was riding his bike abruptly ended sending him
headfirst into a ditch unable to maintain negligence suit because a state statue waives
immunity for negligence regarding "dangerous conditions" of roadways, but not
"inadequate design"). Aside from these bars to personal injury actions, the testimony
provided numerous other examples of the areas in which states and local governments
may maintain sovereign immunity.
383. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998).
384. See Eberhard, supra n. 326 ("Suffice it to say here that virtually every state has
retained its immunity from a wide variety of suits. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court recently lent added credence to the immunity of state and local governments in
Bogan v. Scott-Harris.").
385. The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act, 1 Navajo Nation Code § 553(B) (1995).
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the federal government in providing remedies. A number of
commentators refuted this assumption by providing concrete evidence of
tribal laws that waived immunity and provided for individual relief in
case of injury or violations to rights in a number of circumstances. For
instance, the Chairman of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota)
Community presented information about its Tort Claims Ordinance.8 6
Congress also received information regarding a variety of other tribal tort
claims ordinances, 387 and tribal-state gaming compacts that assure
protection of casino guests.
Tribes across the United States long have grappled with how to
provide individuals with redress for injuries sustained by tribal
governments and their officials. At the time Congress deliberated over
what the appropriate scope of tribal immunity should be as a matter of
federal law, in fact, a myriad of mechanisms had been created by tribal
governments to waive immunity in certain circumstances, thereby
providing for redress by aggrieved individuals. Like state waivers, tribal
waivers of immunity typically embrace suit or other form of redress 389 in
limited sets of circumstances. In some instances, the constitution,
bylaws, or charter of the tribal government provide express waivers of
immunity and authorize civil suits.
390
386. Crooks, supra n. 372. The ordinance provides a broad waiver of the Community's
immunity to ensure redress for persons, including organizations that do business with or
are guests of the Community and those who are members, injured by the Community or its
employees or agents. It caps recovery at $250,000 per claim, up to $1 million for a single
event or occurrence. Stated the Chairman, "[The Ordinance] does guarantee justice for all
through a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity, and it does so in a manner which
strengthens the Community's sovereignty." Id.
387. See e.g. id. (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's Sovereign Immunity Waiver
Ordinance, M.P.T.O. 011092-01 (providing waiver in specified circumstances, including
"injuries proximately caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the Gaming
Enterprise")), and Pasienza v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 24 Ind. L. Rptr.
6219 (Mash. Tr. Ct. 1996); Testimony of Pedro Johnson, Council Member of Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL 236821 (F.D.C.H.) (May 6, 1998).
388. Crooks, supra n. 372. A common model is for tribes, without expressly waiving their
immunity, to agree to obtain liability insurance to cover injuries to visitors and to prevent
insurers from asserting the tribe's immunity. Congressional testimony highlighted the
compacts involving a number of tribal and state entities, including compacts between the
Ak-Chin Indian Community and the State of Arizona, the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe and the
State of Wisconsin, the Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri and the State of Kansas, and the
Cow Creek Tribe and the State of Oregon. Id
389. These might include administrative remedies, Peacemaker Court and other
traditional forums, and other forms of dispute resolution. For selected examples of
indigenous peacemaking systems, see infra n. 401.
390. See e.g. Cleveland, Sr. v. Blackhawk, 24 Ind. L. Rept. 6051 (Winn. Tr. Ct. 1996)
(analyzing the sovereign immunity waiver contained in the Winnebago Constitution). See
Long v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, 25 Ind. L. Rptr. 6111, 6116 (Mohegan Gaming
Disputes Tr-. Ct. 1997). (Employee challenged termination of employment with gaming
authority, alleging breach of contract and discrimination, among other claims. Gaming
Authority moved to dismiss contractual claims on grounds of sovereign immunity, and
discrimination claim on grounds of lack of standing-tribal employment discrimination
ordinance does not give standing to managerial staff or others with access to
administrative grievance procedures. Court agreed with Authority. Contractual, quasi-
contractual, and collateral estoppel claims were neither waived by contract nor did they fit
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More typically, waivers of immunity are set forth in ordinances or
other forms of legislation. The legislative council for the Navajo Nation,
for instance, has enacted a Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act.391 In it the
Navajo Nation expressly recognizes that "[s]overeign immunity is an
inherent attribute of the Navajo Nation as a sovereign nation and is
neither judicially created by any court, including the Courts of the
Navajo Nation, nor derived from nor bestowed upon the Navajo Nation by
any other nation or government."392  In addition, the Navajo Nation
Council has enacted the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights in recognition of the
interests and rights of its people.3 93 The Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act
balances the interests of individual parties in obtaining "benefits and
just redress to which they are entitled under law in accordance with
orderly process of the Navajo government" with the public interest in
securing public funds and assets and ensuring the ability of the
government to function for "the general welfare and the greatest good of
all people."3"
Consistent with these objectives, the Act authorizes suit for
prospective injunctive relief or declaratory judgment in the courts of the
Navajo Nation against an officer, employee, or agent of the Navajo Nation
under certain circumstances in order to compel performance of their
responsibilities under the laws of the United States and the Navajo
Nation, including the latter's Bill of Rights. 95 Other provisions authorize
within limited waiver of sovereign immunity provided for by Mohegan Constitution. That
Constitution gives authority to Gaming Authority to grant limited waivers of sovereign
immunity as to gaming matters and provides that no provision of tribal law should limit
the right that "any person may otherwise have to bring an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to protect a right or seek a remedy otherwise available pursuant to the Indian
Civil Rights Act.... Mohegan Constitution, Art. XIII." Since plaintiff did not contract for
limited waiver of sovereign immunity nor did he bring a claim under the ICRA, the court
found that no waiver of sovereign immunity applied and, hence, that it did not have
jurisdiction over any claims.)
391. 1 Navajo Nation Code § 551 et seq. (1995). The legislation was enacted in 1980 and
amended a number of times, most recently in 1992. See Raymond v. Navqjo Agric. Prod.
Indus., 22 Ind. L. Rptr. § 6100 (Nav. S. Ct. 1995) (recognizing the codification of the
nation's inherent immunity from suit and waiver in four circumstances).
392. 1 Navajo Nation Code § 553(B) (1995).
393. 1 Navajo Nation Code § 1 et seq. (1995). Like the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), 25
U.S.CA. § 1301 et seq. (West 2001), and the United States Bill of Rights, the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights provides for protection of civil liberties from incursions by the Navajo Nation
or its agents. Its protections largely mirror the United States Bill of Rights, although
discrimination based upon gender Is expressly prohibited. 1 Navajo Nation Code § 3 (1995)
("Equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex
nor shall any person within its jurisdiction be denied equal protection in accordance with
the laws of the Navajo Nation, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law."). It provides for a number of protections not available under the Indian
Civil Rights Act. For instance, unlike ICRA. it prohibits the establishment of religion,
provides for the right to counsel for indigent defendants, requires just compensation for a
taking of private property by the Navajo Nation, and provides for the right to keep and bear
arms. 1 Navajo Nation Code §§ 4, 6, 7, and 8 (1995). Cf. 25 U.S.C.A. §1302 (West 2001).
394. 1 Navajo Nation Code § 554(A) (1995).
395. Id. at § 554(G).
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recovery of monetary damages for injuries and amounts that lie within
the coverage of applicable liability insurance retained by the Nation.3 96
The Act establishes certain procedures, such as the need for claimants
to file notice of suit with administrative offices of the President and
Attorney General of the Navajo Nation, as jurisdictional prerequisites to
maintaining suit against the Navajo Nation.397
Aside from the Navajo Nation, the laws and precedent of many other
tribes acknowledge the inherent immunity of tribal governments while
recognizing the interests of individuals in obtaining redress or protection
from the actions of a tribal government or its officers or agents. Some
tribes, like the Navajo Nation, provide for limited waivers of immunity in
order to guarantee protection and enforcement of individual liberties and
other rights guaranteed under their constitutions or charter documents
or, in some instances, even the Indian Civil Rights Act.398  Yet others
have laws that acknowledge express and implied waivers of tribal
immunity in a variety of other circumstances, including personal injury
or property damage claims, employment claims, and suits based upon
396. Id. at § 554(F). Section 554(F) states:
The Navajo Nation may be sued only in the Courts of the Navajo Nation with
respect to any claim which is within the express coverage and not excluded by
either commercial liability insurance carried by the Navajo Nation or an
established Navajo Nation self-insured and/or other claims program of the Navajo
Nation government, approved and adopted pursuant to the laws of the Navajo
Nation and further, subject to [certain enumerated] provisions and limitation[.].
Recovery is excluded in a number of circumstances. For instance, certain kinds
of claims are exempt from the provisions of the Act (e.g., false arrest, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or claims demonstrating gross negligence
in probation, parole, furlough or release from confinement of a prisoner or
detainee). Id. Punitive or exemplary damages against the Navajo Nation or its
officers, employees or agents acting within the course and scope of the authority
of their office also are precluded.
Id
For a discussion of the Act by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, see Raymond v.
Navajo Agric. Prod. Indus., 22 Ind. L. Rptr. 6100 (Nav. S. Ct. 1995). In that case, a tribal
member sued a Navajo Nation agricultural business entity for sexual harassment, breach
of employment contract, and wrongful termination. The Court held that the claims were
barred under the Navajo Sovereign Immunities Act. The decision was based upon the
Court's conclusion that the suit did not fall within any of the authorized categories under
the Act. According to the Court, the Act codifies the nation's inherent immunity from suit,
allowing for suit in only four circumstances: (1) when explicitly authorized by federal law,
(2) when explicitly authorized by council resolution, (3) for claims within the express
coverage and not excluded by the commercial liability insurance carried by the nation, and
(4) when brought against an officer, employee or agent of the Navajo Nation to compel him
or her to perform his/her responsibilities under the laws of the U.S. and the Navajo Nation,
including the Bill of Rights of the Navajo Nation. None applied to plaintiff. Although the
Act requires commercial liability policies established by the Navajo Nation to cover
personal injury and property damages established as a direct and proximate cause of a
violation of the wrongful deprivation or impairment of civil rights under the Navajo Nation
Bill of Rights, NAPI's insurance policy did not cover these types of claims and no civil rights
violations were presented. See 1 Navajo Nation Code at § 554(F).
397. 1 Navajo Nation Code at § 555.
398. 25 U.S.C.A. §1301 etseq. (West 2001).
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contractual arrangements. 99 In addition, a number of tribes expressly
acknowledge and set forth parameters for voluntary contractual waivers
of sovereign immunity by tribal governments. 40 0 Additionally, tribes may
399. For a discussion of some of the different legal constructs, see e.g. Chatterson v.
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or., 24 Ind. L. Rptr. 6231 (Siletz Ct. App. 1997)
(describes limited waiver of sovereign immunity and holds that tribal statute of limitations
for purposes of actions against tribal officials does not violate the equal protections
guarantees of the tribal constitution or ICRA); Cloud v. Smith, 25 Ind. L. Rptr. 6030 (Ho-
Chunk S. Ct. 1998) (acknowledges tribal resolution providing for limited waiver of
sovereign immunity in employment context but holds that trial court lacked jurisdiction
because employee failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to coming to court);
Galardi v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 24 Ind. L. Rptr. 6191 (Mash. Peq. Tr. Ct.
1996) (discusses Mashantucket Pequot's Sovereign Immunity Waiver Ordinance in context
of "slip and fall" in accident in tribal gaming enterprise facility, held to be an arm of the
Tribe, and concludes that Ordinance expressly excludes from immunity waiver awards for
loss of consortium: "The Gaming Enterprise shares the common law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. The... Ordinance waives the sovereign
immunity of the Tribe and Gaming Enterprise to permit certain causes of action, but
except to the extent that such sovereign immunity is clearly and unequivocally waived, the
sovereign immunity of the Gaming Enterprise continues. The court cannot expand the
scope of the Tribe's limited waiver of sovereign immunity beyond that which was intended
by the Tribe. It has no jurisdiction to award damages based on loss of consortium.");
Martin v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Ind. L. Rptr. 6185, 6187 (Hopi Tribe App. Ct. 1996) (determining
whether tribal members could maintain in tribal court claims for wrongful termination of
employment, Court finds that under Hopi Constitution and Bylaws Hopi Tribal Council has
authority to waive Hopi sovereign immunity and that Tribal Council clearly and
unequivocally waived immunity in Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual: "The Hopi
Tribe does enjoy sovereign immunity and it may assert or waive the doctrine in its own
courts. The Hopi Tribe may waive sovereign immunity through a clear and unequivocal
statement of waiver, which will be determined by looking at the intent of the Tribal Council
and the plain statement"); Pazienza v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 24 Ind. L.
Rptr. 6219 (Mash. Peq. Tr. Ct. 1996) (Analyzes Mashantucket Pequot's Sovereign Immunity
Waiver Ordinance with respect to common law invasion of privacy claim and strict liability
claim and concludes that waiver of immunity does not extend to strict liability but does
extend to tort action); Wells v. Fort Berthold Community College, 24 Ind. L. Rptr. 6157 (Ft.
Berthold Tr. Ct 1997) (In denying tribally chartered corporation's motion to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds an unjust enrichment employment action, the Court held that
tribal charter's provision that the Corporation has the power "to sue and be sued, complain
and defend, in its corporate name in the Fort Berthold Tribal Court" constitutes an express
waiver of immunity. The fact that there was no written contract or waiver did not matter.
The court did, however, express its concern about the unlimited nature of the waiver,
advising the College to have counsel or the Tribes' legal experts consider appropriate
limitations.).
400. The Ho-Chunk Nation, for instance, through its Tribal Court has expressly grappled
with this issue. See e.g. C & B Inv. v. Ho-Chunk Dept. of Health, 24 Ind. L. Rptr. 6114 (Ho-
Chunk Tr. Ct. 1996) (Tribal health department entered into commercial lease for use of
office building, then vacated the premises. Following unsuccessful effort to maintain suit
in the trial and appellate courts of Wisconsin, C & B commenced action in tribal court.
Tribe raised defenses of sovereign immunity and res judicata. Ho-Chunk court agreed with
state court's finding that sovereign immunity bars enforcement of action by plaintiff.
Neither the governing documents of the Business Committee, nor by-laws of the Health
Board, nor lease agreement contained 'sue or be sued' language. The court said: "Nothing
short of an express waiver in a case between a non-government individual or entity and the
Ho-Chunk Nation or sub-entity satisfied the Martinez standard. The Ho-Chunk nation did
not expressly waive its sovereign immunity in agreeing to the general contract language
used here. The plaintiffs in this case were free to request a waiver of sovereign immunity
before executing the lease agreement... Indian tribes have structured their many
commercial dealings upon the justified expectations that absent an express waiver their
sovereign immunity stood fast." Dismissal was also supported by principles of res
judicata.).
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provide redress to individuals against intrusive government action by
creating administrative remedies, peacemaker courts, and other non-
adjudicatory methods of dispute resolution.4 °1
While the absence of mechanisms for universally reporting tribal
judicial decisions and laws does not currently permit accurate statistical
assessment of the status of sovereign immunity in all tribes and no such
statistical data was provided to Congress, the numerous examples that
readily can be documented clearly refute the assumption that no, or
even few, tribes have voluntarily chosen to waive immunity. From this
fact, together with the reality that states and the federal government
were and continue to be permitted to shape their own waivers of
sovereign immunity, a number of tribal representatives argued that it
would be unfair for Congress to deny tribes the opportunity to similarly
develop their legal systems and laws regarding sovereign immunity. In
this regard, then, the facts about tribal immunity support moral claims
against Congressional intervention with tribal sovereignty. As Chairman
Crooks explains:
[I]t is unfair to compare governments that have had a century or more to
build their institutions and their financial security to tribal governments
that are still striving to reach the same ends. Indian tribes-Indian
governments-must be accorded the same rights and respect as their
non-Indian counterparts.... [Tribal waivers of immunity are increasingly
common. As tribal governments interact more with non-Indians and as
they become more stable financially, there is every reason to believe that
the trend will continue.
40
2
g. Testimony Regarding Research on Tribal Liability Insurance
Coverage and the Federal Tort Claims Act
Congress also received testimony regarding the need to examine
tribal liability insurance coverage and its intersection with coverage
provided by the federal government. Specifically, it took testimony
regarding the importance of heightening tribal awareness about existing
tort claim coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA). °3
401. For published descriptions of indigenous peacemaking systems, see Robert B. Porter,
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal
Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 235 (1997)
(describing an over 500-year tradition of peacemaking in Seneca society); Robert Yazzie,
Life Comes from It. Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175 (1994); James W. Zion,
The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 Mediation Q. 327 (1993).
402. Crooks, supra n. 372.
403. See Testimony of Phyllis C. Borgi, J.D., M.A., Center for Health Policy Research,
George Washington University Medical Center, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1998 WL
552152 (F.D.C.H.) (July 15, 1998). The Center reported on a study completed in 1998
entitled "Accessment (sic) of Access to Private Liability Insurance for Tribes and Tribal
Organizations with Self-Determination Contracts/Compacts." The United States
Department of Health and Human Services in conjunction with the Departments of Interior
and Justice commissioned the study and requested the Center to assess tribal access to
748 [Vol. 37:661
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Testimony also emphasized the need for the federal government, through
its trust responsibility, to (1) conduct further assessments of tribal
liability insurance, and (2) assist tribes and tribal organizations in
accessing accurate information about federal coverage and appropriate
and reasonably priced supplemental insurance. 4°
In an effort to encourage tribes and tribal organizations to assume
management responsibility over certain programs historically
maintained and operated by the federal government (e.g. health clinics
and social services programs), Congress extended the protections of the
FTCA to tribal entities carrying out such programs.4 5 The FTCA
provides immunity from common law tort claims against tribal entities
and individuals whose acts or omissions are within the scope of self-
determination contracts and within the scope of employment (as a
matter of state law). If a claim is covered under the FTCA, thereby
satisfying all of the requirements specified under the Act, the United
States "steps into the shoes of the tribal defendant(s) and assumes
liability for the claim." 40 6 As a result, tribal entities need not provide for
private liability insurance to protect against claims covered by the FTCA.
Notwithstanding this fact, however, testimony drawn from a study
completed on tribal liability insurance access and coverage40 7 indicated
that a significant percentage of tribes nonetheless paid inordinately high
premiums for coverage that was supposed to be merely supplemental
and otherwise experienced difficulties obtaining private insurance.408
Some were not even aware of the alternative coverage provided for under
the FTCA, nor were the brokers with whom they contracted.4 9
Inconsistencies in federal determinations about coverage under the
FTCA further contributed to uncertainty about what claims might be
covered under the Act and in what circumstances private liability
insurance might be necessary or duplicative.410 Emphasizing the benefit
commercial liability insurance and recommend strategies to assist tribes in locating
affordable insurance to supplement the coverage available to tribes under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Id.
404. Id.
405. Congress extended the provisions of the FTCA to tribes and personnel when they are
carrying out self-determination contracts pursuant to Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 314, codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C.A. § 450(o (West 2001). It expanded the coverage for other
activities in other legislative amendments. See e.g. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2802-04 (West 2001)
(provision of law enforcement services in Indian country through contracts with the
Secretary of the Interior acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs); Pub. L. No. 100-466
as amended and codified at 25 U.S.C.A. §450(g) (West 2001)). For additional information
about the historical development of FTCA coverage see Testimony by LeClaire, supra n.
356.
406. Id.
407. See supra n. 395.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. Other problems identified in the report included (1) poor communication between
tribal entities and federal agencies involved in FTCA decision-maklng, and (2) a high rate of
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of FTCA coverage and access to accurate supplemental insurance to
tribal self-determination efforts, the testimony provided a number of
recommendations, most of which focused on ways in which Congress
could assist in facilitating the dissemination and exchange of accurate
411information about FTCA coverage and private liability insurance.
Finally, the testimony endorsed the proposed legislation's goals to
further study and report to Congress on the status of tribal immunity
and insurance coverage. Importantly, it emphasized also how difficult
gathering and analyzing relevant data would be, offering a list of
suggestions drawn from sixteen months of research experience that
failed to "yield any concrete statistics in these critical areas. " 4  Despite
these warnings about the difficulty of gathering data about insurance,
though, Congress opted to adhere to Senator Campbell's plan to make
an examination into tribal liability insurance coverage the salient
purpose of the legislation.
I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act & the Commercial-
Governmental Distinction
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA), expressly circumscribing the contours of foreign sovereign
immunity.4 13 Its refusal to extend similar limits to tribal sovereign
immunity indicates a clear intent on the part of Congress to accord
American Indian nations and their sovereign authority greater deference
than foreign nations, at least with respect to authority over the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
Congress received and considered recommendations in favor of
extending the limits imposed upon foreign nations in FSIA to Indian
nations, particularly with respect to the commercial-governmental
distinction set forth in FSIA. For instance, in advising Congress to
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in its Kiowa decision, the Supreme
Court "[found] instructive the problems of sovereign immunity for foreign
countries."41 4 This decision was rendered as Congress was deliberating
legislation proposed by Senators Gorton and Campbell. Senator
Gorton's proposed legislation, in fact, directly incorporated the Supreme
unfamiliarity with the FTCA on the part of insurance companies and a general reluctance
to accurately take into account the FTCA when determining private liability coverage.
411. Id.
412. Id. Concluded the testimony: "Determining the adequacy of tribal private liability
coverage is at best difficult; at worst, it may be impossible."
413. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (West 2001). For a more detailed discussion of the FSIA
and the historical context in which it was enacted, see supra Parts II.A.3. and IV.
414. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759. Tracing the historical development of the common law
regarding foreign sovereign immunity, the Court described how 'Idlifficulties in
implementing the principle led Congress in 1976 to enact the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, resulting in more predictable and precise rules." Id.
750 [Vol. 37:661
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Court's decision into its findings. 41  The fact that Congress did not
extend FSIA's provisions to tribal immunity, therefore, indicates the
strength of Congress's resolve to (a) treat Indian nations as unique
sovereign entities separate from any other type of sovereign entity, and
(b) continue its historical legacy of protecting tribal sovereign immunity
from unwarranted incursions, thereby fulfilling its trust responsibility to
the tribes.
E. The Enduring Protectionist Policies of Congress
For several years prior to the enactment of the year 2000 sovereign-
immunity-related enactments, Congress considered several pieces of
proposed legislation that sought to essentially eviscerate tribal sovereign
416 wk foimmunity. In the wake of Congressional debate on the matter,
moreover, the United States Supreme Court encouraged Congress to
enact legislation that would limit the ability of tribes to claim immunity,
particularly with respect to commercial activities.4 17  The Court
explained:
There are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine....
In our interdependent and mobile society... tribal immunity extends
beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-governance. This is evident
when tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now
include ski resorts, gambling, and the sale of cigarettes to non-
Indians.... In this economic context, immunity can harm those who are
unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort
victims. These considerations might suggest a need to abrogate tribal
immunity, at least as an overarching rule. 18
The Court referred to the role of Congress in reforming tribal immunity
repeatedly, invoking Congress at least once in each of the six concluding
paragraphs of the majority opinion.4 19 Finding flaw in both the rationale
behind the policy and the strength of the judicial precedent, the Court
415. See supra Part IV.C.5.
416. See supra Part V.C.
417. The Court stated that the doctrine, although perhaps once necessary to promote
economic development and self-sufficiency in fledgling tribal governments, may now be
challenged as "inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending well beyond
traditional customs and activities." Kiowa Thbe, 523 U.S. at 758.
418. Id.
419. For example, the Court makes the following references to Congress: (1) "we defer to
the role Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment;" (2) "[In considering
Congress's role in reforming tribal immunity, we find instructive the problems of sovereign
immunity for foreign countries;"(3) "although the Court has taken the lead in drawing the
bounds of tribal immunity, Congress, subject to constitutional limitations, can alter its
limits through explicit legislation;" (4) "Congress... 'has always been at liberty to dispense
with such tribal immunity or to limit it;'" and (5) "In light of these concerns, we decline to
revisit our case law and choose to defer to Congress." Id. at 758-60 (citing Okka. Tax
Commi., 498 U.S. 510).
20021
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strenuously urged Congress to limit the scope of tribal immunity. The
legislative record is replete, moreover, with testimony and argument in
favor of limiting tribal immunity.
Nevertheless, Congress declined to adopt the Court's
recommendations. After years of deliberation and consideration of a
wide array of perspectives presented in legislative hearings, federal,
state, and tribal courts, and even the media, members of Congress
implemented only minor revisions to tribal immunity. They did so after
listening to multiple representatives of American Indian nations, as well
as representatives of other interests openly in favor of derogating tribal
immunity. In enacting provisions that would require gathering data on
tribal insurance policies and other matters related to tribal immunity,
Congress in March 2000 opted instead to defer its decision over the
matter until a later date and, therefore, largely maintained the status
quo. Moreover, its amendments to 25 U.S.C. § 81, although significant,
were narrow in scope.420
The fact that Congress declined to enact legislation more limiting of
tribal immunity is consistent with a Congressional tradition-indicated
by the paucity of exceptions to the general rule of tribal immunity-that
is generally protective of tribal sovereignty and its inherent attributes.
In only a few narrowly prescribed circumstances has Congress limited
tribal sovereignty.4 2' Significantly, Congress did not abrogate tribal
immunity when enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, a piece of
legislation that provided for state-tribal compacting process and imposed
some additional limitations on the tribes' sovereign prerogative to
conduct gaming. It narrowly abrogated immunity with respect to the
Indian Civil Rights Act. Other circumstances have been limited to
particularized regulatory scenarios and have been the subject judicial
interpretation.
While the new Section 81 Amendments require certain contracts
(e.g. those that are "relative to Indian lands" and require the approval of
the Secretary of Interior) to contain express waivers of tribal immunity,
there is interpretive latitude with respect to their scope as well. At least
one court has declined to extend the Amendments' coverage to contracts
in which an Indian tribe rented equipment from a gaming corporation for
use in a casino on tribal land.4 22 Thus, the 2000 Amendments are
limited in scope and reaffirm Congress's ongoing commitment to
preserving tribal immunity.
420. See supra Part IV.C.
42 1. Id.
422. U.S. ex rel. Steele v. Trn Key Gaming, Inc., 260 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2001).
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poor and Indian children.4 28
Consistent with these goals, President Clinton issued an Executive
Order on the same day he met with tribal leaders that confirmed his
administration's commitment to fostering a government-to-government
relationship with Native American tribal governments in recognition of
their inherent sovereignty.429 Specifically, it directed the head of each
executive department and agency to implement the government-to-
government relationship as well as to consult with federally recognized
tribal governments and attempt to work cooperatively with them in
matters that affect them.430
Besides issuing these statements committing the Executive Branch
to respecting the sovereignty of Indian nations, the Clinton
administration supported indigenous self-determination in other ways as
well. For instance, representatives from the Administration testified at
Congressional hearings directly related to sovereign immunity,
announcing the administration's unequivocal support of tribal
immunity. 43' Legal representatives from the Clinton Administration also
consistently advocated for strong sovereignty positions in litigation
before the United States Supreme Court and other judicial
proceedings.
432
President Clinton was not the first contemporary President to
uphold and further the inherent sovereignty of tribes. President Lyndon
Johnson initiated the post-termination-era commitment to self-
determination on the part of the Executive Branch.4 33 President Richard
Nixon forcefully advocated for self-determination, including self-
governance, of Indian people, denouncing previous federal policies of
forced termination and excessive paternalism and setting forth specific
recommendations for action.4 3" Emphasizing the strength, endurance,
and creativity of American Indian people, again often in the face of
tremendous obstacles, President Nixon acknowledged the enormous
contributions American Indians had made to the United States. 5  In
428. Id. at 345.
429. William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, (Apr. 2, 1994), in Francis Paul Prucha, Documents of United
States Indian Policy at 346 (3d ed., U. Neb. Press 2000).
430. Id.
431. See suprann. 345-48 and accompanying text.
432. See e.g. supra nn. 231-35 and accompanying text.
433. See supra n. 423.
434. Richard M. Nixon, Speech, Special Message to Congress (U.S. Capitol, Washington,
D.C., July 8, 1970), in Francis Paul Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy at
256-58. (3d ed., U. Neb. Press 2000).
435. Id. at 57 ("But the story of the Indian in America is something more than the record
of the white man's frequent aggression, broken agreements, intermittent remorse and
prolonged failure. It is a record also of endurance, of survival, of adaptation and creativity
in the face of overwhelming obstacles. It is a record of enormous contribution to this
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V. EXECUTIVE POLICY WITH RESPECT TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The federal government, through its Executive Branch, has been
committed to promoting tribal self-government and self-determination,
mirroring the other branches of government's commitment to those
policies as well. Since 1968, virtually every presidential administration,
regardless of political affiliation, has confirmed its commitment to tribal
sovereignty, including the development of tribal economies and means of
self-governance. 3  In addition and consistent with its trust
responsibility with respect to the tribes, the Executive Branch has
supported tribal self-governance and economic development in testimony
before Congress and in case pending before the Supreme Court.
On April 29, 1994, President Clinton invited leaders of 547 federally
recognized tribes to a meeting in the White House to discuss his views
on Indian policy and receive comments about their goals and
424priorities. He made tribute to the unique and indomitable spirit of
American Indian people that has enabled them to retain their identity,
dignity and faith in the face of "often immeasurable obstacles."425 He
acknowledged the fact that their cultures and societies predated the
Constitution.4 26 He pledged the federal government's support to its
nation-to-nation relationship with the various tribes as well as to the
self-determination of American Indian peoples and continued efforts at
strengthening tribal economic development. 427 Unlike other Presidents,
he emphasized also the importance of enhancing the health needs of
tribal communities and their families and children through an enhanced
Indian Health Service budget as well as in improving the education for
423. In 1968, in a "Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American Indian:
TFhe Forgotten American,'" President Lyndon B. Johnson articulated a bold statement
advocating the end of "old debate(s)" about termination and paternalism in favor of a
federal commitment to self-determination and self-help. Lyndon B. Johnson, Speech,
Special Message to Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: "The Forgotten
American," (U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 1968), in Francis Paul Prucha,
Documents of United States Indian Policy 1, 249-50. (3d ed., U. Neb. Press 2000). President
Johnson also requested a ten percent funding increase or one-half a billion dollars for
programs aimed at the American Indian. President Johnson stated: "I propose, in short, a
policy of maximum choice for the American Indian: a policy expressed in programs of self-
help, self-development, self-determination.... The greatest hope for Indian progress likes
in the emergence of Indian leadership and initiative in solving Indian problems. Indians
must have a voice in making the plans and decisions in programs which are important to
their daily life." Acknowledging the federal government's responsibility to the Indian
people, he recommended a relationship based upon "partnership-not paternalism"
between the federal government and the Indian nations. Id.
424. William Jefferson Clinton, Speech, Remarks to Native American and Alaska Native
Tribal Leaders (White House, Washington, D.C., Apr. 29, 1994), in Francis Paul Prucha,
Documents of United States Indian Policy at 343-45 (3d ed., U. Neb. Press 2000).
425. Id. at 344.
426. Id- at 343. ("So much of who we are today comes from who you have been for a long
time. Long before others came to these shores there were powerful and sophisticated
cultures and societies here: yours. Because of your ancestors, democracy existed here
long before the Constitution was drafted and ratified.").
427. Id. at 344-45.
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light of these contributions and "as a matter of justice and ...
enlightened social policy," he advocated that the federal government
promote and encourage self-determination of indigenous people.
Although his rhetoric focused more on the Indian people rather than
their status as sovereign nations, his condemnation of termination-era
policies aimed at separating American Indians from their communities
and culture indicates a commitment to the collective sovereignty of
American Indian tribes.
Following President Nixon's lead, President Reagan, while cutting
federal aid during his administration in ways that exerted a deleterious
effect on Indian communities, also advocated for placing greater
responsibility with Indian people and enhancing the self-governing
powers of tribal governments.436  President Reagan stated: "This
administration believes that responsibilities and resources should be
restored to the governments which are closest to the people. This
philosophy applies to State and local governments but also to federally
recognized American Indian tribes."437 Recounting the United States'
history in entering into treaties with the tribes, President Reagan
reiterated the enduring government-to-government relationship between
the federal government and each of the federally recognized tribes.
Throughout our history, despite periods of conflict and shifting national
policies in Indian affairs, the government-to-government relationship
between the United States and Indian tribes has endured. The
Constitution, treaties, laws, and court decisions have consistently
recognized a unique political relationship between Indian tribes and the
United States which this administration pledges to uphold.... Our policy
is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a government-to-government
basis and to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian tribes without
threatening termination.
438
Drawing from President Nixon's policy of self-determination, President
Reagan advocated for tribes to strengthen their institutions and
processes of self-government according to each tribes' unique priorities,
goals, and values.439  Development of reservation economies also
featured prominently in his statement of federal Indian policy.440
436. Ronald Reagan, Statement by the President. Indian Policy (Jan. 24, 1983), in Francis
Paul Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy at 302-04 (3d ed., U. Neb. Press
2000).
437. Id. at 302.
438. Id. at 303.
439. Id. ("This administration will take a flexible approach which recognizes the diversity
among tribes and the right of each tribe to set its own priorities and goals....
Development will be charted by the tribes, not the Federal Government.").
440. Id. at 304. The statement emphasizes ways of stimulating private investment in
Indian communities, including devising investment strategies that are consistent with the
federal government's trust relationship, removing legal barriers to contracting with tribes,
reducing regulations which hamper economic growth, enhancing tribal infrastructure, and
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Moreover, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12401, establishing
a commission to study economic development on Indian reservations
and report on barriers to investment and economic growth in Indian
country.4"
President George Bush followed the policy of the Reagan
administration, of which he had been a part, reaffirming his
administration's commitment to a government-to-government
relationship between the federal government and federally recognized
tribes and acknowledging the sovereignty of such tribes.442 President
Bush stated:
This government-to-government relationship is the result of sovereign and
independent tribal governments being incorporated into the fabric of our
nation, of Indian tribes becoming what our courts have come to refer to as
quasi-sovereign domestic dependent nations. Over the years the
relationship has flourished, grown, and evolved into a vibrant partnership
in which over 500 tribal governments stand shoulder to shoulder with the
other governmental units that form our Republic.
443
Like President Reagan, he encouraged tribal governments to assume
responsibility for the administration of a number of programs previously
administered by the federal government. 444 He established also an Office
of American Indian Trust in the Department of the Interior to oversee the
trust responsibility for the federal government and a senior staff member
to act as the President's liaison with the Indian tribes. 44 5
Beginning with President Johnson, the Executive Branch, through
its presidential administrations, has articulated a policy with respect to
Indian nations that acknowledges their enduring sovereignty and
promotes self-determination and economic growth. Each administration
has maintained a government-to-government relationship with tribes.
While none of the policy declarations articulate specific correlates of
sovereignty, such as the right of immunity from suit, their endorsement
of the principle of tribal sovereignty and tribal self-governance is
nonetheless consistent with the conclusion that tribes should maintain
the right to determine when and under what circumstances they may be
subject to suit or liability. It is the Executive Branch, through its
improving the regulatory, adjudicatory, and enforcement mechanisms critical to recruiting
and maintaining private contracting and participation in economic development. Id.
441. Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies, Executive Order 12401
(Jan. 14, 1983), in Francis Paul Prucha, Documents of United States Indian Policy at 302
(3d. ed., U. Neb. Press 2000).
442. George Bush, Statement on Indian Policy (June 14, 1991), in Francis Paul Prucha,
Documents of United States Indian Policy 335-36 (3d. ed., U. Neb. Press 2000). It is too
early to tell what the current administration of George W. Bush will do with respect to
American Indians and tribal sovereignty.
443. Id. at 335.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 335-36.
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Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs and other federal
agencies, that supports and maintains tribal programs important to self-
governance, sovereignty, and the proper exercise of sovereign immunity.
Other federal agencies have upheld the doctrine of tribal immunity in
promulgating regulations that implement and interpret Congressional
legislation.
446
VI. SYNTHESIZING THE FEDERAL STRANDS
A. Reflections on the Current Lay of the Land
From recent Supreme Court decisions and Congressional
enactments have emerged a dialogue regarding the appropriate scope of
tribal immunity in contemporary American society. In articulating and
reconsidering the scope of tribal immunity, each has drawn from a rich
and firmly-rooted tradition of judicial precedent and legislative action,
that has recognized and been generally protective of tribal immunity.
Their dialogue may be situated against a backdrop of executive policy
and action that in recent administrations has also generally lent support
to tribal self-governance and economic development. A number of other
federal and state judicial opinions have informed the discussion as
well,447 as has previous dialogue over other related matters, such as the
appropriate scope of the sovereign immunity of foreign nations as well as
states. 48 While the primary participants in the federal discourse over
tribal immunity have been the Supreme Court and Congress, all three
branches have demonstrated their long-term commitment to tribal self-
determination and to continued recognition and preservation of tribal
immunity and tribal sovereignty.
It is too early to tell how the Supreme Court may yet respond to the
political branches' resistance to making wide-scale substantive changes
to the doctrine of tribal immunity. In its most recent opinion, C & L
Enterprises, decided in April 2001, the Court limited itself to
consideration of an issue that lies within the scope of one of the
standard exceptions to immunity: namely, whether contractual language
regarding an arbitration clause proffered and entered into by the
Citizens Band of Potawatomi could be construed as a waiver of the
tribe's immunity.449 While the C & L Enterprises opinion may indicate
the Rehnquist Court's willingness to broadly construe contractual
waivers in which tribes appear to have abrogated tribal immunity, the
446. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency has determined that tribes
remain immune from suit under the citizens' suits provisions of the Clean Air Act. 63 Fed.
Reg. 7253, 7260-62 (Feb. 12, 1998), supra n. 277.
447. See e.g. supra Parts III.C.3 and III.D. 1; supra nn. 177-85.
448. See e.g. Kennecott, 327 U.S. 573 (federal); Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (state).
449. See supra n. 94.
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basic interpretive rules regarding tribal immunity remain intact. In the
absence of Congressional abrogation of tribal immunity, the Court has
acknowledged that immunity presumptively flows from tribal sovereignty
where such sovereignty has been recognized by the federal government.
Where Congress has acted, moreover, as it did in enacting the ICRA, the
Court has exercised restraint in implying limitations on tribal immunity
when called upon to interpret such legislation.5 0 Thus, while it has
been more active in limiting tribal exercise of authority in other areas,
the Court has consistently declined to change its course with respect to
the doctrine of immunity.
An analysis of the dialogue between different branches of the
federal government as well as the results of each branch's separate
deliberations leads to a number of interesting observations and
conclusions. In addition to demonstrating the strength and durability of
tribal sovereignty as a matter of federal Indian law, the body of law
generated by these federal entities provides insight into the
pervasiveness of the doctrine of immunity as a more general principle of
Anglo-American sovereignty jurisprudence. As with states, the federal
government, and foreign nations,45 l tribal immunity emerges as a
natural corollary of sovereignty. It flows inherently from federal
recognition of tribal sovereignty, and is perpetuated through judicial
precedent, Congressional action, Executive policy-making and action,
and the collaborative decision-making of each. Even where an express
Constitutional provision, namely the Eleventh Amendment, may be
identified with respect to the sovereign immunity of states, the federal
judiciary's sovereign immunity jurisprudence consistently hearkens back
to pre-Constitutional, or at least extra-Constitutional principles of
common law or natural law when defining the boundaries of sovereign
immunity.
The dialogue between the branches also provides a venue for testing
hypotheses regarding constitutional interpretation and, more
particularly, the development of federal common law. Specifically, the
evolution of the law of tribal immunity may illustrate how structural
rules of interpretation and decision-making may develop between the
judicial and political branches of government. Examining the evolution
of tribal immunity helps illuminate the way in which fundamental
jurisprudential values may emerge and be perpetuated, such as those
that underlie and define the appropriate the balance and distribution of
power between different sovereign entities that interact and share
territory within the United States.
450. See Martinez, 436 U.S. 49. In Martinez, the Court declined to imply federal
jurisdiction over claims brought under ICRA except in the case of petitions for habeas
corpus, where Congress had expressly provided for a federal cause of action.
451. See supra Parts II.A-C. and accompanying notes.
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Traditional notions of constitutional interpretation recognize the
role of the judiciary in defining and interpreting constitutional rights and
fundamental values: namely, the federal judiciary exercises its powers of
judicial review, independent of the political processes reserved for the
other branches, and articulates rules designed to protect fundamental
constitutional rights and values.452  As such, many theories of
constitutional interpretation describe a one-sided approach to
constitutional interpretation in which the political branches may propose
rules and policies, but where the judiciary maintains the power to strike
them down on constitutional grounds.45 3
A growing number of scholars, however, describe a more interactive
interpretive process between the branches with respect to the
development of fundamental principles of constitutional law. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg, for instance, summarizes this more interactive
view of the iole of the federal judiciary in the following statement:
"[Judges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not
alone shape legal doctrine but... they participate in a dialogue with
other organs of government, and with the people as well."45 A number
of others have described ways in which constitutional values may be
protected and clarified through structural rules of "interbranch
dialogue."455 While theories of inter-branch dialogue have predominantly
focused upon the context of constitutional interpretation, they are
relevant also to the development of federal common law in other areas of
the law such as where fundamental values (e.g. of sovereignty and
corollaries inherent in sovereignty) may be involved.
The underlying premise of theories that identify and implicate the
concept of inter-branch collaboration is that the federal judiciary does
452. The power of judicial review was first set forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is... ."). Building upon Marbury, the Court has declared that it is the "ultimate
interpreter" of constitutional protections. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969). It has emphasized the finality of its decisions. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211 (1995). And it has declared its decision-making to be supreme. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). As one scholar describes: "According to this view, the Court
stands apart from the other branches-independent, even aloof-in executing the 'solemn
function' of judicial review. The political branches adopt rules; the Court evaluates the
constitutionality of those rules; the Court declares those rules valid or invalid-and that's
that." Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1578-79 (2001).
453. Coenen, supra n. 452.
454. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Speaking in A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198
(1992).
455. See e.g. Coenen, supra n. 452 (providing comprehensive analysis of ways in which
the Supreme Court has protected certain fundamental constitutional values with
structural rules that deflect constitutional decision-making to Congress); Louis Fisher &
Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 1 (West 1992) (challenging traditional
notions that the courts are the dominant interpreters of the Constitution and describing
the role of interactions between the courts and the political branches in making
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more than engage in one-sided interpretation of constitutional
principles; it engages the other political officials in constitutional
decision-making as well.456 These officials may independently deliberate
over constitutional interpretations or they may respond to rules
established by the judiciary.457 Where the political branches engage in
constitutional decision-making, the federal courts in turn may respond
by reshaping or overturning rules established by the political branches.
As Professor Dan Coenen describes:
Often the Court directly engages nonjudicial officials in a shared
elaboration of constitutional rights. It does so through the use of
doctrines that focus on whether nonjudicial actors have taken an
appropriately close and sensitive look at policy judgments that threaten
important constitutional values. In many of these cases, the Court in
effect 'remands' constitutionally controversial programs to the political
branches -inviting a more studied consideration of the program than
attended its initial adoption, and leaving open the possibility that the
readopted program will be upheld against constitutional attack.458
Through such interaction between the different branches of government,
structural doctrines have been generated to govern constitutional
interpretation.459
While many structural rules have been recognized as acting upon
interpretation of the Constitution, structural rules have been identified
with respect to the development of common law in other fields as well.46°
They arise in conjunction with fundamental values. For instance,
Professor Coenen describes a category of rules through which
substantive values may be preserved "in a structural way" through the
judiciary's empowerment of Congress to reverse longstanding
456. See e.g. Coenen, supra n. 452.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1582.
459. Id. According to Coenen, these structural rules "are not required so much as
inspired by the Constitution" and, therefore, are reversible and conducive to facilitating
inter-branch dialogue. Id. at 1735-36. They encompass a process through which
substantive constitutional values may be safeguarded through judicial remand to non-
judicial governmental policymakers who may effectively "reverse" principles dictated by the
federal judiciary provided such policymakers adhere to certain judicially-mandated
mandates. Id. at 1587-88. Such mandates include: "(1) rules of clarity; (2) form-based
deliberation rules; (3) proper-findings-and-study requirements; (4) representation-
reinforcing structural rules; (5) time-driven second-look doctrines; (6) thoughtful-
treatment-of-the-area rules; (7) constitutional common law and common-law-like rules; (8)
proper-purpose requirements; and (9) constitutional 'who' rules." Id. at 1587. Other
scholars have emphasized the interactive interpretive process between the federal judiciary
and the executive branch. See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
593 (1992) (describing judicial rules and cannons, for instance, deferring to agency
interpretations, creating presumptions against derogation of the President's traditional
powers, etc.).
460. See e.g. Coenen, supra n. 452, at 1740-41.
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principles. 46' He classifies the Supreme Court's holding in Kiowa as
such a "reversible rule."462 In short, the "rule"-namely, tribal immunity
is an inherent feature of tribal sovereignty that has consistently been
recognized as a matter of federal common law-is preserved as a matter
of judicial decision-making but is deemed to be reversible by Congress.
Another structural rule-namely, a presumption in favor of
Congressional plenary power over tribal affairs-may also be at work, a
rule that similarly preserves a doctrine rooted in the inherent nature of
tribal sovereignty and longstanding judicial precedent.4 63  Moreover,
where Congress has acted, rules restrict judicial derogation of tribal
immunity to circumstances in which Congress has a articulated a
"super-strong clear statement." 4 64
While rules like those created by the Supreme Court in Kiowa may
be reversible, thereby authorizing the political branches of government to
change longstanding substantive values articulated by the Court, other
structural principles and realities may protect fundamental values from
significant change by any of the branches of government. For instance,
institutional norms and processes-inherent in the bureaucracies,
customs, and procedures of the political branches of government-may
perpetuate a status quo that resists dramatic change. Longstanding
doctrines like the federal trust doctrine may also contribute to a
particular conservatism with respect to acting in ways that encroach
upon on American Indian sovereignty.46 5 Additionally, it is possible that
the political branches may be influenced by their own type of executive
or legislative "precedent" that reinforces certain norms and values,
including those associated with preserving tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.
Indeed, in some circumstances, inter-branch legacies, created
through generations of dialogue and decision-making by and between
each of the three branches of government, may create barriers to change
over and above those created merely by the separate actions and
461. Id. at 1735-1742. These so-called "reversible rules" are "judicially deployed devices
that both protect identifiable constitutional values and are subject to reversal by legislative
authorities without the need for a constitutional amendment. All of these rules-whether
or not properly characterized as 'constitutional common law'-are accordingly structural
in nature." Id. at 1742.
462. Id. at 1741. Other examples of reversible rules include the Court's supervisory
authority and dormant commerce clause cases. Id. at 1741-42.
463. This rule is not identified by Coenen, although others have identified structural rules
that apply to fundamental values protecting tribal sovereignty and American Indian people
in other contexts. See e.g. Eskridge & Frickey, supra n. 459, at 602, 622, 628 (describing,
for instance, interpretive presumptions favoring group interests of Native Americans and
"longstanding canons favoring broad interpretation of federal statutes benefiting Indian
tribes" but demonstrating how other interpretive rules-such as those perpetuating
federalism-may be leading toward the demise of interpretive canons disfavoring state
regulation in Indian country).
464. Id. at 594.
465. For a discussion of the federal government's trust responsibility, see supra Part IV.B.
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interpretations of each of the branches of government. The evolution of
the federal doctrine of tribal immunity, for instance, appears to
exemplify the way in which inter-branch dialogue may reinforce certain
principles of law, enhancing their resistance to change and elevating
their supremacy with respect to other values and principles. Even where
the Court conveys its reluctance to perpetuate tribal immunity in
contemporary society, it is compelled to uphold principles that are firmly
rooted in the historical and jurisprudential fabric of this nation. Thus,
as Kiowa indicates, the Court is bound by its own precedent regarding
tribal immunity as well as by the Congressional plenary power doctrine.
It is perhaps encouraged by its knowledge that Congress is actively
reconsidering the scope and breadth of the doctrine, since it defers the
ultimate decision to Congress. However, it is urged also to uphold the
doctrine of tribal immunity by a representative from the Executive
Branch.466
Similar deference to structural and legal principles may take place
in the political branches as well. For example, Congress, is informed by
its own history of Congressional enactments as well as the legacy set
forth by the Court. Consistent with the federal trust relationship, its
year 2000 enactments replace proposals that would have significantly
derogated tribal immunity. In enacting the most recent legislation
regarding tribal immunity, Congress considers judicial precedent as well
as testimony and materials submitted by representatives of the
Executive Branch that weigh in favor of preserving the doctrine and refer
to a variety of tribal perspectives regarding the doctrine. The Executive
Branch, in its presentation, refers to both Congressional legislation and
judicial precedent. Therefore, by relying and referring to each other's
precedents and by deferring to the power of each to resolve certain
issues related to tribal sovereignty and recognition of the doctrine of
immunity, the branches in concert largely preserve and perpetuate the
status quo with respect to tribal immunity. In such a manner, the
combined effect of inter-branch decision-making may act as a further
measure of protection for certain fundamental principles of federal law,
protecting and reinforcing a status quo developed over time and firmly
rooted in each branch.467
466. The United States Solicitor General, for instance, presented oral argument in
support of the tribes' position in Klowa. See supra nn. 231-34 and accompanying text;
supra nn. 345-48.
467. To truly understand the role of interbranch dialogue on the development of federal
Indian law, however, would require a much more in-depth consideration of the
development between the branches of other principles of law (e.g., tribal adjudicatory
jurisdiction) in which the Supreme Court has been much more activist in changing
interpretive presumptions and rules without deference to Congress. See supra Part III.D.3.
Additionally, it would be necessary to analyze the circumstances in which both Congress
and the Supreme Court have been more active in altering each other's interpretation of
fundamental principles of federal Indian law. For example, it would be instructive to
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To truly verify whether and, if so, to what extent structural rules
and institutional factors existing within and between the three branches
of government have an impact on any doctrine's resistance to change
would require further examination, analysis, and comparison of the
development of the law of tribal immunity with the evolution of other
legal principles. 468 In the absence of definitive support for such a theory
of the impact of inter-branch dialogue with respect to tribal immunity,
the fact that the tradition of sovereign immunity is rooted in inherent
notions of sovereignty rather than in the text of a statute or the
Constitution may provide a better explanation for its resilience. That
tribal immunity has emerged and been perpetuated as an intrinsic
feature of tribal sovereignty, just as immunity has been recognized as
arising naturally from the sovereignty of the United States, states, and
foreign nations, lends further support to the theory that immunity is an
inherent and natural corollary of sovereignty. Time will tell how resilient
these principles are and whether the Court, or either of the political
branches of government, will take steps to alter time-honored principles.
B. Normative Policy Considerations
Determining the appropriate scope of tribal sovereign immunity
raises complex normative questions. These include questions about the
ways in which tribal independence, economic viability, and self-
determination should be balanced against the need for greater
accountability of tribal governments. Accountability is of particular
importance to individuals or entities who have been harmed by tribal
governments or whose rights or other interests have been-and, absent
intervention, may continue to be-unlawfully denied or abridged.
Questions about the extent to which tribal sovereignty should be
afforded protection from the exercise of federal and state power also
arise, as do questions about the proper balance of power and rules of
interaction between tribes, states, and the federal government. Who
should be responsible for allocating the distribution of power, defining
intergovernmental relationships and for determining whether to waive
tribal immunity also remains at the heart of the normative debate.
compare with the development of the law of tribal immunity with the process involved
between the branches in determining whether tribes could exercise criminal jurisdiction
over nonmember Indians. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the inherent sovereignty
of Indian tribes did not include criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians despite a
longstanding practice by Congress of authorizing tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians, not just their own members. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). Shortly
thereafter, Congress overruled the Court, affirming "the inherent power of Indian tribes...
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians." 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301(2) (West 2001).
While a full analysis and comparison of this interbranch discordance lies beyond the scope
of this paper, it does indicate that federal Indian law presents an interesting yet
complicated context for exploring theories of interbranch dialogue and the development of
structural and legal rules of interpretation in federal law.
468. See supra n. 459.
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1. Contexts for Analysis of Normative Issues
In exploring the normative issues regarding the proper scope of
tribal immunity, it is useful to consider some possible circumstances
with respect to which judicial redress may be contemplated. For
instance, there are tort victims who have suffered bodily injury,
including death, or injury to property due to the negligent or intentional
acts of tribes, their officers or employees. 46 9 There are those who have
been unlawfully or unjustly terminated from employment with tribal
governments or who have been subjected to harassment or
discrimination in the workplace.4 7 ° There are others whose fundamental
civil rights under the ICRA or tribal law or custom have been violated by
tribal agents, sometimes resulting in serious consequences (e.g. causing
prolonged incarceration without due process, suppression of freedom of
expression with very serious consequences, harassment, discrimination,
and even brutality committed by tribal officers, etc.).47' Intellectual
property rights may also be at stake.
While some persons injured by tribal action may suffer injury while
voluntarily traveling through or visiting Indian country or while enjoying
the temporary benefits of employment, others may be lifelong members
and residents, whose family and cultural roots are firmly tied to the land
and to the tribe. In thinking through normative dimensions associated
with the debate over tribal immunity, therefore, it is important to keep in
mind that, as with virtually every other type of sovereign entity,
egregious injuries and civil and human rights violations may be
committed by tribal governments and their agents even against their
own members and their families. Victims may be tribal members or
non-members, Indians or non-Indians. Injuries and rights deprivations
may be isolated or widespread, affecting whole groups of persons as well
as greater societal interests.
The need for redress by individual and business entities, including
non-Indian entities, may also arise with respect to commercial
transactions involving tribes.473 For instance, tribes acting directly or
through tribally-owned corporations may infringe upon the legal rights
or interests of other entities where tribes enter into, then default or
469. A number of examples of personal injuries inflicted by tribal officers were presented
in Congressional testimony. See supra n. 325 and accompanying text. The dissent in
Kiowa also addresses potential injustice to tort victims. See supra n. 88.
470. See id.
471. See Martinez, 436 U.S. 49; Sanderlin. 243 F.3d 1282.
472. See e.g. Bassett, 204 F.3d 343 (Film producer barred under doctrine of tribal
immunity from bringing suit against tribe for copyright infringement, breach of contract,
and various torts arising out of a dispute over a film about the Pequot War of 1635-38 that
the tribe produced but that the producer claimed she had written and submitted to the
tribe for review pursuant to an agreement with the tribe.).
473. This is the situation underlying the dispute in Kiowa Tribe, see supra n. 76.
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otherwise intervene with, commercial contracts.474 Entities providing
services as vital as medical care, education, law enforcement, and the
construction of roads, schools and other infrastructure may be affected
by breaches of contract or other business disputes with tribes, for which
legal redress in a court of law may be desired. In addition, states, or
other governmental entities, may desire to seek legal redress for breach
of contract, resolution of disputes over taxation, gaming, regulation of
natural resources, provision of law enforcement and emergency response
services over mutually exclusive territories and other matters. 5 Where
contracting documents lack clear waivers of tribal immunity, many of
these private and governmental entities who engage in business with
tribes do not have access to judicial means of resolving disputes and
other problems arising from commercial dealings and other interactions
with tribes.
2. Balancing Normative Principles in Light of Tribal Sovereignty
In light of all of the various interests and scenarios that might be
imagined with respect to tribal immunity, it might be asked: as a
normative or policy matter what should the appropriate balance be
between tribal immunity and the interests of others? Should any of the
entities having potential interest in seeking redress from tribal
governments be entitled to seek judicial recourse for their injuries or to
resolve disputes? If so, to what extent and under what circumstances?
If not, need there be some other kind of remedy available to injured
persons and what form might other remedies take? These are questions
that might be asked of the sovereign immunity of any entity, but are
relevant as well to discussions of tribal immunity.
Depending on one's vantage point, resolving questions regarding the
proper balance between tribal interests in suit immunity and others'
interests in redress or government accountability might be more
straightforward in some contexts than in others. It might be argued, for
instance, that government or business entities who voluntarily enter into
contractual arrangements with tribes should be entitled to less
protection under federal law than those whose relationship with the tribe
may be less voluntary and whose interests may be more fully entwined
with the tribe.47 6  After all, under current law, wherein tribes are
empowered to waive their immunity, principles of contract law grant the
474. Id.
475. Okl.. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. 505, provides an example of state efforts to compel
tribes to respect and enforce regulatory laws like those related to the collection of state
sales taxes. Congress also took testimony regarding collection of state taxes. See supra
nn. 339-41 and accompanying text; Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237.
476. This argument, in fact, was considered by the Supreme Court in Kiowa and in
Congressional hearings over tribal immunity. See e.g. supra n. 236 (Supreme Court oral
argument); supra Part IV.D.2.c. (Congressional testimony).
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freedom to choose between negotiating for the inclusion of immunity
waivers in tribal contracts or electing to do business elsewhere.477
Resolving the balancing issues in other contexts, however, may be
more complicated. For instance, while tribal membership and residence
within reservation boundaries are themselves parameters that arguably
can be embraced or rejected by individuals, cultural and familial
connections stemming from tribal affiliation and place of origin are likely
to have significance that mere contractual dealings made in the course
of business lack.478 Moreover, the preservation of collective social and
cultural identities of indigenous peoples, which is undermined as people
leave their cultural roots and relinquish membership, arguably has
greater moral imperative than protecting businesses from poor choices
in contracting. Consequently, the existence of culturally appropriate
remedies for personal injuries or deprivation of rights by tribal
government may be especially important for tribal members.
Normative issues are implicated also where states, or other
governmental entities seek enforcement of their own laws within tribal
geographical boundaries that coincide with those of the state. For
instance, should states be permitted to bring suit against tribes to
compel collection of taxes legitimately owed to the states or to compel
compliance with state gaming regulations, environmental laws, natural
resources regulations, or other issues affecting the public health and
safety of state residents? Such issues are complicated by the fact that
they are entwined with issues of federalism and a legal history in which
structural limits have been placed on states' ability to encroach on tribal
sovereignty. The federal government, including the Supreme Court, has
thus far resolved these issues in favor of preserving tribal immunity from
state encroachment, requiring states to enter into compacts with tribes
and otherwise negotiate resolution to disputes over regulation of
resources and taxation. 479  Given the fact that tribes enjoy a type of
477. Justice O'Connor in Kiowa likened the circumstances of contracting with tribes to
"buyer beware" and suggested through her questioning that "someone dealing with the
tribe should protect himself in the contractual arrangements that he makes." Oral
Argument, Supreme Court Transcript at 31, Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751. See supra n. 236.
The federal law with respect to tribal authority to waive immunity has evolved from a time
when tribes appeared to have lacked such authority unless Congress granted it, to one in
which their power to waive was unrestricted. William V. Vetter, Doing Business With
Indians and the Three "S"es: Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 169 (1994).
478. Native Americans and those who have interacted closely with Native Americans have
documented the importance to indigenous people of remaining connected to their culture,
tribe and even reservations. See e.g. Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, supra n. 240 at 125
("Because Indian people are federal and state citizens, assimilation often seems benevolent,
merely a means of escaping poverty and discrimination. Yet these pressures are ultimately
lethal for people whose primary identity is with a group or culture that forces of
assimilation seek to dismantle. As a good friend, Elizabeth Little Elk, once said to me: 'I
cannot live without the reservation. It is like oxygen to me.'") (citing Frank Pommersheim,
When it Comes to Indians, the West Is Ignorant High Country News 15 (May 21, 1990)).
479. See e.g. Okla. Tax Commn., 498 U.S. 505; Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237 (holding
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separate sovereignty that predated the formation of the constitutional
system of government adopted and ratified by the states, according their
sovereignty greater strength through imposing limits on states' ability to
file nonconsensual suit against tribes is reasonable.4s0
From the perspective of civil liberties and human rights, the
doctrine of immunity generally may be criticized across all categories of
sovereignty, including that of tribes, to the extent it renders governments
exempt from accountability to individuals that may be harmed by the
exercise of governmental power, thereby allowing discriminatory and
injurious conduct to go unchecked and denying remuneration to those
injured. A compelling argument might be made based upon
fundamental or natural law principles of human rights that torture and
other forms of cruel and unusual punishment, deprivations of life or
liberty without due process of law, discriminatory and abusive police
practices, and other forms of human brutality and discrimination should
never be tolerated, no matter who the offending entity. Furthermore, it
might be argued, as a matter of national policy, that the United States
ought not allow any sovereign entity, regardless of its status, to
legitimize and perpetuate inhumane or abusive acts. Consistent with
this position, the argument might be made that courts should be
available to resolve disputes pursuant to law, rather than coercion or
power, especially when civil and human rights are involved. As one
scholar has articulated:
Sovereign immunity often produces an uncivilized result, because what
counts-what determines who gets the property, for instance-is not
reason but force, not law but power, not orderly adjudication but physical
talcing by the stronger party, not refinements the sum of which we call
civilization but crudities that are sometimes characteristic of primitive
481
men.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, sovereign immunity may serve a
number of legitimate purposes that justify its protection and
perpetuation in the law. Common rationales behind the immunity
state has no implied cause of action under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act-that set
forth a complex scheme for compacting between states and tribes-to compel tribe
engaged in tribal gaming to comply with IGRA).
480. The moral imperative for preserving tribal immunity is especially great so long as the
federal law defining the scope of state sovereign immunity continues to bar suits brought
against states by tribes. See Seminole T-ibe, 517 U.S. 44; Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.
481. Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereignlmmunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383, 392 (1970)
(italics removed). Professor Davis offers other justifications for eliminating sovereign
immunity as well. Specifically, he argues that sovereign immunity (1) can cause serious
substantive injustice, (2) results in final determinations that lack protections essential for
procedural justice, and (3) "causes gross inefficiency in the allocation of functions between
officers and agencies, by preventing courts from resolving controversies they are especially
qualified to resolve." Id. at 383. He argues that only "historical accident, habit, a natural
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doctrine, particularly as the doctrine relates to minority cultures and/or
indigenous peoples, are that it protects the nation-state from (1) the
financial impact of suit, and (2) incursions on its right to self-
determination that would be imposed on the sovereign entity, should the
sovereign be compelled to defend itself against legal action.48 2 The
argument in favor of sovereign immunity has been accorded particular
weight in reference to fledgling or developing states or tribal governments
whose treasuries and self-governing capacities might be
disproportionately affected by the burdens of defending legal proceedings
and satisfying judgments. 483 As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
articulated: "Indian tribes enjoy immunity because they are sovereigns
predating the Constitution.... and because immunity is thought
necessary to promote the federal policies of tribal self-determination,
economic development, and cultural autonomy.
" 4 8 4
Ensuring protection of the democratic processes that sustain a
sovereign entity from distraction or derailment by a single individual or
small group of citizens is another justification for tribal immunity. For
instance, the doctrine may protect a governing entity, responsible for
governing and protecting the interests of an entire community of people,
from being diverted from that role by a single plaintiff, who may in fact
present a disputed question of law or fact. As the Supreme Court has
articulated: "The Government as representative of the community as a
whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a
disputed question of property or contract right." 485 In the dissenting
opinion of an earlier decision, Justice Gray articulated this concern in
light of other essential responsibilities of the executive branch of the
government:
1I]t is essential to the common defense and general welfare that the
sovereign should not, without its consent, be dispossessed by judicial
process of forts, arsenals, military posts, and ships of war, necessary to
guard the national existence against insurrection and invasion; of
customs-houses and revenue cutters, employed in the collection of the
revenue; or of light-houses and light-ships, established for the security of
commerce with foreign nations and among the different parts of the
482. See e.g. Layton, The Thorny Gift supra n. 273, at 286 (-The small population of the
average Indian reservation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to support the same
sophisticated legal defense system employed by state or local governments. If forced to
defend itself against Section 304 [CAA] lawsuits, a tribal government would not only have
to finance its legal defense but also face the threat of being forced to pay the plaintiffs legal
fees.").
483. A number of commentators have emphasized these rationales. See e.g. Wagman,
supra n. 370. They were discussed as well in some of the early federal cases describing the
need for tribal immunity. See e.g. supra nn. 134, 139 and accompanying text.
484. Am. Indian Agric. Credit, 780 F.2d at 1378 (citations omitted).
485. Larson v. Dom. & For. Corp.. 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
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One scholar has argued in the context of the federal government that
immunity "is not so much a barrier to individual rights as it is a
structural protection for democratic rule."487  To a large extent the
arguments in favor of sovereign immunity as a general proposition focus
on allocation of power and conceptions of legitimacy between the
different branches of a government. Proponents of federal sovereign
immunity conclude that the legislature is better suited for resolving
issues of government policymaking and that the courts should not be
permitted to intrude in this process.
While these and other normative and practical considerations may
be applicable to federal and state governmental immunity as well as
tribal immunity, additional considerations are relevant to defining the
proper scope of tribal immunity. For instance, observers of tribal
immunity have defended the doctrine in light of the democratic process
on slightly different grounds than criticisms made with respect to other
sovereign entities. Specifically, they argue that the size and
administrative organization of many tribal governments allows them to
be more responsible to the individual citizens, thereby reducing the
circumstances in which suit would be warranted. As one commentator
describes:
[F]or most tribal governments there is a diminished need to provide a
judicial check to the administrative government. With the exception of the
Navajo and Cherokee Nations, most Indian tribes have a population of less
than 50,000 and a correspondingly small governing body. The small size
of most tribal reservations makes them more comparable to townships,
which usually have more simplistic government structures than do states
or even large cities. In a small governing system each citizen represents a
greater proportion of the electorate, and the electorate has closer proximity
to its elected officials. These factors should make the governing
organization more responsive to the individual citizen. 8
3. An Ordering of Sovereign Interests: Comparisons of Tribal
Immunity with the Other Forms of Sovereignty
Within the United States (where local, state, federal, and American
486. Lee, 106 U.S. at 226. Critics of sovereign immunity, such as Kenneth Culp Davis,
find arguments like these to be unpersuasive. According to Professor Davis: "What is
needed is a much better balance between the public interest in the effectiveness of
governmental programs and private interests. The present law, a mixture of medieval
history and modem casuistry, does not even aim at creating such a balance...." Davis,
supran. 481, at 395.
487. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1529, 1531
(1992). He argues in favor of protecting government policymaking and deferring
determinations to Congress over the proper balance to be afforded to the different branches
of government.
488. Layton, The Thorny Gift, supra n. 273, at 286.
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Indian governments share overlapping boundaries and jurisdictional
power), debates over the scope of each sovereign's entitlement to
immunity also often are related to principles of federalism and protection
of the integrity of one sovereign's jurisdictional power from incursions by
another. Another fundamental normative question with respect to tribal
immunity, therefore, is whether tribes are entitled to any more or less
immunity from suit than any other sovereign entity. There are a number
of reasons tribes should be afforded immunity from suit, independent
from any immunity also afforded to states and the federal government.
First and foremost, tribal immunity protects the fundamental and
inherent sovereign right to continuing self-determination of American
Indian people and tribes, whose culture and traditions preceded the
United States republic. Critically, the doctrine enables tribes to
determine whether and, if so, under what circumstances, to provide
judicial remedies for challenges to the exercise of their sovereign powers.
It protects relatively small and developing tribal economies from
potentially devastating costs and impact of defending lawsuits. It
protects tribal executive officers, judges, and policymakers from
becoming sidetracked or sandbagged by unwanted litigation.
Second, preserving tribal immunity assists tribes in continuing to
strengthen and develop their legal systems, re-infusing them where
appropriate with traditional norms and processes that may have been
eliminated through the federal government's colonization of tribal justice
systems.489  Specifically, preserving tribal suit immunity fosters
opportunities for developing and sustaining alternative methods of
resolving disputes, including mechanisms that may differ from Anglo-
American systems wherein the lawsuit is the traditional method of
seeking redress for personal injury, breach of contract, or deprivation of
civil liberties and the judiciary is deemed vital to the enforcement of
constitutional and civil liberties. Peacemaker courts, whose objectives
489. With the exception of a very few tribes (e.g., the Osage, the Pueblos, the Eastern
Cherokee, the Indians of New York, and the Five Civilized Tribes), most Indian tribes
operate judicial systems that are based upon written codes, rules of procedure, and
adversarial methods of dispute resolution imposed upon them originally by the federal
government. Consequently, many contemporary tribes are engaged in the process of
reclaiming and re-integrating custom and tradition into their legal systems. I have
discussed the history of tribal courts, including some ways in which custom and tradition
have been integrated into contemporary judicial systems, in a previous publication.
Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical Legal
Education, 6 Clin. L. Rev. 127, 138-143 (1999). Others have described the importance of
recapturing and integrating into tribal jurisprudence traditional values and norms as well.
See e.g. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 225
(1989); Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers, supra n. 240 at 110 ("Narrative and stories in
tribal court jurisprudence are valuable not only as an omega of resistance set against the
dominant narrative but also as an alpha of aspiration to connect the past with the
future.... Indeed, without stories the collective memory of culture will be severely
impoverished, if not eradicated. In turn, the culture will become increasingly susceptible
to being swallowed whole by the great American maw of assimilation and unifonnity.").
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are to restore harmony between members of a community, are an
example of the type of alternative dispute resolution method that could
be fostered by maintaining tribal immunity from suit.
490
Other strategies are potentially fostered within Indian nations by
preserving tribal control over suit immunity as well. These might
include (1) increased reliance on negotiation and enhancement of
negotiation skills and strategies, (2) lobbying and dialogue with elected
tribal officials or participation in electoral politics, (3) reliance on
insurance policies maintained on behalf of the tribe, (4) collaborative
problem-solving with executive officers, including police, social services
personnel, and others in a position to change internal operating
procedures and policies , and (5) creation of internal grievance
procedures for obtaining redress and otherwise resolving problems
involving tribal entities or agents. Indeed, tribal immunity (and the
absence of opportunities for judicial redress in the form of a lawsuit)
presents many opportunities for crafting creative agreements and
solutions to problems in the face of disputes with tribes. At the same
time, other tribal systems or governmental branches may be
strengthened in the process, and the judicial role and judicial expertise
may be defined and exercised for very particular sorts of things.
Because of the unique cultural heritage retained by many tribes, there is
the potential for great variation and innovation in methods and
solutions. 491 That variability is potentially beneficial for the development
of the law in non-tribal justice systems as well.492
In light of these possibilities, it may be argued that tribal sovereign
immunity, including the ability to decide under what circumstances an
entity wishes to subject itself to suit, should be at least as strong as that
enjoyed by states and the federal government.4 93  Arguably, tribal
490. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Justice Raymond
Austin, also of the Navajo Supreme Court, and past-Solicitor of the Navajo Nation, James
Zion, have described a traditional peacemaker court developed and revived from past
custom and tradition. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through
Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 235 (1997) (describing a tradition of peacemaking originating
in Seneca Society over 500 years ago).
491. For a discussion of the unique and innovative role tribal courts may play, see Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 225 (1994);
Douglas B. L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 Judicature 142
(1995). See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 70
Judicature 126 (1995); Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 Kan. J. L. Pub.
Pol'y 17 (1997).
492. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for instance, has described some of the benefits.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.
J. 1 (1997).
493. Tribal immunity should be stronger also than the protections currently afforded
under federal law to foreign nations. Tribes, by virtue of their aboriginal occupancy within
the territory now occupied by the United States, enjoy a status different from foreign
nations who choose to enter into trade or government-to-government relations with the
United States. Early colonists and representatives of the federal government engaged in
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immunity should be afforded more protection as a matter of federal law
than that of the states. It arises from the inherent sovereignty of tribes
that predated the Constitution that is different from that of the states,
who ratified the Constitution and agreed to be part of the federal union.
Unlike the states, the tribes did not agree to be part of the union or its
constitutional structure and, rather, had a long history of dialogue and
treaty-making with the federal government. The doctrine of tribal
immunity is rooted in the recognition of tribes as independent sovereigns
for early cross-cultural trade, communication, and treaty-making with
colonizing powers.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the time being at least, the doctrine of tribal immunity is alive
and well. Its legal and historical foundations are deeply rooted in
American jurisprudence and policy. Contemporary normative and
political considerations supportive of indigenous self-determination and
development of tribal economic and governance systems support the
doctrine as well.
The fact that tribal immunity is also rooted in pervasive Anglo-
American notions about immunity in general-namely, that it flows
naturally from sovereignty and is fundamental to the exercise of
sovereignty-further underscores the likelihood that it will remain
intact. Were any branch of the federal government, or the three acting
in concert, to take steps to eviscerate tribal immunity in the future,
Indian nations and those supportive of indigenous sovereignty would
likely wage a joint political movement against the proposal as they did in
response to Slade Gorton's proposed legislation. In the event future
challenges to tribal immunity are proposed, however, they will have to be
considered in light of the longstanding inter-branch jurisprudential
legacy set forth in this paper that has consistently endorsed a federal
policy and jurisprudence protective of tribal immunity, an consistently
recognizing tribal sovereignty and the right to indigenous self-
determination and governance. Moreover, state and federal courts faced
with challenges to tribal immunity-including those based upon claims
that tribes have voluntarily waived their immunity-should be
compelled in light of this legacy to strictly construe those challenges and
the legal authority upon which they purportedly rely, applying
interpretations that are most protective of tribal immunity.
Notwithstanding the strength of the legal and historical record,
commercial trading and treaty-making with the tribes. There is therefore no legitimate
basis for distinguishing the commercial activities of tribes from their role as government
actors. Furthermore, there are natural economic incentives for tribes to agree to limited
waivers of immunity or other remedies in order to attract investment and collaboration
with outside commercial entities.
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however, it would be imprudent to assume that no branch of the federal
government will ever pursue implementing more dramatic restrictions on
tribes' ability to determine when and under what circumstances they
wish to be amenable to suit. It is not unprecedented for the Court to
reverse itself, and members of the Rehnquist Court have demonstrated a
willingness to do so with respect to a number of its precedents.
494
Moreover, the Court has demonstrated that it is capable of reversing
well-established principles of tribal sovereignty in other contexts,
thereby limiting the ability of tribes to fully exercise all of the powers of
self-governance.495 It might be argued that the distinctive nature of
Congressional plenary power with respect to tribal sovereignty and
federal-tribal-state relations may warrant greater judicial adherence to
common law principles protective of tribal sovereignty, including the
judiciary's longstanding recognition of tribal inmunity.496  However, it
494. For instance, in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, the Court reversed its precedent
regarding Congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Specifically, it reversed
its decision set forth just seven years earlier in Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
that held that Congress had the authority pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Although the Court in Seminole Tribe considers the scope of Congress's power to
waive state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, it holds that
Ii]f anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of
power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate
Commerce Clause. This is clear from the fact that the States still exercise some
authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority
over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 62. The Court rejects instead its holding in Union Gas. Id. at
66. The Court explains:
Reconsidering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none of the policies
underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its holding. The
decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable precedential value, largely
because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the
plurality.... The case involved the interpretation of the Constitution and
therefore may be altered only by constitutional amendment or revision by this
Court Finally.... [the case] depart[s] from our established understanding of the
Eleventh Amendment and underminefs] the accepted function of Article III. We
feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be,
and now is, overruled."
Id. In other cases, the Supreme Court has articulated limits on the stare decisis effect of
its precedents as well. For instance, the Court has held that stare decisis is a "principle of
policy," Helvering v. Haock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940), not an "inexorable command,"
Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). See Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994)
(the "degree of confusion following a splintered decision.., is itself a reason for examining
that decision"); P.R. Aqueduct and SewerAuth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993).
495. For instance, it has altered its jurisprudence regarding tribal civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction. See supra Part III.D.3.
496. In creating exceptions to the stare decisis effect of its own decisions, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that its willingness to reconsider earlier decisions has been
.particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through
legislative action is practically impossible.'" Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 (quoting Bumet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. The doctrine of immunity is rooted in a long tradition of federal
common law, not principles of constitutional interpretation., Moreover, the Court itself
recognizes the distinctive power of Congress, bestowed in the Indian Commerce Clause, to
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would be imprudent to assume that the Court will never alter its
jurisprudence regarding tribal immunity.497
With respect to the potential for change among the political
branches, Congress has on many occasions passed legislation, albeit of a
more limited nature, limiting tribal sovereign immunity.498 Moreover, in
enacting the Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 2000,' 9'
Congress appears merely to have postponed substantive consideration of
tribal immunity until more information about the availability of remedies
and insurance coverage can be more fully developed. In doing so, future
legislative encroachment upon tribal immunity is not foreclosed by
Congress. Similarly, the Executive Branch, although committed in
recent years to supporting tribal self-determination and economic
development, has a historical record of reversing its policies with respect
to Tribes.5 °° There is no guarantee, therefore, that tribal immunity will
remain free from federal diminution in the future.
In light of the ever-present potential for change, it is imperative that
tribes take advantage of this window of opportunity to reflect on what
balance they wish to maintain between the need for immunity, on the
one hand, and the need for government accountability and the ability of
citizens and others who interact with tribes to seek enforcement of rights
and redress for their injuries, on the other hand. By doing so, tribes will
strengthen the rules and institutions important to sustaining their
powers of self-governance and prepare for future attacks aimed at the
integrity and fairness of their justice systems.
That is not to say that tribes should adopt exact replicas of Anglo-
American conceptions of immunity, passing for instance legislation
providing for limited waivers of suit immunity; nor is it to say that tribes
need to provide exclusively judicial remedies for commonly recognized
regulate tribal affairs. See e.g. id.
497. The Court's expression of disagreement with the underlying rationale and
precedential basis for tribal immunity in Kiowa may signal the potential for reversal in
future cases. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751.
498. For a discussion of the circumstances in which Congress has delimited tribal
sovereign immunity, see supra Part IV.C.
499. See supra Part IV.E.
500. For instance, while recent administrations have supported tribal self-determination
and economic development, see supra Part V, previous ones have adopted policies aimed at
assimilating American Indians into American society and diminishing the land base
reserved through treaties in reservations. For instance, between 1871 and 1928, the
federal government engaged in a policy of Allotments and Assimilation in which land held
in trust for tribes and their members was divided in allotments and distributed to
individual households in an effort to encourage Native Americans to assimilate into
American society. The years 1945-1961 marked The Termination Period, during which
time the federal government attempted to end the status of Indians as wards of the
government and integrate them as separate individuals into American society. The Era of
Self-Determination, which repudiated previous policies and has carried forward to the
present, originated in 1971 in the Nixon Administration in response to Termination. For a
discussion of the history of shifting federal policy, see David H. Getches et al., Cases and
Materials on Federal Indian Law 41-257 (4th ed., West 1998).
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injuries like torts, violations of civil rights, or breach of contract.
At the same time, tribes are not necessarily well-served either by
rejecting altogether opportunities for judicial redress. In fact, grave
harm to the long-term sustainability of tribal sovereignty can be inflicted
by tribes whose policies and officers may perpetuate abusive and
discriminatory practices and where no remedies may be available at law
to address these practices. Tribes who have not elected to provide some
form of judicial remedy to ensure compliance with important civil and
human rights, or who do not yet provide opportunities for redress to
persons injured by their policies and officers, would do well to implement
some form of process and checks on tribal exercise of power. Those who
have provided some form of redress should take the opportunity to re-
examine their systems and laws, including those related to coordinating
services and insurance coverage with the federal government. Failure to
develop and refine some type of working means through which people
may seek redress from and demand accountability from tribal
governments may contribute to the disenfranchisement of members
necessary to the long-term sustainability of tribal sovereignty. It may
cause them to seek homes and livelihoods in other places, thereby
contributing to the exodus of members, their assimilation in other
places, and the eventual weakening of tribal culture. It may cause the
legitimacy of tribal justice systems to be compromised, undermining
people's respect for, participation in, and reliance upon their own justice
systems. Finally, it might also discourage outside entities from
contracting with the tribe for critical services or business opportunities,
or it may hinder tribes' ability to recruit and retain skilled and ethical
employees and officers.
In implementing and revising appropriate systems and remedies,
tribes have an obligation-morally as well as for the sake of sustaining
their powers of self-governance and their economic viability-to restore
harmony or otherwise make remedies available to people injured by the
exercise of tribes' sovereign authority. Remedies might include monetary
damages or other culturally appropriate means of restoring those who
have been unjustly or unlawfully injured by tribes. Additionally, they
should include some mechanism for enjoining government policies or
activities likely to inflict future harm and for replacing harmful practices
with newer, fairer governmental policies and systems. Tribes, however,
by virtue of their separate sovereignty and diverse cultural heritages, are
uniquely situated to develop innovative approaches to resolving disputes
and enhancing government accountability and effectiveness. Whatever
the solutions that they generate, one would hope that they would
encourage business and economic development in Indian nations while
contributing to the development of legal systems, rules, and
jurisprudential norms that nurture sovereignty and preserve the dignity,
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health, and safety of tribal members. The federal government-by
virtue of its trust relationship with American Indian tribes and their
members -should support tribes in that endeavor.
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